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ABSTRACT 
 
“A GOOD PLACE TO MAKE MONEY”: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHARLOTTE 
Julia Elizabeth Gunn 
Thomas J. Sugrue  
 
 North Carolina, long regarded as among the most politically progressive states in 
the American South, has also maintained the lowest union membership rate in the nation. 
This dissertation attempts to explain this paradox by examining civil rights, labor, and the 
politics of economic development in Charlotte—a city that would eventually become the 
nation’s second largest banking center after New York. In recent years, civil rights 
scholarship has focused increased attention on the movement’s emphasis on economic 
justice. At the same time, labor and business historians have become interested in the role 
of business interest groups in undermining organized labor and the New Deal order. This 
dissertation bridges these two often-divergent bodies of scholarship by looking at public 
employee unionism, the politics of racial moderation, and the development of pro-
business governance in the urban South. Public employees became the face of the 
American labor movement in the second half of the twentieth century, yet surprisingly 
little has been written on them—an oversight especially pronounced in literature on the 
Sunbelt. However, the fates of public and private sector workers were deeply intertwined 
and telling the story of one without the other leaves an incomplete narrative of post-
World War II labor history. One only has to examine the primary opponents of public 
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sector unions—businessmen and their organizations—to appreciate that even if public 
workers were not waging war against capitalism, capitalists were nonetheless waging war 
against the public sector. Drawing on labor union records, government documents, court 
cases, personal papers, newspapers and oral histories, this dissertation argues that the 
same politics of moderation that stymied civil rights activism in North Carolina became 
an indispensable tool for undermining and neutralizing organized labor and worker 
protest in Charlotte. Through the lens of public employee unions and the campaigns 
waged against them, this study traces the evolution of racially moderate, anti-union 
politics that have fundamentally reshaped the American political landscape. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
viii 
	  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………...IV 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... VII 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
From “Union Bosses” to Chamber Bosses: The Charlotte Bus Strike of  
1958, Public Workers, and the Politics of Anti-Unionism …………..……….…………17 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
“Just Enough to Keep the Match from Being Struck”  
The Shaping of the Civil Rights Landscape in Charlotte………………………………..62 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
“Time to Turn Down the Heat”:  
Julius Chambers, the Firefighters Assembly, and Public Worker Unrest……………...101 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
“These Damned Lawyers and Their Consultants”:  
The Remaking of Anti-Union Politics in 1970s Charlotte……………………………..154 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
Sunbelt Booms in the Age of Austerity………………………………………………...206 
 
EPILOGUE……………………………………………………………………………..236 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1	  
	  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1964, Charlotte journalist Harry Golden remarked, “[Charlotteans] would elect 
Martin [Luther] King or Malcolm X mayor if somehow one of them could give them a 
guarantee of no labor unions and no minimum wage for laundry workers.”1 Though 
something of an exaggeration, Golden’s comment intended to highlight the contrast 
between the city’s seeming progressiveness on civil rights issues and its steadfast 
opposition to organized labor. Charlotte had garnered its reputation as a bastion for 
Southern progressivism by avoiding the racial clashes that had engulfed cities like 
Birmingham and Little Rock. The city served as a national model for school busing 
efforts in the 1970s, and in 1983 it distinguished itself as the first large white-majority 
city in the South to elect a black mayor, architect Harvey Gantt. Yet, at the same time, 
Charlotte became the financial capital of a right-to-work state with the lowest rate of 
union membership in the nation.2 North Carolina remains also—specifically because of 
events that occurred in Charlotte in the late 1950s—one of only three right-to-work states 
that prohibit all public sector bargaining.3 Although better known in recent scholarship as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Pat Watters, “Charlotte” (Atlanta: SRC, 1964), 76.  
2 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2011, North Carolina’s union membership rate was 
2.9% and the national average was 11.8%. See Bureau of Labor Statistics Press Release, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t01.htm. On union density rates over the past 50 years, see 
Leo Troy and Neil Sheflin, Union Sourcebook: Membership, Structure, Finance, Directory (West 
Orange: New Jersey, 1985).   
3 The other right-to-work states that prohibit all public sector collective bargaining are South Carolina 
and Virginia. Texas and Georgia also enacted prohibitive legislation, but created an exemption for 
police and firefighters. Tennessee case law has determined public sector bargaining to be illegal, but 
the state legislature has exempted public school teachers. Milla Sanes and John Schmitt, “Regulation 
of Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the States,” Center for Economic and Policy Research 
Report, March 2014, http://www.cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf (Accessed 15 
August 2014). 
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the site of the landmark Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971) 
school desegregation case, Charlotte also provides a useful lens through which to view 
post-World War II era contests over labor, civil rights, and economic development.4 
Eventually becoming the nation’s second largest banking center by assets after New 
York, Charlotte is well situated to shed light on a strain of pro-business, anti-labor 
politics that has come to dominate the American political scene.  
* * * 
 Since political scientist V. O. Key famously described North Carolina as the most 
politically progressive state south of the Mason-Dixon Line, scholars have debated to 
what extent the Tar Heel State deserves that reputation.5 Nearly three decades after Key, 
Jack Bass and Walter De Vries characterized the state as having “evolved into a 
progressive myth that remains accepted as fact by much of the state’s native leadership, 
despite ample evidence to the contrary.”6 William Chafe extends the critique in his 
seminal study of the black freedom struggle in civil rights era Greensboro, arguing that 
the state’s “politics of moderation” was more stylistic than substantive, and at odds with 
black political aspirations: “By renouncing the harsh language of massive resistance, 
white leaders believed, they could reinforce the progressive image of their city and state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 On school desegregation, see, for example, Stephen Samuel Smith, Boom for Whom? Education, 
Desegregation and Development in Charlotte (Albany, New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2004); Davison O. Douglas, Reading, Writing and Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte 
Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Frye Gaillard, The Dream Long 
Deferred (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).  
5 V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), ch. 4-10.  
6 Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and 
Political Consequence Since 1945 (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1976), 221. 
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and, at the same time, alter only minimally the racial status quo.”7 North Carolina’s 
politics of moderation included “an insistence on defining the world in polar opposites, 
both of which made the middle seem automatically reasonable and just.”8 In many 
instances, North Carolina’s leaders did just enough to hold disorder at bay. 
 In the years since Chafe’s Civility and Civil Rights was published, scholarship on 
the Sunbelt has illustrated the ways in which business boosters used the politics of racial 
moderation to attract Northern industry and capital investment. Matthew Lassiter has 
described this political formulation as the “Sunbelt Synthesis”—“a booster vision 
designed to transcend the burdens of the region’s history through the twin pillars of rapid 
economic development and enforced racial harmony.”9 In Atlanta, business-minded 
white and black civic leaders desegregated the city’s buses, libraries, airports, and other 
public spaces—leading Mayor William Hartsfield to famously boast that his was “the city 
too busy to hate.” However, according to Kevin Kruse, “The idea of ‘the city too busy to 
hate’ was invented and sustained by a moderate coalition born not out of chance but 
through careful calculation.” Despite the fact that some white politicians and corporate 
leaders may likely have held segregationist ideals in private, these pragmatic men 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina and the Black Struggle 
for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 7.  
8 Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 7. 
9 Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 11. Legal historian Davison Douglas also shows how the state’s 
politics of moderation influenced its reaction to the Brown decision: “North Carolina’s ‘moderate’ 
response to Brown did not open the doors of the state’s white schools to black children. By engaging 
in well-publicized but decidedly token, integration, North Carolina managed to maintain an almost 
completely segregated school system for the first decade after Brown.” Douglas, Reading, Writing and 
Race, 26. 
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“discovered to their delight that progressive politics—or the appearance of it at least—
resulted in economic progress and profits.”10   
In Charlotte, civic leaders likewise understood that in order for the city to become 
a national center of finance, it must embrace the politics of racial moderation. As 
economist Gavin Wright and political scientist Stephen Smith have shown, such moves 
proved tremendously beneficial for economic growth. Wright explains how 
“desegregation opened clogged channels for outside investment in the region,” 
encouraging major national corporations such as IBM to open offices in Charlotte.11 For 
this reason, it is impossible to understand Charlotte’s transition into a national financial 
capital without first understanding the policies of racial moderation that encouraged this 
vast influx of capital. 
 From the early 1950s through the late 1980s, a biracial—though unequal—
coalition of affluent whites from southeast Charlotte and African Americans from the 
northwest section of the city governed Charlotte, with a cadre of elites representing both 
groups. The city’s at-large voting system necessitated such a political alliance because 
neither group could fully govern without the assent of the other.12 Unlike Atlanta, which 
had gained a black majority by 1970, the proportion of blacks in Charlotte’s population 
remained fairly constant between 1970 and 2000, only increasing from 30 to 33 percent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 41.  
11 Gavin Wright, Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution in the American 
South (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 210.  
12 In cities with at-large city council elections, all councilmembers are elected by entire city, rather by 
districts or wards. In Charlotte’s at-large system, the top seven finishers were given seats on city 
council. 
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over the three decades.13 Black political representation and by extension, power, relied on 
cooperation with white leaders in business and government. Also influential in the city’s 
political trajectory were North Carolina’s aggressive annexation laws, which allowed the 
city of Charlotte to acquire economically prosperous, mostly white outlying areas while 
maintaining essentially the same racial balance for the better part of the twentieth 
century.14 Because Charlotte never approached having a black voting majority, its 
trajectory resembles national political trends more than that of other seemingly similar 
southern cities, such as Atlanta.  
 Like Atlanta, however, Charlotte’s governing coalition was unified by pro-
growth, neo-Keynesian ideals typical of the era. The city’s business and political leaders 
maintained a shared faith that continual economic growth would eventually solve 
problems of poverty, underemployment and unemployment.15 Assumptions of perpetual 
economic expansion and America’s unrivaled economic strength shaped not only U.S. 
foreign trade policy during this period but also informed approaches to social issues, such 
as civil rights. According to Judith Stein, the neo-Keynesian consensus viewed racially 
discriminatory hiring policies as incompatible with a growth agenda because segregation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This coalition remained, though somewhat battered, through the election and reelection of Harvey 
Gantt, who left office in 1987. Smith, Boom for Whom? 24-44. 
14 The most substantial demographic change came near the end of the twentieth century, when Latino 
immigrants began to constitute an increasingly substantial portion of the population. During the 1990s, 
Charlotte’s Latino population increased 600 percent and between 1990 and 2005, North Carolina saw 
a 394 percent increase in its Latino population. Smith, Boom for Whom? 24. For more on Latino 
immigration into Charlotte, see Jose L. S. Gamez, “Mi Rena: Latino Landscapes in the Queen City 
(Charlotte, N.C.)” in William Graves and Heather A. Smith, eds. Charlotte, NC: The Evolution of a 
New South City (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 263-283.  
15 Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 153-164; Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social 
Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth Century US History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 144.  
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“interfered with the proper functioning of the labor market.”16 In Charlotte, this mindset 
translated into an economic boom that trickled down largely to the city’s financiers, 
lawyers, real estate developers and associated industries. 
 As in other Sunbelt cities, Charlotte’s business leaders historically dominated 
local politics.17 These civic boosters spent much of the twentieth century obsessed with 
the city’s national image, working tirelessly to distinguish their city from other 
southeastern “Ch” cities like Charleston, South Carolina or Charlottesville, Virginia.18 
Lacking Charleston’s historic charm and Charlottesville’s college town advantages, 
Charlotte’s leaders set out to put their city on the map by transforming it from a regional 
trading hub into an international center of finance.19 So great were their efforts that one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Market-based arguments for affirmative action would have little effect on industries collapsing 
because of the deindustrialization of the United States, however. The “notion of affluence” ignored 
broader structural economic transformations occurring in the mid-1960s and workplace desegregation 
would have limited influence on equality in an economy where jobs were disappearing. In the 
Carolina Piedmont, for example, American foreign trade policies eventually enabled the decline of the 
region’s textile sector due to a flood of imports from across the globe, prompting mills to move abroad 
in search of cheaper labor. Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America: Race, Economic Policy, and 
the Decline of Liberalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 4. On the collapse 
of the textile industry in the Carolina Piedmont, see Timothy J. Minchin, Empty Mills: The Fight 
Against Imports and the Decline of the U.S. Textile Industry (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2013); Marko Maunula, Guten Tag, Y’all: Globalization and the South Carolina 
Piedmont, 1950-2000 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009),ch. 2. 
17 On other Sunbelt cities, see Bruce J. Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, 
Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980 (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1994); James C. Cobb, The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial 
Development, 1936-90 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982); Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt 
Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Kruse, White Flight.  
18 Lassiter, Searching for Respect, 25. 
19 The most detailed study of Charlotte’s development in the first half of the twentieth century is 
Thomas W. Hanchett’s Sorting Out the New South City: Race, Class, and Urban Development in 
Charlotte, 1875-1975 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1998). Also see political 
scientist Stephen Samuel Smith’s excellent Boom for Whom? Education, Desegregation and 
Development in Charlotte, which examines the relationship between school desegregation and 
economic development policies in Charlotte. Also on Charlotte’s development in this period, see 
selected chapters in Charlotte, NC: The Global Evolution of a New South City, ed. William Graves 
and Heather A. Smith (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010).    
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visiting journalist famously observed, “Charlotte . . . may edge out Dallas and Atlanta as 
home to the purest strain ever discovered of the Southern booster gene.”20  
Charlotte’s civic promotion resulted from and, in turn, fostered deep ties between 
business and city government. Between 1935 and 1979, every mayor of Charlotte, with 
only one exception, had been either the president or owner of his own business. Many of 
these men came directly from the Chamber of Commerce boardroom. Serving as the 
chairman of Charlotte’s Chamber of Commerce virtually guaranteed a mayoral 
candidate’s win, as was the case for Stanford Brookshire and John Belk, Charlotte’s 
longest serving mayors in the twentieth century. Many in the city were proud of the 
Chamber’s prominent role in city politics. Not least among these were the editors of the 
city’s morning and evening newspapers, the Charlotte Observer and Charlotte News. 
“Some towns are run by one man, some by a handful of men,” boasted the Observer’s 
editorial staff in 1960, “Not Charlotte . . . Charlotte is run, primarily and well, by the 
Chamber of Commerce . . . We are pleased to acknowledge its bossism and to wish it 
continued health.”21 By the early 1970s, the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce had 
adopted what one visiting journalist described as “the world’s bluntest Chamber of 
Commerce slogan”: “Charlotte: A Good Place to Make Money.”22 The business 
community’s influence in Charlotte, however, had more serious implications than 
regrettable Chamber of Commerce slogans. In striving to create the political and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Peter Applebome, Dixie Rising: How the South is Shaping American Values, Politics and Culture 
(New York: Times Books, 1996), 153.   
21 “Guess Who’s Boss of Our Town,” Charlotte Observer, 12 February 1960. This use of the term 
“bossism” may have been inspired, at least in small part, by the recent defeat of union “bosses” 
through the 1959 public worker union ban.  
22 Applebome, Dixie Rising, 154; this overview of Charlotte politics draws on Smith, Boom for 
Whom? 23-55. 
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economic climate most hospitable to business, Charlotte’s leaders worked to create a city 
free of organized labor. The influence business organizations wielded over labor 
legislation in North Carolina was not lost on the state’s union leaders. During the 1958 
North Carolina AFL-CIO Convention, for example, one national labor leader described 
Charlotte as “the seat of more vicious anti-union propaganda than any other city of the 
United States of America.”23  
 This dissertation sits at the intersection of several fields of scholarship including 
postwar labor history, the development of the Sunbelt, civil rights politics, and late 
twentieth century political economy and the emergence of neoliberalism. In the second 
half of the twentieth century, public workers—a major focus of this dissertation—would 
become the face of the American labor movement. From the early 1960s to the early 
1990s, government employee union density increased from just below 13 percent to 
almost 40 percent while private sector union density dropped from more than 33 percent 
to less than 12 percent over roughly the same period. 24 By 2013, nearly half of union 
members nationwide were public employees, despite representing a much smaller sector 
of the American workforce.25 Yet, with a few notable exceptions, scholarship on public 
worker unions remains thin.26 Part of this neglect likely stems from a relatively small 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Statement by Chicago AFL-CIO Regional Director Eugene Moats, Proceedings of the First Annual 
Convention of the North Carolina State AFL-CIO for 1958, Held in Charlotte March 19-21 (Raleigh: 
Edwards and Broughton, Co., 1958), 120.   
24 Joseph E. Slater, Public Workers: Government Employee Unions, the Law, and the State, 1900-
1962 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 1.   
25 See Bureau of Labor Statistics Press Release, “Union Members—2013,” 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
26  Important exceptions include Slater, Public Workers; Richard B. Freeman, “Unionism Comes to 
the Public Sector,” Journal of Economic Literature 24 (March 1986): 43; Joseph A. McCartin, 
“Bringing the State’s Workers In: Time to Rectify an Imbalanced US Labor Historiography,” Labor 
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public sector in the first half of the twentieth century combined with public workers’ 
exclusion from the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)—more commonly known 
as the Wagner Act—which protects the rights of private sector workers to join unions, 
bargain collectively, and declare strikes.27 In 1959, however, Wisconsin became the first 
state to grant organizational and “proto-bargaining rights” to public workers and in 1962, 
President John F. Kennedy granted limited bargaining rights to federal workers through 
Executive Order 10988.28 In the years that followed, however, public workers’ ranks and 
militancy grew tremendously, thus challenging the declension narrative of post-World 
War II American labor history.  
By including public employee unions in the narrative of the postwar era, as 
Joseph McCartin and Joseph Slater have argued, the trajectory and composition of labor 
union activism looks substantially different. Instead of viewing the 1950s as the high 
water mark for organized labor and the period that followed as one of decline, the years 
between the 1960s and 1980s witnessed substantial growth in public sector union 
numbers, percentages of the total union numbers, and general public sector political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
History 47 (February 2006): 73-94; Joseph A. McCartin, “A Wagner Act for Public Employees: 
Labor’s Deferred Dream and the Rise of Conservatism, 1970-1977,” Journal of American History 95 
(June 2008): 123-48; Margaret C. Rung, Servants of the State: Managing Diversity and Democracy in 
the Federal Workforce, 1933-1953 (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 2002); Joseph A. 
McCartin, Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike that Changed 
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Frances Ryan, AFSCME’s Philadelphia Story: 
Municipal Workers and Urban Power in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: Temple University, 
2011).  
27 Due to the power of Southern Democrats in Congress, the Wagner Act also excluded domestic and 
agricultural workers. The exclusion of public sector workers, however, had bipartisan support, 
including that of President Roosevelt. See Slater, Public Workers, 90-91; Boris and Klein, Caring for 
America, 24. 
28 On Wisconsin’s law, see Slater, Public Workers, 158-192.  
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activism. 29 In addition to seeing a more militant labor movement, centering government 
workers and their unions also reveals a labor movement that is increasingly composed of 
black and female workers. In short, excavating the history of public sector workers is 
crucial to a comprehensive understanding of twentieth-century America. 
 Attention to public worker unions in the post-World War II era is also important 
because assaults on both the public sector and organized labor became integral to 
dismantling the New Deal order. Attacks on public worker unions—which represented 
both labor and the state—should figure centrally in the historiography of the business-led 
assault on the New Deal and the rise of the New Right. Nevertheless, the otherwise 
robust body of scholarship on American conservatism has largely overlooked public 
employee unions—an oversight especially pronounced in literature on the Sunbelt.30 In 
the Sunbelt as elsewhere, however, the fates of public and private sector workers were 
deeply interconnected and to tell the story of one without the other leaves an incomplete 
narrative of postwar labor history. For example, one only has to examine the primary 
opponents of public sector unions—businessmen and their organizations—to appreciate 
that even if public workers were not waging war against capitalism, capitalists were 
nonetheless waging war against the public sector. As anti-public sector unionism became 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 McCartin, “Bringing the State’s Workers Back In;” Slater, Public Workers. 
30 For example, a recent edited collection on the Sunbelt, Sunbelt Rising, overlooks public sector 
workers entirely. Another recent edited volume, The Right and Labor in America, includes an 
excellent essay by Joseph A. McCartin and Jean-Christian Vinel on the Sunbelt origins of one strand 
of anti-public sector union ideology, but it does not include any discussion of the workers themselves. 
Michelle Nickerson and Darren Dochuk, Sunbelt Rising: The Politics of Place, Space and Region 
(Philadelphia, 2011); Joseph McCartin and Jean-Christian Vinel, “’Compulsory Unionism’: Sylvester 
Petro and the Career of an Anti-Union idea, 1957-1987” in The Right and Labor in America: Politics, 
Ideology, and Imagination, eds. Nelson Lichtenstein and Elizabeth Tandy Shermer (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 226-251.  
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one of the Sunbelt’s most successful ideological exports to the rest of the nation in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century, historians interested in both the Sunbelt and 
twentieth century political economy would be wise to refocus their attention on public 
workers and the campaigns waged against them.   
 Examining the battles over public employee unions also reveals a more complete 
picture of how North Carolina became—and has remained—the least unionized state in 
the nation. Most North Carolina labor histories focus primarily on rural struggles, with a 
heavy bent towards the state’s textile mills.31 This is somewhat understandable, given that 
for much of the late nineteenth and twentieth century, textile mills dominated the state’s 
manufacturing sector and mill owners were unrivalled in their opposition to organized 
labor. The labor struggles in and around the Piedmont are essential to understanding 
American labor history. By the 1970s however, when the textile industry began to 
collapse and mill labor became a dwindling sector of the state’s economy and labor force, 
textile industrialists’ opposition to unions no longer sufficiently explains North 
Carolina’s low union rates or the state’s contribution to anti-labor ideology. Instead, as I 
argue in chapter four, it is important to look at Charlotte, the state‘s largest urban area 
and emerging financial capital in order to understand the persistence of anti-unionism in 
North Carolina.32   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 There are exceptions, of course, such as Robert Korstad’s Civil Rights Unionism, but such examples 
to not challenge the larger point that the power of textile mills has often been used to explain North 
Carolina’s persistent anti-unionism. Robert Korstad, Civil Rights Unionism: Tobacco Workers and the 
Struggle for Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth Century South (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003). 
32 Despite the importance of labor to understanding Charlotte’s development and, in turn, the 
importance of Charlotte to the state’s anti-union stance, existing scholarship on Charlotte has all but 
ignored organized labor. The most recent anthology on Charlotte, for example, relegates discussion of 
unions to two sentences on NASCAR Charlotte, NC, 85. 
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 This dissertation also contributes to recent scholarly debates on neoliberalism, late 
capitalism, and modern political economy. Much recent scholarship on the emergence of 
neoliberalism focuses on international policy, right-wing think tanks, or events in 
northern cities, such as the fiscal crisis in New York, to explain the rise of this 
phenomenon.33 As Nancy MacLean has argued, however, understanding the origins of 
American neoliberalism requires looking south: “No better tutors could be found than 
conservative southern elites for what David Harvey depicts as the core project of 
neoliberalism: the reassertion of class power in its rawest form so as to reduce everything 
to a commodity, especially labor, in the quest to free capital of social obligations and 
political constraint.”34 Similarly, Elizabeth Tandy Shermer’s work on the Phoenix 
businessmen’s efforts to use the state to undermine unions, lower taxes, and decrease 
regulations suggests that scholars should also look south and west to understand the 
origins and development of neoliberal ideology and practice. My dissertation contributes 
to this endeavor in showing how Charlotte became a laboratory for neoliberal labor-
relations ideology in the 1970s.   
 This dissertation also engages scholarship on the War on Poverty and black 
politics in the civil rights era South. It draws on political scientist Preston Smith’s 
distinction between “racial democracy” – the idea that all races should share proportional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Joshua B. Freeman, Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since World War II (New York: New 
Press, 2000), chapter 15; Jason Hackworth, The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology and 
Development in American Urbanism  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); David Harvey, A Brief 
History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
34 Nancy MacLean, “Southern Dominance in Borrowed Language: The Regional Origins of American 
Neoliberalism,” in New Landscapes of Inequality, ed. Micaela di Leonardo and Jane Collins (Santa 
Fe: School of American Research, 2007).    
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access to essential social goods — and “social democracy”— that individuals should 
have equal access irrespective of social class —as a way of explaining Charlotte’s 
politics during the 1960s.35  The city’s biracial civic leadership’s adoption of a racial 
democracy framework converged with changing ideas at both the local and national level 
about the relationship between the state and poverty, employment, and economic growth. 
At the same time that it reinforced Charlotte’s well-cultivated image of a progressive 
Sunbelt metropolis, the dominance of the racial democracy framework served to 
undermine social democracy arguments. Consequently, this often meant that the interests 
of the civic and professional class displaced those of the city’s working classes.  
*** 
 The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter One explores Charlotte’s 
long history of labor activism. It begins by charting the city’s labor history from a 
streetcar strike in 1919 through the General Strike of 1934 and Operation Dixie in the 
mid-1940s. It then examines a series of strikes in Charlotte in 1958 and 1959 and the 
resulting campaign by the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce in 1959 to ban all public 
employees from collective bargaining and police and firefighters from unionizing 
entirely. Within the context of growing support for the rights of public workers 
nationwide, Chapter One examines the political power that Charlotte’s Chamber of 
Commerce wielded to shape both local and state laws in their interests and, in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Preston H. Smith, “The Quest for Racial Democracy: Black Civic Ideology and Housing Interests in 
Postwar Chicago,” Journal of Urban History, Vol. 26 No. 2 (January 2000), 133-4. Smith expands on 
this framework in Racial Democracy and the Black Metropolis: Housing Policy in Postwar Chicago 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2012). 
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process, shape the fates of workers throughout the state for the remainder of the 
twentieth century. Although this chapter concerns the primarily white and male workers 
who filled Charlotte’s union halls during the first half of the twentieth century, mid- 
twentieth century Charlotte’s contests over organized labor have had important 
implications for African American and female workers as public jobs became integral to 
these groups’ economic mobility in the following decades.36  
Chapter Two examines civil rights era politics in Charlotte using both “racial 
democracy” and “the politics of moderation” as an organizing framework. During the 
early 1960s, unionization struggles in the city faded to the background—in large part 
because of the 1959 ban—and civil rights struggles took center stage. In response to 
pressure from black activists and fearful of attracting negative attention to the growing 
Sunbelt metropolis, Charlotte’s Chamber of Commerce joined with civic leaders in 
spearheading the peaceful desegregation of the city’s public establishments, winning the 
city substantial praise on the national political scene for racial moderation and “peaceful 
race relations.” The chapter then turns to civil rights and anti-poverty activism in 
Charlotte, and specifically, the efforts of Charlotte’s domestic workers to improve their 
wages and working conditions with the help of the Charlotte Area Fund (CAF), a wing of 
the pioneering North Carolina Fund. While the North Carolina Fund’s creation signaled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 As Michael Katz and Mark Stern have shown, public sector work, which they argue became 
“African Americans’ distinctive occupational niche,” became crucial for black and female economic 
mobility in the second half of the twentieth century. Though fewer than 15 percent of African 
American women worked in government-related jobs in 1950, this number had almost tripled to 43 
percent by 2000, with public jobs paying significantly more than the private sector. For an overview 
of the significance of public employment to African American economic mobility in the second half 
of the twentieth century, see Michael B. Katz and Mark J. Stern, One Nation Indivisible: What 
America Was and What It Is Becoming (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 91-95.  
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an important achievement in efforts to combat southern poverty, the North Carolina Fund 
also had its limitations, some of which become evident by looking at the CAF. This 
chapter follows CAF staff, local activists, domestic workers, business leaders and elected 
officials as they debate poverty and inequality, revealing how the politics of racial 
moderation benefited the city’s civic elites but also stymied challenges to the prevailing 
economic order. 
 Chapter three examines public employee activism in Charlotte in the late 1960s in 
the wake of North Carolina’s 1959 ban on police and firefighter unions and public sector 
collective bargaining. It examines the events surrounding the city’s all-white firefighters 
union to hire the state’s preeminent black civil rights attorney, Julius Chambers, to 
challenge the ban in federal district court in 1969. In so doing, the chapter reveals a 
history of white working class political activism in postwar urban South not captured by 
narratives of Massive Resistance and the Silent Majority. The chapter also examines 
efforts by the city’s poorly paid and predominantly black sanitation workers to organize 
and exert influence on the city to raise wages and improve working conditions. It shows 
how city leaders’ embrace of racial moderation both enabled initial gains for sanitation 
workers while thwarting substantive challenges to anti-labor politics in the city.   
Chapter Four tells the story of how local and national political interests converged 
as the city of Charlotte became an innovative center of the anti-union ideology in the 
1970s. The city’s history during this decade also brings together many important strands 
of 1970s political economy, including financialization, anti-public unionism, private 
sector union-busting campaigns, and the emergence of neoliberal politics. It was during 
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this decade that Charlotte’s rise as a financial center and its anti-union activism became 
mutually reinforcing. This chapter traces the evolution of anti-labor politics in Charlotte 
in the 1970s. It examines the career of Edward J. Dowd, Jr., an important yet almost 
entirely overlooked figure who helped solidify Charlotte’s anti-union position in the face 
of growing labor militancy in the city and across the state. From relatively humble origins 
as executive secretary of an employers association, he helped reframed anti-unionism into 
a “progressive” and “modern” ideology, spread these new ideas to national organizations, 
and in so doing, became an important innovator in the 1970s assault on organized labor.  
 The dissertation’s final chapter explores the political and economic development 
of Charlotte in the late 1970s and 1980s. Specifically, the chapter examines black reverse 
migration and the implications this demographic phenomenon had for black politics and 
Charlotte’s growing black professional class. During this period, the city’s decades-long 
emphasis on racial democracy and elite-led, growth-oriented politics culminated in the 
1983 election of Harvey Gantt, the city’s first black mayor. It also explores the continued 
ascendance of Charlotte’s financial industry and the central role banks played in driving 
the redevelopment of downtown Charlotte. In conclusion, this dissertation offers a brief 
discussion of the Democratic National Committee’s decision to hold its 2012 national 
convention in Charlotte, the financial capital of the least unionized state in America. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
From “Union Bosses” to Chamber Bosses: The Charlotte Bus Strike of 1958,  
Public Workers, and the Politics of Anti-Unionism 
 
 
 On March 19, 1958, the North Carolina AFL-CIO held its first annual convention 
in downtown Charlotte since the merger of the state’s two houses of labor the previous 
year.37 Among the first speakers to welcome this assembly of union leaders was 
Charlotte’s Chamber of Commerce president, publisher Thomas L. Robinson. Robinson 
told the crowd, “Labor has played a very significant part in the development of this great 
state. In fact, without the… relentless work of your labor groups we could not possibly 
have achieved the standard of living and the substantial gains which have been made in 
recent years in this great state of North Carolina.”38 Although at the time, it was 
unremarkable for civic leaders such as the Chamber of Commerce president to address a 
convention of this size, Robinson’s remarks would carry special significance in the 
period that followed. Within the span of a few months, the city of Charlotte would 
become embroiled in a battle between city and state officials, business leaders, and labor 
unions over the rights of both public and private workers to organize and bargain 
collectively.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The national AFL and CIO merged in 1955, but the state affiliate did not formally merge until 1957.  
According to local labor leader Floyd Henderson, the Mecklenburg County Council (CIO) and the 
Charlotte Labor Council (AFL) “effectively carried out the spirit of the national merger” on 30 April 
1957.  See J. Floyd Henderson to Charles R. Brockman 5 August 1960, “Trade Union Movement: 
Charlotte and Mecklenburg County,” Charlotte Trade Unions Clippings File, Robinson-Spangler 
North Carolina Room, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Public Library (hereafter CMPL). 
38 Proceedings of the First Annual Convention of the North Carolina State AFL-CIO for 1958, Held in 
Charlotte March 19-21 (Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton, Co., 1958), 3.     
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 These confrontations culminated in an effective Chamber of Commerce-led 
campaign to persuade the Charlotte city council to ban municipal employees’ unions. 
The ban solidified a power dynamic in Charlotte politics that flowed directly from the 
Chamber’s boardroom to city council and on to the mayor—a dynamic that had 
disastrous consequences for both the city’s unionized and non-unionized workers. The 
Chamber’s actions, moreover, had political implications that extended beyond the local 
level. Attempts to organize city workers and the ensuing Charlotte municipal employee 
ban, along with a prolonged textile strike elsewhere in the state, prompted the North 
Carolina General Assembly to pass legislation in 1959, HB 95-98, prohibiting all public 
employees from collective bargaining and banning police and firefighters from 
unionizing entirely. Although the latter portion of the legislation was overturned a 
decade later, the public employee collective bargaining ban has remained intact for more 
than five decades, fundamentally shaping and constraining the options for workers 
throughout the state of North Carolina.  
 These events occurred at an important turning point for the nation’s public 
workers, whose numbers had grown dramatically in the post-World War II years. In the 
two and a half decades following the war, state and city employee rosters tripled, while 
federal worker numbers doubled. Though excluded from the Wagner Act’s collective 
bargaining protections, public worker activism increased across the nation in the late 
1950s, especially in larger cities. For example, in 1958, due to growing activism on the 
part of the city’s sanitation workers, bus drivers, social workers, teachers, police officers, 
and firemen and with pressure from AFSCME, New York City mayor Robert Wagner, 
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Jr. granted city workers the right to organize and bargain collectively. The following 
year, Wisconsin became the first state to recognize public sector bargaining rights and in 
1962, President John F. Kennedy extended bargaining rights to federal employees 
through Executive Order 10988.39 As this chapter elucidates, however, Charlotte and the 
state of North Carolina chose a decidedly different path, passing some of the most 
stringent restrictions on public workers in the nation. 
 This chapter begins by exploring Charlotte’s history of organized labor in the first 
half of the twentieth century in order to put the events of the late 1950s into a broader 
historical context. Specifically, the chapter looks at an explosive streetcar workers strike 
in 1919, textile mill unionism in the 1930s, and Operation Dixie efforts in the Carolina 
Piedmont. It then turns to struggles over public employee unionism in late 1950s 
Charlotte, showing the ways in which the business community, and especially the 
Chamber of Commerce, exerted considerable political influence during this period over 
the fate of the city’s working class. This chapter illustrates how the city of Charlotte 
experimented with various responses to organized labor before ultimately settling upon a 
course of legislative action intended to prevent unions from gaining political traction in 
the second half of the twentieth century.  
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Organized Labor in the Carolina Piedmont  
 By the middle of the twentieth century, Charlotte emerged as a city steadfast in 
its opposition to organized labor. This path, however, was not inevitable. Instead, the 
first decades of the twentieth century were marked by workers’ repeated attempts to gain 
union recognition, increase wages and benefits, and improve overall working conditions. 
Charlotte’s predicament at midcentury was decades in the making, much of which can be 
traced to the emergence of the state’s textile industry, which dominated the political 
economy of the region surrounding Charlotte for the better part of the twentieth century. 
Often referred to as the Carolina Piedmont, this region of North Carolina was ideally 
situated for textile production. It contained flat expanses of land suitable for constructing 
large factories, abundant rivers to provide hydroelectric power, and an almost entirely 
non-unionized labor force, consisting primarily of women and children, willing to work 
for substantially less than their northern counterparts. 40 Though cotton mills in the 
region dated to the early 19th century, the industry took off between the 1880s and the 
1920s when area industrialists began erecting mills modeled after and intended to 
compete with those in the Northeast. The Charlotte Cotton Mill, for example, which 
opened its doors in 1880, was a single-story brick building outfitted with ventilation 
skylights, walls of windows, and modern machinery purchased from Northern 
manufacturers. Within a few years of opening, the mill was turning out profits of $155 
dollars per day—profits that amounted to nearly two and half times that of the $60 per 
day it cost to operate the mill.  
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 Following the success and profitability of the Charlotte Cotton Mill, other textile 
mills soon opened, leading to substantial economic growth in the region. Also following 
the pattern of Northern industry, many of Charlotte’s textile mill owners constructed mill 
villages in which millhands and their families would reside.41 By the turn of the 
twentieth century, the Piedmont had become the state’s industrial and economic center. 
The growth of the region’s textile industry enticed Northern investors to open mills in the 
Piedmont and by 1927, the South had supplanted New England as the nation’s largest 
textile producer, putting Charlotte “at the center of a textile manufacturing territory 
having 770 mills…and consuming more cotton than any other section of the world.”42 
According to Charlotte historian Tom Hanchett, North Carolina’s “leaders (and many 
ordinary folks) felt that cheap labor was the only way that [the state] could compete with 
more advanced and more capitalized regions. The alternative to low wages was not 
higher wages, in their minds, but instead a non-industrialized wasteland.”43 In the era 
before American textile manufacturers began outsourcing production across international 
borders and oceans, the Carolina Piedmont was America’s Mexico.44 
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 As a result, this period of unprecedented economic growth in the Carolina 
Piedmont witnessed a consolidation of power in the hands of an overconfident and 
paternalistic merchant and manufacturing class that traveled the nation proudly 
marketing their low-wage, non-unionized, and purportedly docile workforce. Duke 
Power advertised, “The birth rate of the Carolinas is the highest in the United States. 
Already a second generation of textile workers has come along, and in many older textile 
centers a third generation has grown up.” 45  Another industrialist boasted of “willing 
labor, unhampered by any artificial restrictions on output.” 46 It would not be long, 
however, before labor conflicts undermined the message of North Carolina’s 
industrialists and manufacturers.   
 Among the lowest paid industrial workers in the nation, Piedmont workers would 
face an uphill battle in improving their economic circumstances throughout the twentieth 
century. The first set of contests occurred when Charlotte’s millworkers and streetcar 
drivers went on strike in response to post-World War I cuts in hours and wages. Like 
cities across the nation, Charlotte witnessed significant labor unrest during the economic 
recession following the war.47 In May of 1919, 150 workers at two of the city’s Highland 
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Park Mill plants walked off the job protesting the elimination of wartime bonuses and the 
implementation of a four-day workweek, which decreased workers’ total weekly wages. 
Following the walkout, most of the strikers joined the United Textile Workers. Refusing 
to negotiate with union labor, Highland Park’s management closed both plants and 
evicted workers and their families from company-owned houses. Workers responded by 
forming armed patrols to protect their homes and property. The strike lasted longer than 
either labor or management anticipated and, as it stretched into its third month, 
Charlotte’s mayor, Frank McNinch, called on the state’s governor, Thomas Bickett, to 
mediate. As area industrialists watched carefully to see how the state’s leadership would 
respond, North Carolina’s politically moderate governor supported the strikers, much to 
the chagrin of Highland Park management. A lawyer by training from the eastern part of 
the state, Bickett had few debts to Piedmont textile manufacturers and supported the 
rights of industrial workers to organize.48 “This position on the part of the mill owners is 
unwise, unjust, and cannot be maintained. Labor has just as much right to organize as 
capital,” proclaimed the Governor. “This right—the right of collective bargaining on the 
part of labor—is recognized by every civilized government in the world.” Bickett called 
for moderation on the part of management and labor:  
When the mill owners discharged the operatives because they joined a 
union,  they resorted to force and not to reason to sustain their position. A 
lockout is war—industrial war waged by organized capital against labor. 
A walkout is war waged by organized labor against capital…In the case of 
a walkout or a lockout each side is trying to starve the other side into 
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submission to its will…The only hope for better conditions, for enduring 
peace, is for labor and capital to stand together in a spirit of mutual 
helpfulness.49    
Governor Bickett concluded by issuing a stern warning to Highland Park management, “I 
give my solemn warning that the full power of the State will be exerted to protect any 
man who wants to work, and any one who shall dare to interfere with a willing worker 
will do so at his peril.”50 Shortly thereafter, pressure from state authorities combined 
with higher cotton prices to persuade management to reach an agreement with workers.51 
Piedmont workers, at least for a moment, had captured some degree of control over their 
working conditions. In their landmark study of millworkers in the Carolina Piedmont, 
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall et. al. characterize the settlement as a “watershed in southern labor 
relations.”52  
 Within a few months of the Highland Park strike’s resolution, Charlotte’s 
streetcar workers also declared a strike. This came on the heels of the Amalgamated 
Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees decade-long campaign to unionize 
streetcar workers in Charlotte, Winston-Salem, and Greenville, South Carolina. Although 
the union’s campaign initially met with limited success, Charlotte’s streetcar workers’ 
mounting frustration with their working conditions converged with general unrest during 
the summer of 1919. On August 10, 1919, Southern Public Utilities (SPUCo.) workers in 
Charlotte went on strike, hoping to win higher wages and official union recognition. 
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Numbering in the hundreds, the streetcar workers gained the support of thousands of 
Piedmont millworkers, many of whom had likely participated in strikes during the 
preceding months.53 Not long after the strike began, SPUCo.’s management raised the 
stakes by hiring strikebreakers. Solidarity among the city’s white working classes 
materialized as thousands of textile workers assembled outside SPUCo.’s streetcar barn 
on the evening of August 25 to support the strikers. Just before midnight, police officers 
and armed strikebreakers opened fire into the large crowd, killing five men and 
wounding twenty more. Within days, national guardsmen were patrolling Charlotte’s 
streets and SPUCo.’s employees had returned to work by the beginning of September, 
demoralized by the city’s and their employer’s response as well as the lack of substantive 
redress for their losses.54  
In a few short years, following other failed strikes in Spartanburg and Columbia, 
South Carolina, streetcar unions in the Carolinas dwindled and many disappeared. One 
SPUCo. conductor explained that participants in the 1919 strike were “advised not to say 
too much about it in order to prevent younger employees from ‘getting ideas’ about 
unionism.”55 SPUCo., on the other hand, emerged from the strikes stronger than ever. 
Renamed to honor founder James B. Duke in 1927, Duke Power eventually became the 
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largest electric power holding company in the nation. Charlotte’s industrial leaders and 
civic boosters demonstrated collective amnesia toward the incident and, over time, the 
1919 streetcar strike would become a forgotten chapter in the city’s history.56  
 Organized labor in the Carolina Piedmont faced resounding defeats in the years 
that followed. By 1921, textile workers throughout the area had lost virtually all World 
War I-era gains.57 The Great Depression exacerbated their plight and in 1934, Piedmont 
laborers joined more than 400,000 textile workers across the nation in a general strike, 
which was the largest single-industry strike to date. Largely self-organized, the General 
Strike of 1934 was marked by repeated incidents of violent repression of unionists. In 
the Carolina Piedmont, the escalation of violence and intimidation reached its zenith at 
the Chiquola Mill in Honea Path, South Carolina on September 6, 1934 when factory 
guards shot and killed seven factory workers and injured 20 more.58 Though the strike 
ended roughly three weeks after it began, management’s retaliation had more lasting 
consequences. Workers across the South were refused jobs when they returned to the 
mills, evicted from company-owned houses, and blacklisted from future employment. 
The strike had been a decided failure. “Millhands learned from their history, and in 
1934 the lesson for many was deep distrust of government and trade unions alike,” 
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explains Jacquelyn Dowd Hall. “Above all, the General Strike drove home the cost of 
challenging the established order. Better the familiar security of job and home than ‘air 
and promises,’ followed by exile, suffering and defeat.”59  
 If the General Strike of 1934 signaled the end of an era for organized labor in the 
South, then its death throes lasted for more than two decades. This trajectory, however, 
was not readily apparent to labor organizers operating on the ground as World War II-
era wage increases and growing union rosters breathed new life into industrial unionism. 
Between 1932 and 1945, union membership across the United States increased from 
under 3 million to 14.5 million and, in 1945 unions won 82.9 percent of the nearly 5,000 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections held.60 By the end of the war, the 
CIO had an estimated 225,000 members in southern states.61 Small signs of progress 
were also evident at the local level. During the 1930s and 1940s, Charlotte became 
home to the Charlotte Labor Journal and Dixie Farm News, an American Federation of 
Labor (AFL) newspaper dedicated to “presenting news and views without fear and 
without favor.”62 For a subscription of two dollars per year, union members received a 
weekly newspaper supported by advertisements from local businesses and filled with 
articles and editorials detailing labor’s accomplishments across the state and nation. 
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However, indicative of the changing political landscape for organized labor in Charlotte 
in the years to come, the newspaper was out of business by Labor Day 1953.  
Labor’s unprecedented gains during the Second World War gave union leaders a 
renewed determination that they could finally breach the anti-union South. Labor’s 
optimism best manifested itself in Operation Dixie, the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations’ (CIO) campaign launched in 1946 to add millions of southern industrial 
workers to union rosters.63 Operation Dixie targeted a variety of industries, but focused 
most of its financial resources and manpower on the textile industry, still the South’s 
largest employer. As textile manufacturing continued migrating to Southern states, it 
became imperative for unions to protect the contract gains of their membership base in 
other parts of the nation. According to Robert Zieger, Operation Dixie differed from 
previous campaigns in that it “abjured the fiery rhetoric and provocative tactics of the 
1930s and attempted to divert attention from racial matters.”64 Moreover, explains 
Zieger, “the privileging of textiles, the marginalization of the left, and the relegation of 
blacks to a subsidiary role shaped every aspect of the campaign.”65 The CIO’s 
intentionally moderate approach yielded few results and the forces operating against 
southern workers proved insurmountable. The TWUA, for example, spent more than two 
years and four million dollars to gain only an additional 15,000 members. Operation 
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Dixie, like it predecessors, was unable to crack the Carolina Piedmont’s enduring anti-
union edifice. In short, the campaign was an expensive failure.66 
 In addition to the internal forces Zieger offers to explain Operation Dixie’s 
defeat, other scholars have highlighted the significance of social and economic 
transformations occurring in postwar America. Timothy Minchin emphasizes how 
millworkers’ improved standard of living in the postwar era, combined with textile 
management raising wages to stave off unionization, made it difficult for labor 
organizers to convince workers that unions could benefit them. “Management was able 
to harness the war-induced prosperity far more effectively that the TWUA was,” asserts 
Minchin, “and it was this ability that accounted for its continued hegemony over the 
union in these years.” 67 In an era of growing consumer affluence where textile workers 
drove cars and owned television sets, it became ever more challenging to convince them 
they should put it all on the line to join the union. 
 In 1947, North Carolina joined ten other Sunbelt states in passing “right-to-work” 
legislation that created a new series of obstacles for organized labor.68 Such legislation 
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emerged as the result of section 14b of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which allowed 
individual states to pass legislation banning the “union shop”—the condition whereby 
unions and employers were prohibited from making union membership a requirement for 
employment.69 While such legislation generally did not imperil unions that were already 
strong, it made organizing new unions more difficult as workers who decided not to join 
unions could still take advantage of union-negotiated wages, contracts and benefits. This 
“free-rider” problem made it doubly challenging for labor organizers to convince 
workers to join unions in states already hostile towards organized labor as those same 
workers could reap the benefits of membership without paying the dues. Within a decade 
of such legislation being passed, the percentage of the workforce belonging to unions in 
many “right-to-work” states began to decline.  
At the same time that organized labor struggled to overcome this legacy of defeat, 
Charlotte’s bankers, merchants, manufacturers, and real estate developers had never been 
better off. The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond had recently opened a branch in 
Charlotte, making it the region’s financial center and the city was able to sustain 
substantial economic growth throughout the post-World War II era. Manufacturing, 
wholesaling, transportation and banking provided a diversified economic base for the 
city, which meant that the textile industry’s decline after the Second World War did not 
hurt Charlotte’s economy to the same degree that it did other textile-heavy cities.70  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Constitutional Amendments in Effect as of January 1, 2009. <http://www.dol.gov/whd/state 
righttowork.htm (accessed 10 September 2012)>. 
69 The “union shop” which requires union membership upon hire, varies slightly from the “closed 
shop,” which makes union membership a prerequisite for employment.    
70 Hanchett, Sorting Out the New South City, 225-6.   
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 North Carolina’s elected officials and businessmen joined Governor Luther 
Hodges—the self-described “businessman in the statehouse”—in scouring the nation in 
pursuit of new industry to recruit to the Tar Heel State.71 Hodges relished the title of 
“industry hunter” as he restructured the state’s tax code to be more business-friendly and 
touted the state’s achievements with full-page advertisements in national publications 
like the Wall Street Journal.72 Unsatisfied with the promotion of his achievements in 
print alone, Hodges recruited a team of the state’s most successful salesmen to travel 
with him to New York to publicize the state’s economic advantages and its people who 
were “anxious to work and interested in their jobs.” Hodges extended his marketing tour 
to Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Chicago, hoping business leaders would interpret North 
Carolinians’ “anxious[ness] to work” to mean that the state was not burdened with strong 
labor unions and their capacity to hamper productivity or profits.73   
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Governor of North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962).  For more on 
industrial recruitment to the South, see Cobb, The Selling of the South; Schulman, From Cotton Belt to 
Sunbelt and, most recently, Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, “Sunbelt Boosterism: Industrial Recruitment, 
Economic Development, and Growth Politics in the Developing Sunbelt,” in Sunbelt Rising: The 
Politics of Place, Space and Region, eds. Michelle Nickerson and Darren Dochuck (Philadelphia: 
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72 Hodges, Businessman in the Statehouse, 29.    
73 Hodges, Businessman in the Statehouse, 61. Hodges was interesting, howev  er, because at the same 
time he abhorred labor unions, he also advocated raising the state’s minimum wage, which was among 
the lowest in the nation when he took office. Addressing the Southern Garment Manufacturers 
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ed., Messages, Addresses and Papers of Governor Luther Hartwell Hodges, Volume I, 1954-6 
(Raleigh, 1960), 186. 
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The Herald of 1958: The Charlotte Bus Strike  
Within months of Charlotte’s Chamber of Commerce president praising 
organized labor’s contributions to state prosperity at the 1958 AFL-CIO convention, both 
public and private workers became engaged in a series of highly publicized and 
contentious labor disputes with the city. The first among these conflicts involved the 
city’s bus drivers and mechanics who staged a nearly month-long strike in October of 
1958. At issue were the workers’ wages and job security, but also at stake was 
determining what role the city would take in mediating a labor dispute between a private 
company and its employees. Perhaps most importantly, this transportation strike would 
inform the way that Charlotte’s Chamber of Commerce, city council, and mayor would 
react to public workers attempting to unionize a few months later.   
Like many southern cities during this era, Charlotte did not have publicly funded 
mass transit. Instead, the city leased franchise rights to City Coach Lines, Inc., which 
was headquartered in Detroit but operated buses in municipalities across the nation. In 
Charlotte, City Coach operated 97 buses estimated to have transported more than 25,000 
riders per day, a substantial portion of the city’s population.74 A step ahead of public 
employees, the city’s drivers and mechanics had been unionized since 1909 and in early 
September 1958, representatives of the International Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 
Local 1038 began renegotiating the contracts of its 140 bus drivers and 25 mechanics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 It was estimated that buses had 52,000 ticketed rides per day, but it is reasonable to assume that the 
average rider made two trips per day. See Lu Stanton, “52,000 Bus Riders Had to Find New Way to 
Go,” Charlotte News, 8 November 1976.   
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that were set to expire in October. 75 After nearly a month of negotiations between City 
Coach and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, a compromise between the company 
and the union eventually hinged on the union’s demand for a two-year contract and a 20-
cent per hour increase from the current wage of  $1.57 for drivers and $1.92 for 
mechanics. National Deputy President of the union, W.F. Lester, who had come to 
negotiate on behalf of local 1038, argued that these improvements would make 
Charlotte’s wages and benefits comparable with other southern cities. City Coach’s vice 
president, Merl C. Morrow, who had also come to Charlotte from Detroit to negotiate on 
behalf of the company, rejected these demands, maintaining that the company was only 
willing to offer was a 3-cent per hour cost of living raise. The company hoped this 
increase would be just enough to stave off a strike. The union, however, found such a 
modest increase insufficient. In the second round of negotiations, Lester stated that Local 
1038 would be willing to accept a two-year contract composed of a 10-cent increase the 
first year and a 5-cent increase the second but City Coach again declined their offer. This 
time, the company countered with a one-year contract, but stuck to the 3-cent cost of 
living increase despite Lester and other union representatives’ avowal that this was still 
insufficient to avoid a strike. Neglecting the fact that progress was at a standstill and a 
citywide transit strike was imminent, Morrow returned to Detroit, signaling that upper 
management had made its final offer. 76   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 J. Floyd Henderson to Charles R. Brockman, 5 August 1960, “Trade Union Movement: Charlotte 
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76 Don Seaver, “Unions Threatens Bus Strike on Wednesday,” Charlotte Observer, 28 September 
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 As the strike deadline approached, city officials made clear that they would not 
intervene in what they considered to be a decidedly private matter.77 The dispute became 
more than a private affair, however, on the morning of October 1 when City Coach’s 
buses remained in their lot behind locked gates. The strike captured the Charlotte 
Observer’s front-page headline in an article highlighting the absence of picket lines, thus 
implying that Charlotte’s workers were not inclined to public displays of labor unrest. 
However, given the highly visible nature of a transit strike, picket lines were almost 
beside the point. Local 1038 had all the publicity it needed. Streets were without buses, 
bus stops void of waiting passengers, and automobile traffic in this normally quiet city 
congested many of the city’s major thoroughfares. Also affected were thousands of city 
school children who relied on the 40 additional buses City Coach operated during the 
school year, as Charlotte lacked a publicly funded school bus fleet.78 Hardest hit were 
domestic workers, the vast majority of whom were left stranded miles from the 
neighborhoods where they worked. The Charlotte News also fomented concern that the 
strike would prevent thousands of city residents from attending Billy Graham’s upcoming 
crusade, set to begin the same day as the strike, although union representatives had 
already released a statement that as “a Christian organization,” union drivers were 
“willing and anxious” to transport crusade participants free of charge.79  
 In the first week of the strike, Charlotte’s city council and the mayor stuck to 
their “hands off” policy. However, with the capacity to directly affect a wide swath of 
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78 “Stranded Charlotteans Begin Looking for Transportation,” Charlotte Observer, 1 October 1958.   
79 “City Bus Strike Deadline Nears,” Charlotte News, 30 September 1958.   
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the public, mass transit strikes inevitably create a sense of urgency and as the strike 
moved into its second week with no compromise in sight, the city’s position became 
increasingly difficult to maintain. The situation became even more tenuous as City 
Coach management began publicly lashing out at striking workers.  Speaking with 
reporters, one spokesman for the company charged that union members were content 
being out of work because many had taken side jobs as cab drivers and others had leased 
their cars to cab companies. The City Coach representative also chided the men for 
“allowing” their wives to work. 80 Union representatives were quick to respond to these 
attacks, however. Speaking with reporters for the Charlotte Observer, Lester said, “I 
can’t blame the boys for holding other jobs and letting their wives work. It’s the only 
way they could live on the wages they’ve been getting. And if some of them are acting as 
cab drivers, well, I’m glad to see them get a buck or two.”81Despite daily meetings 
between union representatives, company management and city officials, negotiations 
remained deadlocked well into the middle of October. In an effort to use what leverage it 
could, City Coach began threatening service cutbacks if the union did not end the strike 
immediately.82  
 Mounting hostility between City Coach and its workers, combined with growing 
public frustration, eventually forced city council to address the strike. This time they 
took a more public stance, passing a resolution requesting that City Coach’s general 
manager, Merle Morrow, return to Charlotte immediately to resume negotiations. 
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81 Ibid. 
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Councilmembers, the mayor and the city attorney expressed frustration that City Coach’s 
leadership did not believe the strike was pressing enough to warrant their full attention.83 
Still, Charlotte’s mayor, James Smith, took an ambivalent position towards the strike. On 
the one hand, he created an “Emergency Advisory Committee” and appointed none other 
than Chamber of Commerce president, Thomas L. Robinson, to chair the new body.84 On 
the other hand, Smith resisted clamping down on the strikers, recalling his experience of 
living through Charlotte’s violent streetcar strike of 1919 to explain his position to the 
city council. Smith reminded his colleagues that the oft-forgotten streetcar strike was “a 
horrible experience” and one that had convinced him that the only way to handle labor-
management issues, from a governing perspective, was through persuasion, not heavy-
handed tactics.85   
After another week of buses at a standstill, Mayor Smith and the city council held 
a series of emergency meetings and Morrow eventually bowed to pressure from the city 
and returned to Charlotte on October 23 to continue strike negotiations. Mayor Smith 
also threatened to call on North Carolina’s governor, Luther Hodges, to intervene.86 
Unlike governor Bickett a generation before, Hodges’s antipathy toward organized labor 
was well known throughout the state, signaling to the union that the city’s hands-off 
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approach might have an expiration date. In response, City Coach and union 
representatives held a series of meetings with negotiations hinging primarily on two 
issues: the second phase pay raise and whether the company would agree to rehire all 
drivers and mechanics employed when the strike began.87 After two tense days of 
negotiations, City Coach and union representatives finally reached an agreement. On the 
morning of October 25, Local 1038 voted by a wide margin to accept a three-phase 
contract whereby drivers and mechanics would receive three 4-cent hourly wage 
increases spread out over the following twelve months. Additionally, City Coach agreed 
that all striking mechanics and drivers would return to work, despite Morrow’s repeated 
insistence that the company could not afford to rehire all employees.88 As the final piece 
of the negotiations package with City Coach employees, union members were able to 
retain all fringe benefits they had enjoyed previously.   
Although the bus strike ended peacefully and strikers won modest gains, this 
episode had a lasting influence on elected officials, business leaders, and city residents. 
In the future, city council and the Chamber of Commerce would become more proactive 
in shaping labor policy in the city as a response, in part, to the frustration city residents 
expressed with how the strike progressed. Some argued ownership of city buses should 
be made public. “Isn’t the bus strike ample proof that the problem of public 
transportation in Charlotte is no longer a business for private enterprise,” wrote Charlotte 
resident Charles Manchester to the Charlotte Observer, “but rather, like water-supply; 
fire and police protection; health and sanitation—a department of city operation? Many 
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cities have already come to this.”89 Another reader pleaded with city officials to “Kill—
their—franchise; the public, the citizens, should not be made to suffer for [an] argument 
of this nature between people of that type and unions.”90 Others advocated legislation to 
prevent transportation workers from striking.91 This final suggestion, as it turned out, 
would be the path the city ultimately chose.   
 
Lessons Learned: Municipal Organizing Efforts  
  Less than two months after the City Coach bus strike ended, Charlotte again 
found itself at the center of labor tensions, this time over the right of municipal 
employees to join unions. Still licking its wounds from the disappointments of Operation 
Dixie, the recently merged AFL-CIO had once again set its sights on organizing workers 
across the North Carolina Piedmont.92 Between 1957 and 1959, labor organizers 
managed to bolster their ranks with broad sectors of public employees—from sanitation 
workers to law enforcement officers and firefighters—but municipal workers’ right to 
remain unionized came under attack from elected officials, business leaders, and the 
city’s newspapers. These contests, although seemingly minor at first, would escalate and 
shape both local and state labor policy for the remainder of the twentieth century.   
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Movement: Charlotte and Mecklenburg County,” Charlotte Trade Unions Clippings File, CMPL. 
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 In order to understand the conflict, it is useful to look at the American Federation 
of State, County and Municipal Employees’ (AFSCME) campaign to organize city 
workers in the summer of 1957.  AFSCME’s campaign was a response to more than 200 
garbage collectors who had recently staged two spontaneous work stoppages to protest 
the city granting raises to police and firefighters while neglecting all other employees.93  
Sanitation workers were among the city’s lowest paid workers, with more than half being 
African American. Drivers of the trucks, who were invariably white, had a starting salary 
of $225 per month that reached a ceiling of $291 per month after 25 years’ service while 
black workers received a fraction of this, with their pay starting at $182 per month. From 
these low wages, workers were then responsible for paying taxes, hospitalization 
insurance, and (for drivers) liability insurance that covered the use of city equipment. 
After these deductions, average take-home pay for most city workers was $150 or less 
per month.94 The recent garbage strikes, albeit brief, made AFSCME organizers 
optimistic that the city’s sanitation workers, and hopefully other public workers, might 
be receptive to unionizing. H. L. McCrorie, a city employee with more than twenty years 
of experience as a labor organizer in Charlotte, led the campaign which specifically 
targeted employees of the Motor Transport Department (primarily the city’s garbage 
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workers within the department), the Street Maintenance Division of the City Engineering 
Department, the Signal Department, and the Water Department field employees. 95  
 Throughout the summer, AFSCME held a series of informational meetings at the 
AFL-CIO’s Labor Temple to enlist new members. It was primarily employees of the 
motor transport and street maintenance department who attended these meetings, as 
organizers had predicted.96 AFSCME reported that by mid-summer, more than 140 city 
employees had signed union cards and consented to paycheck deductions. At one of 
these meetings, the president of the Charlotte firefighters’ union, Jim Long, spoke to city 
workers about the benefits of organizing.97 Long told the approximately twenty white 
and forty black workers in attendance about his union’s success in lowering firefighters’ 
average week’s work from 84 to 60 hours a week, a substantial decrease for another 
group of overworked and underpaid city workers. “Had we not been organized and had 
some way of collectively bargaining,” explained Long, “I don’t think we would have had 
too much of a chance.”98 Municipal workers officially organized as AFSCME Local 984 
and were chartered in August of 1957. By November, they had negotiated a grievance 
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procedure, a wage increase and a three-dollar per month payroll deduction that would go 
towards life insurance policies for all members.99   
At the same time, two interrelated AFL-CIO developments on the national level 
threatened AFSCME’s success in Charlotte. The first issue involved the AFL-CIO’s 
recent expulsion of the Teamsters on charges of corruption in December of 1957. The 
AFL-CIO maintained that the Teamsters’ expulsion was an act of self-preservation, but 
this action had detrimental financial consequences for the many remaining unions.100 
With one of the largest dues-generating unions gone, the AFL-CIO had to find a way to 
finance organizing campaigns, especially those already fragile ones in southern states, on 
a budget that was now ten percent smaller.101 The second issue occurred a month later, in 
January 1958, when the AFL-CIO’s removed 100 of its 215 field organizers.102 All of 
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helped conservatives win a new round of legislative restrictions on organized labor in the form of the 
1959 Landrum-Griffin Act. See David Witwer, “The Racketeer Menace and Anti-Unionism in the 
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these organizers were fired, transferred, or forced into early retirement. The union also 
dismissed five of its ten North Carolina organizers, including Bob Christofferson, who 
had organized Charlotte’s municipal workers.103 The AFL-CIO was embarking on a new, 
expensive public relations campaign and argued it could no longer afford to employ so 
many field organizers without Teamster dues.104 This explanation, however, rang hollow 
to Christofferson and other organizers who believed that these firings were in retaliation 
to the recently formed union of labor organizers, the Field Representatives Federation 
(FRF). Christofferson, who served as the FRF’s secretary treasurer, and Albert Bradt, the 
union’s chairman, told the New York Times, “Despite the pattern of anti-union behavior 
followed by responsible officials of the AFL-CIO in their dealings with the Field 
Representatives Federation, we are nonetheless shocked by this sudden uprooting 
without cause of so large a number of faithful employes . . . Such treatment of loyal 
employes only serves to dramatize further the very real need for a union of field 
representatives.”105 Even the Charlotte Observer detected the irony: “The world’s most 
powerful labor organization has put in years of acrimonious hair-pulling with 
management to get job security yet it is now seemingly unwilling to offer that same basic 
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benefits to its own employees.”106 Ultimately, the NLRB ruled in favor of the field 
organizers, declaring that there was “no incompatibility between faithful performance of 
duty” and union membership. The episode undermined the AFL-CIO’s attempts to 
improve its image, despite the organization’s recently launched public relations 
campaign.107 The NLRB’s decision also did nothing to reverse the AFL-CIO’s decision 
to cut its field staff in half, diminishing an already fragile organizing force in the state of 
North Carolina.   
Notwithstanding these setbacks, the remaining organizers in Charlotte pressed 
ahead in attempting to unionize other sectors of Charlotte’s municipal workers.  This 
time they set their sights on the city’s police force. While organizing Charlotte’s 
sanitation workers did not elicit substantial opposition from city leaders, the creation of a 
police union was a different matter altogether. One of the most vocal adversaries was the 
police chief himself, Frank Littlejohn, who had successfully barred labor organizers from 
the halls of Charlotte’s police stations for the entirety of his career.108 The International 
Association of Police Chiefs (IAPC) agreed, highlighting tensions between the rank-and-
file and those in leadership positions. Fortunately for AFSCME, however, its attempt to 
unionize the city’s police officers coincided with Chief Littlejohn’s retirement in 1958.109 
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Littlejohn’s successor, E.C. Selvey, took a more neutral stance and within a year of his 
arrival, many of the city’s police officers joined the recently chartered AFSCME Local 
1492. However, the union had limitations from the outset as its charter prohibited 
striking, collective bargaining, and the use of a national union to bargain on behalf of its 
members. While the strike ban was common for police and firefighter unions, the 
elimination of bargaining reduced the union to little more than a fraternal organization 
offering life insurance and a few other modest benefits to its membership.110  
Nonetheless, despite its relative weakness, Charlotte’s police union faced 
opposition from all sides. In December of 1958, the Chamber of Commerce’s Board of 
Directors passed a resolution calling on city council to forbid police officers and all other 
municipal employees from unionizing. According to the resolution: 
We believe it to be fundamentally important in any community that 
governmental employees shall be neutral and impartial. Certainly this is 
an absolute essential as to those who enforce the law. Controversies in 
the field of labor relations have a widening impact not only upon the 
employers and employees and labor unions directly involved, but also 
upon the general public.  Such controversies sometimes result in strikes 
and picketing, which in turn may be accompanied by high tension, 
violations of law, and breaches of peace and violence… 
The unionization of our police department has disturbed the community 
and is a threat to its continued good order and effective law 
enforcement… 
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It is further resolved that the Charlotte City Council and the Mecklenburg 
County Commissioners be respectfully requested to make it known 
officially to all employees of the City and County that their becoming 
aligned with a labor union is not in the public interest.111  
The Chamber of Commerce worried that a police union would jeopardize one of its most 
vital instruments of labor control. They argued that union membership created a conflict 
of interest for the city’s law enforcement officers since a unionized police force might 
sympathize with the strikers they would be ordered to disperse, intimidate, or arrest. 
Observer columnist Joe Doster best articulated this hypothetical scenario when he 
rhetorically asked, “Would a policeman walk a beat to maintain peaceful picketing 
during duty hours and then join the strikers to walk the picket line at night?”112 These 
concerns were disingenuous, however, given that the police union had a no-strike clause 
written into its charter. Moreover, the police union drafted a letter to the Observer, which 
unequivocally reiterated the union’s policy of requiring members to follow orders “fairly 
and impartially.”113  
The Chamber’s resolution received broad support, though a few members voiced 
concerns about the resolution’s expansive language. “It would be more effective to 
confine this to the police,” asserted A. Stokes King, a local Southern Bell telephone 
executive. “When you scatter shots you’re going to meet with more resistance.”114 
Despite King’s protestations, however, the Chamber moved forward with the terms of 
the resolution. The Chamber’s Board of Directors then sent its resolution to Charlotte’s 
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city manager, Henry Yancey, and county commission chairman Sid McAden, who 
agreed they would present the resolution to their respective boards. “Labor unions are all 
right in their place,” asserted McAden, “but they have no place in any police force.”115  
 In addition to opposition from the chamber, unions and their organizers also had 
to contend with interference from anti-labor organizations posing as legitimate labor 
unions. The most pernicious of these in Charlotte was the United Southern Employees 
Association (USEA).116 Based in Rock Hill, South Carolina and with small chapters 
throughout the Piedmont, USEA leaders attempted to attract white workers to this self-
described “Southern Man’s Union” with the promise that it would remain a segregated 
organization.117 Also hoping to stir up anti-communism, one pamphlet distributed to city 
workers claimed, “All the [AFL-CIO] wants is to collect dues from you so they can use 
the money to stir up race trouble between the races which is in harmony with the 
Communist plan.”118 The USEA, however, ultimately gained little traction among 
Charlotte’s municipal workers as they discovered that the USEA offered little in the way 
of actual, work-related benefits, despite its claims. This held true outside of Charlotte, as 
well. According to economist Ray Marshall, “The USEA apparently generated more 
publicity than collective bargaining contracts. It was temporarily active in many places 
but it never succeeded in winning bargaining rights or apparently in establishing 
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permanent labor unions.”119 One AFL-CIO organizer at the time charged, “This 
organization, we find, had no workers, no contracts, and the two locals are in name only 
and just on paper.”120 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) agreed. In 1960, the 
NLRB ordered, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld, “the disestablishment of 
the USEA as a labor organization and require[d] it to cease and desist from engaging in 
employer-dominated activities, maintaining agreements with employers, and restraining 
employees.”121 
 The city’s newspapers, too, railed against the police union. Like many southern 
newspapers during this era, the Charlotte Observer and Charlotte News were only too 
happy to ridicule unions and their perceived influence on the city.122 The Charlotte 
Observer was hardly an impartial party, as it had recently been dealing with an attempt 
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by the Teamsters to organize the paper’s drivers and truck-loaders.123 In editorials and 
news items, staff writers criticized organized labor with charges of corruption, bloated 
budgets, and being a general danger to American economic prosperity. Some columnists 
asserted that unions held disproportionate power in labor negotiations, creating an 
uneven playing field on which business could not fairly compete. In effect, the 
newspaper portrayed industry as the underdog. One editorial demanded, “If unions can 
help each other win strikes, why can’t employers do the same?”124 The editors argued 
that businesses should organize themselves and work collectively to protect against 
labor’s “excesses.” In the same way that members of one union do not cross a picket line 
of another, went the argument, business leaders should show solidarity toward one 
another, working collectively against organized labor and if one company’s workers 
threatened to strike, then other companies within the same industry should threaten a 
preemptive shutdown in retaliation. 125 The Observer also missed no opportunity to 
equate alleged Teamster corruption with union operations in general and in late 1958, ran 
a four part series “investigating” the union drives with a byline describing the series as 
“an attempt to determine whether Jimmy Hoffa’s Teamsters Union is trying to take over 
at City Hall.”126  With such pressure from the city’s newspapers, as well as the Chamber 
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of Commerce and municipal officials, it became increasingly difficult for the Charlotte 
city council to ignore the issue of a unionized police force. 
 
A Disproportionate Response: The City and State Ban Public Union Collective 
Bargaining  
On New Year’s Eve of 1958, Charlotte city councilman Steve Dellinger 
presented his colleagues with a resolution banning all municipal employees from joining 
unions. Dellinger referenced recent allegations against the Teamsters to drum up fear of 
union corruption and warned fellow council members that “whether you like it or not, the 
thing that is now going on in New York is not going to stop there. It is coming to 
Charlotte.” 127 Some of Dellinger’s colleagues, however, were unwilling to support this 
broadly anti-labor resolution. Councilmembers Martha Evans, Claude Albea, and H.H. 
Baxter indicated that they would not support this resolution should it come to a vote. 
Evans, Charlotte’s first female city councilwoman and a candidate who had carried all of 
the city’s African American precincts and many white working class ones, called the 
resolution “horribly…dictatorial.” She added, “I think city employees should have the 
right to decide for themselves if they want to join a union.”128 Also during this meeting, 
Floyd Henderson, President of the Charlotte Labor Council, led local labor leaders in 
speaking before the city council in opposition to Dellinger’s broadly conceived 
resolution. All of the labor leaders in attendance were AFL-CIO members who 
encouraged council members to target resolutions at the Teamsters, who the AFL-CIO 
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had recently expelled, rather than penalizing all city workers affiliated with any union. 
“If you want to fight [the Teamsters],” asserted Henderson, “I’ll help you fight them.”129 
The leaders of the police and fire unions also stepped forward to publicly endorse these 
anti-Teamster sentiments. After much deliberation, the council passed a narrower 
resolution that “opposed any organization of any employees by the Teamsters.” Having 
no enforcement mechanism, the resolution served the symbolic function of 
demonstrating the council’s opposition to Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamsters.130   
Many in the business community, however, voiced their dissatisfaction with this 
compromise.  The Charlotte Observer and Chamber of Commerce pressured city council 
to take stronger measures against organized labor. The board of directors of the Charlotte 
Merchants Association also adopted a resolution opposing the police union and called for 
a state law prohibiting police officers from unionizing.131 Three days after the council 
passed its first resolution, the Observer declared, “a policeman’s uniform and a union 
card don’t mix…Attorney General Malcolm Seawell has said clearly that North Carolina 
cities have authority to forbid union membership. This is an issue the Council can’t 
dodge.”132  
The city’s firefighters also found themselves ensnared in the anti-union crusade. 
Members of the business community and some city officials argued that striking 
firefighters, like police officers, were a part of unique category of municipal employees 
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who would present a danger to the public good. As with their law enforcement 
counterparts, however, this was a moot point since the firefighters union, the 
International Association of Firefighters Local 660, included a no-strike clause when it 
was chartered in 1940. The union also provided firefighters with a $5000 insurance 
policy which, given the risks inherent to their line of work, was no minor concern.133  
Labor leaders in Charlotte were outraged by the Chamber’s actions. The president 
of AFSCME Local 984, C.A. Cross, told the press, “The real issue is whether the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants Association are going to be allowed to dictate 
policy to our elected officials.”134 The hypothetical answer seemed to be a resounding 
yes. Cross went on to say, “it is too idealistic to depend solely on a hoped for beneficial 
attitude of public administrators since they are subject to political pressures of such 
groups as the Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants Association.”135 More than 40 
North Carolina labor leaders submitted a letter to the City Council and County 
Commissioners asserting that fears of Charlotte’s firefighters going on strike were 
disingenuous. Instead, they maintained, it demonstrated the business community’s 
resistance to “labor organizations in any form,” demonstrated by the assertion that the 
city’s firefighters had been working “without any conflict of interest or duty” since their 
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union formed more than 18 years ago.136 Some union leaders drew comparisons with 
other fraternal or professional associations, arguing that the city would never win 
widespread support for barring citizens from joining the Freemasons, the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, or the Chamber of Commerce and the police union once again issued a 
public statement to the Charlotte Observer and Charlotte News reminding readers that its 
charter included a no-strike clause.137  Still other labor leaders charged that this move 
was all part of the Chamber’s long-range plan to rid the city of all organized labor and 
make city workers “second-class citizens.”138   
 On January 5, 1959, the Charlotte Labor Council drafted a letter to the mayor, city 
manager, city attorney, county commissioner, and all members of city council expressing 
scorn for private interference in the matter—specifically, the role of the city’s 
newspapers, Chamber of Commerce, and local businesses and business interest groups, 
whose efforts the letter described as “arbitrary, capricious, and dictatorial.” The Labor 
Council accused these entities, especially the Chamber and local businesses, of 
encouraging their members to “impress the governing bodies by mail and other 
communication” in an effort to make their numbers seem larger than they were. These 
groups, argued the Labor Council, “being opposed to labor organizations in any form, 
which they will of course deny, are attempting to use this concerted effort as a means to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Internal memo from North Carolina labor leaders to the national AFSCME Office, 28 December 
1958, AFSCME Office of the Secretary-Treasurer: Gordon Chapman Records, Box 122, Folder 11, 
WPRL.  
137 Statement Released to the Charlotte Observer and Charlotte News by the Charlotte Law 
Enforcement Officers Local 1492,” 3 January 1959, AFSCME Records, Office of the Secretary, Box 
123 Folder 4, WPRL.  
138 “Board to Discuss Unions Resolution,” Charlotte Observer, 5 January 1959; Joe Doster, “City 
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create an unfounded fear and apprehension” of unions in Charlotte. Moreover, the letter 
asserted that business interest groups were trying to use “guilt by association” tactics—
claims that all unions were inherently corrupt because some labor groups had been found 
guilty of mishandling of funds—when the same could be said of businesses. “One could 
… say that because some few business firms have been guilty of … wrongful corrupt 
influence in Government, specific facts of which are common knowledge and can be 
enumerated, that consequently all business firms and management are guilty of such.”139   
Pressure continued to mount and the council convened again on January 9, this 
time passing a resolution prohibiting employees of the police and fire departments from 
forming a union. Councilmen Steve Dellinger, Herbert Baxter, Ernest Foard, and Everett 
Wilkinson voted in favor of the resolution. Claude Albea, a member of the Charlotte 
Labor Council and the city’s only elected representative of organized labor, voted against 
the measure and councilmembers Herman Brown and Martha Evans were absent for the 
vote.140 The resolution required the unions to disband by the first of February.141 North 
Carolina’s Attorney General Malcolm Seawell affirmed the legality of city council’s 
resolution, stating, “Neither the City nor any of its departments of government have any 
right to enter into any collective bargaining agreement dealings with wages, hours, and 
working conditions of any public employees of Charlotte.”  Joining Seawell, the 
Chamber of Commerce and Merchants Association of course praised city council’s 
decision. Sutherland Brown, president of the Merchants Association, said his 
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organization was “delighted at this action” and Chamber of Commerce president Buell 
Duncan called the resolution “a wise move.” Duncan added that Charlotte’s law 
enforcement officers were “now free to look after the welfare of the community without 
any embarrassment whatsoever.”142 What this “embarrassment” might have been remains 
unclear, but the stance of Charlotte’s business leaders was certain: they would not 
tolerate a unionized police department.   
 As these events unfolded, Attorney General Seawell worried unions might 
attempt to use the language of the state’s labor law to defend the rights of labor unions 
(i.e. while workers have the right not to join a union, they also have the right to join a 
union), despite the fact that both unions and their opponents agreed that right-to-work 
legislation’s main purpose was to undermine unions. In other words, Seawell was 
concerned that the language of the law could be used to undermine the intent of the law 
and thus, he tried to circumvent this problem by claiming that public workers were 
precluded from the state’s right-to-work law.143  One Mecklenburg County legislator, 
Representative Frank Snepp, Jr., attempted to clarify the issue through state legislation 
and, together with fellow Mecklenburg County representative Earnest Hicks, introduced 
House Bill 118 on February 19, 1959 before the North Carolina House of 
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Representatives. The bill would outlaw public worker unions and prohibit all public 
employees from collective bargaining with city, county or state government entities.144  
 In response, AFSCME retained Greensboro labor attorney Robert Cahoon to 
advocate on their behalf.  He sent a letter to all members of the state legislature arguing 
that the bill violated both police officers’ First Amendment right to free assembly as well 
as the state’s right-to-work laws. Members of the police union also petitioned the state’s 
legislature, asking that they not “make criminals of us or any public employee.”145   
 HB118 passed its first reading in the House and moved on to the Committee on 
Manufacturers and Labor. The chairman of the committee, Representative Edward 
Wilson of Caswell County, made an important alteration to the bill: he limited the public 
employee ban to just the state’s police officers and firefighters. Some legislators worried 
that the modification would create tension—firefighters were not the same as police and 
should not be unfairly penalized—while others thought the change would make the bill 
more likely to pass since it did not outlaw all public unions. When HB118 reached the 
Senate, the bill drew opposition from a minority camp of legislators. It was public 
employees’ petitions that convinced some lawmakers to vote against the bill. 
Representative Ed Kemp of High Point explained that the deluge of letters from 
Greensboro’s firefighters along with the absence of letters from constituents supporting 
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the bill persuaded him to vote in opposition.146 One senator from eastern North Carolina, 
James Simpkins, argued that the legislation was just another example of the state’s textile 
magnates exerting undue influence on labor legislation. “I’ve got a belly full of Charles 
Cannon telling the General Assembly what to do!” howled Simpkins to his colleagues.147  
Even if Simpkins might have exaggerated his claims, it is useful to consider the 
larger political context in which North Carolina’s General Assembly was debating this 
legislation. Just over forty miles north of the state capital, textile workers at the 
Henderson and Harriet Cotton Mills had been striking for almost eight months, since 
November 1958. The Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) Locals 578 and 584 
declared a strike on behalf of their more than one thousand members after John D. 
Cooper, Jr., president and owner of the mills, eliminated an arbitration clause from the 
union’s pending contract.148 Over the course of the strike, a delivery truck driver was 
beaten, two union members were shot, several bombs exploded in the mill village, and 
TWUA leader Boyd Payton was violently attacked outside his motel room. Despite his 
initial hesitation to intervene, Governor Hodges responded to the escalation by sending 
130 highway patrolmen and then the National Guard into Henderson, which the union 
interpreted as the former textile executive siding with management. By April, it looked 
like both sides had reached an agreement allowing the majority of strikers to return to 
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work at the mill. Almost as soon as they have started, however, talks collapsed when 
millworkers realized that management had only held 30 jobs for them and that the 
remainder would be given to strikebreakers.149  
Unresolved and continuing to garner national attention, the Henderson strike was 
likely on the minds of many North Carolina legislators as they debated HB118.150 The 
issue also weighed heavily on Governor Hodges who later described the episode as “the 
most tragic single matter” he faced during his administration and “a blot on North 
Carolina.”151  
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 Despite some objections, the North Carolina Senate passed HB118 on June 3, 
1959 (now known as General Statute 95-98) with a final vote of 75-31. Governor Hodges 
signed it into law the following day. At the time that the law was passed, firefighters and 
other public workers believed the law was likely unconstitutional. According to 
firefighter Bob Middleton, who joined the department not long after GS 95-98 went into 
effect, “We all knew that [the law] couldn't stand. The Supreme Court had already 
upheld the right for people to belong to the Communist Party, so how in the hell could 
they keep us from belonging to a union?”152 Nevertheless, it would take firefighters in 
Charlotte nearly a decade to muster the considerable resources necessary to challenge the 
city and state ban in federal court. 
 The section of the bill pertaining to the right of police officers and firefighters to 
join unions would be ruled unconstitutional in the years that followed, but the prohibition 
against public sector collective bargaining remains and has continued to shape labor 
relations throughout the state of North Carolina for more than half a century.153 It reads as 
follows:  
Any agreement, or contract, between the governing authority of any city, 
town, county, or other municipality, or between any agency…of the State of 
North Carolina, and any labor union…as bargaining agent for any public 
employees…is hereby declared to be against the public policy of the State, 
illegal, unlawful, void and of no effect…Any violation of the provisions of 
this article is hereby declared to be a misdemeanor…. 
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By February 1960, all of Charlotte’s municipal unions had disbanded.154  
 
Conclusion  
 What a difference a year makes. Just over a year after the North Carolina AFL-
CIO assembled in downtown Charlotte to discuss strategies for bolstering the state’s 
unions, another group congregated downtown to discuss the role of organized labor in 
the city. But unlike the union leaders a year before, these were area businessmen who 
had come downtown to hear a lecture by New York attorney and labor-relations 
consultant Benjamin Werne. Emboldened by their recent legislative victory with HB118, 
Charlotte’s business community was now moving to the offensive and recruiting national 
anti-labor experts to advise them on methods of combating unions and their organizers. 
Despite southerners’ oft heard pronouncements against northern meddling in the 
southern workplace, Charlotte’s business community welcomed such influence if it 
helped them thwart labor unions. 
 Benjamin Werne did not disappoint. A rapt audience listened for more than two 
hours as he recounted experiences working in one of the most heavily unionized cities 
(and states) in the nation. Painting a somber picture of a business’s future once its 
workers unionized, Werne offered a variety of maneuvers for avoiding, obstructing, and 
defeating organized labor. He warned against the dangers of shortsightedness, 
rhetorically asking his audience, “Do [you] want to be crippled for a short period of time, 
or crippled for the rest of [your] life [by a union]?” To this end, employers should devise 
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delay tactics, such as demanding an NLRB hearing (which often took months or years to 
settle) if they got word that workers were attempting to organize, thus slowing a union’s 
momentum and, hopefully, making workers distrust labor organizers and their 
promises.155 Werne’s recruitment to Charlotte was consistent with larger national trends. 
The late 1950s witnessed a boom in the anti-labor consulting business, one that would 
continue to grow in the decades that followed. This occurred within a larger context of 
business lobbying groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and 
the National Chamber of Commerce, and businesses themselves working to influence 
national social and economic policies as well as popular ideas about business, labor and 
the state.156  
  In spreading the gospel of free enterprise to every segment of society, business 
lobbying groups also took their message into schools, hoping to influence primary school 
students and their teachers as well as university undergraduates and professors.157 In 
Charlotte, the Chamber of Commerce proposed surveying local high school students 
regarding their opinions about corporate profits and right-to-work legislation. Among the 
survey’s questions were: “Should a man be required to join a union to hold a job”—to 
which North Carolina, of course, had already answered a resounding “no.” If the 
Chamber considered students’ answers to “indicate a weakness,” it would then develop 
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courses to remedy the situation, which would be followed with another round of surveys 
to determine “how well the point of view was accepted.”158   
 Business leaders during this period also increasingly called on one another to run 
for political office in order to shape public policy in their favor.159 At the time, some 
business interest groups worried businessmen were not sufficiently interested in political 
office, be it local or national. In an effort to stimulate increased interest in politics among 
Charlotte businessmen, the Chamber of Commerce hired a Davidson College political 
science professor to teach a 9-week “Course in Practical Politics.” In February 1960, 
actor-turned-General Electric spokesman Ronald Reagan reinforced this message to the 
Charlotte Chamber of Commerce. In a talk entitled “Business, Ballots, and Bureaus,” 
Reagan emphasized, “the modern importance of business in politics and government.”160 
Reagan’s audience, however, hardly needed instructions on becoming more involved in 
policymaking. The Chamber of Commerce’s swift and successful crusade to outlaw 
municipal unions exemplifies the effectiveness with which business leaders had 
convinced elected officials that what was good for business was good for Charlotte.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
“Just Enough to Keep the Match from Being Struck”: The Shaping of the Civil 
Rights Landscape in Charlotte 
 
 
 
At the 1964 convention of the North Carolina AFL-CIO, delegates passed a 
resolution endorsing the Civil Rights Act that President Johnson had signed into law just 
two months earlier. John W. Jennings, an African American vice president of the North 
Carolina AFL-CIO and chairman of its Human Relations Committee, drafted language 
recognizing the AFL-CIO’s role “at the forefront of the struggle to end 
discrimination.”161 He called on the state’s Central Labor Councils and union locals to 
“join with other organizations in the field of Civil Rights who are friendly to Labor ... to 
bring an end to discrimination in all its forms because of race, creed, color, or national 
origin.”162 During the discussion of the resolution, the white president of the Charlotte 
Central Labor Council, Floyd Henderson, rose to offer his positive experiences working 
with civil rights activists on political issues. He described a call he had made to Reginald 
Hawkins, a Charlotte dentist and civil rights activist, in the lead-up to a city council 
election.  According to Henderson, Hawkins immediately expressed his eagerness to 
collaborate with organized labor, and from there the two men “started talking about 
politics and the shape we’re both in” and how “all of our problems are economic...they 
stem from the same thing.” 163 During the conversation, they drew connections between 
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the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the labor movement of the 1930s—discussing 
how both shared some of the same protest strategies—and determined that moving 
forward, their respective organizations, the Charlotte Central Labor Council and the 
Mecklenburg Organization for Political Affairs (MOPA), should endorse the same 
candidates. Within this civil rights-labor alliance, Henderson believed Hawkins and his 
organization maintained the upper hand, and often called on them to help labor gain 
influence in dealing with local elected officials. “When I have a problem with the city 
councilmen or county commissions, I call Doc [Hawkins],” Henderson told his fellow 
labor delegates. “I say, ‘Doc, see if you can help me out a little bit,’ and he does ... A year 
before, we couldn’t even talk to the county commissioners. They wouldn’t listen to 
us.”164   
The dynamic captured in Henderson’s description of relying on civil rights 
leaders reflected broader political realities unfolding in Charlotte in the early 1960s. 
Unions across the state were reeling from North Carolina’s 1959 ban on public sector 
collective bargaining and firefighter unionization and the concomitant loss of more than 
17,000 union members statewide and thousands of dollars in revenues.165 For unions in 
Charlotte, especially those representing public sector employees, a lack of substantive 
political influence characterized the early 1960s. In contrast, civil rights struggles 
commanded the city’s attention during these years, winning ground on important issues 
and, in turn, winning the city accolades on the national political scene for racial 
moderation and “peaceful race relations.” In 1963, the city’s civic leadership, pressured 
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by black activists, spearheaded the voluntary desegregation of restaurants and other 
public spaces. In 1965, when unidentified whites threw explosives into the homes of four 
leading civil rights leaders—in the city’s lone attack of this sort—Charlotte’s mayor and 
the city’s white leadership closed ranks in public condemnation of the violence. The 
Charlotte Observer raised over $8,000 in reward money for information leading to the 
bombers’ arrests, city police launched a full-scale investigation of the bombing, and civic 
leaders organized a “community meeting” attended by more than 2,500 white and black 
city residents to demonstrate collective outrage. As a result of the city’s efforts to 
integrate public accommodations and its rejection of violent racial intransigence, 
Charlotte successfully distinguished itself in the eyes of the nation as a racially moderate 
southern city.166   
Broad civic support for racial moderation, however, had additional consequences 
for city politics. Most significantly, it served at times to neutralize class-based arguments 
about economic inequality. In order to make sense of the political dynamics operating in 
the city during the 1960s, this chapter employs political scientist Preston Smith’s 
distinction between “racial democracy”—the idea that all races should share 
proportionally in equal access to essential social goods —and “social democracy”—the 
idea that individuals should share equal access to social goods irrespective of social 
class—as a framework to understand Charlotte’s political landscape during the 1960s. “A 
key distinction between the two ideological orientations,” explains Smith, “is that racial 
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democracy focuses exclusively on external race relations, while social democracy can 
pay attention to interracial class relations.”167 Racial democracy, as opposed to social 
democracy, ignores the class divisions found within races. Wealthy black funeral home 
owners and professionals held different objectives than black sanitation workers. 
Charlotte’s early and, for a southern city, aggressive adoption of a “racial democracy” 
framework by a bi-racial coalition of black and white civic leaders converged with 
changing ideas, on both the local and national level, about the relationship between the 
state, employment, poverty and economic growth. As a result, the dominance of the racial 
democracy framework served to marginalize and delegitimize social democracy 
arguments in city politics while, at the same time, reinforcing the city’s well-cultivated 
image as a progressive Sunbelt metropolis. In Charlotte, this often meant that the needs 
and desires of the civic and professional class of both races displaced the needs and 
desires of the city’s working-class residents. 
 The following chapter examines a series of representative episodes in Charlotte’s 
political evolution in the 1960s, demonstrating how the image of progressive politics 
yielded dividends for the city’s business class, while at the same time subverting 
challenges to the city’s economic status quo. The governing coalition’s emphasis on a 
racial democracy framework became a central part of the city’s resistance to organized 
labor and class-based political agitation, as journalist Harry Golden noted in his comment 
on Martin Luther King and Malcolm X (mentioned in the dissertation introduction). In 
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Charlotte, seeming racial progressivism often inhibited attempts to improve the economic 
and political power of the city’s working classes.  
 
Challenges to Charlotte’s Governing Coalition 
 The political dominance of Charlotte’s elite-led governing coalition built around 
support for “racial democracy,” economic growth, and a distrust of labor unions did not 
remain unchallenged. Martha Evans, Charlotte’s first female city councilmember, 
challenged the supremacy of Charlotte’s governing elite. Evans offers an example of 
political roads not taken—she represented a vision of inclusive local politics built along 
economic lines. As a progressive female candidate who did not court the city’s business 
elite, Evans threatened the hegemony of the governing coalition. Although the city’s at-
large election system favored candidates endorsed and usually bankrolled by Charlotte’s 
business community, a coalition of white working-class and African-American voters 
secured Evans’s election in 1955 and reelection in 1957.  
   Evans took divisive and unpopular stands on issues. She advocated for the 
appointment of women and African Americans to important city posts and opposed the 
disproportionate influence of business interests in city politics. In her first year, Evans 
pushed for African American and female representation on Charlotte’s urban renewal 
planning commission—nominating the president of Charlotte’s all-black Johnson C. 
Smith University, Rufus Perry, and a local female real estate agent, Jane Duncan, to serve 
on the commission—a suggestion Evans’s colleagues roundly rejected. Councilman 
Steve Dellinger complained that he could not understand “why any certain groups should 
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be represented when the whole city should be represented by the board members.” The 
at-large election168 system, however, made Dellinger’s objection ignorant at best and 
disingenuous at worst, as it had thus far proven impossible for African American voters 
to elect a single black candidate to the council. Evans’s nominations, of course, would 
not have remedied the absence of black participation in or potential obstruction of 
Charlotte’s urban renewal scheme, yet the rejection of her nominees points to the 
difficulty African Americans would have in gaining white support for city posts. This feat 
would only prove doubly challenging for those candidates at odds with the city’s 
economic development agenda. When the council finally voted, both of Evans’s 
nominees received only her vote.169 Undeterred by taking unpopular positions, Evans did 
not attempt to hide her support for organized labor. According to union leader and 
firefighter Bill Brawley,  “When [Martha Evans] was on council, she was always a friend 
of ours. When the city manager said we couldn’t, shouldn’t meet, she would show up in 
the fire station...She had no qualms about meeting with us.”170  
 In 1959, Evans ran for the highest office in the city, challenging incumbent mayor 
James Smith, again with support from the same coalition of voters who had boosted 
Evans twice to city council. Although Evans could not overcome her well-funded 
opponent, she did receive forty seven percent of the vote, carrying most African 
American precincts and many working-class white ones.171   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 The at-large election system meant that all city council members were elected by the entire city, 
rather than representing particular districts within the city. 
169 Charlotte News, 28 November 1957. 
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171 According to Stephen Smith, Evans’s “tally was especially impressive because she ‘did little 
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 Undeterred by her loss, Evans again threw her hat in the mayoral ring in 1961. 
Given her strong showing two years before, the city’s business leadership worried that 
she might actually win and began actively soliciting local businessmen to challenge 
Evans.172 After a few potential candidates declined, local business leaders called sitting 
Chamber of Commerce president Stanford Brookshire into the downtown office of Rush 
Dixon, a textile executive and local financier, to try to persuade him to enter the race. 
Explaining his fellow businessmen’s motivation for pushing him to run, Brookshire 
offered the following explanation: “Maybe it was because…the woman’s lib movement 
hadn’t advanced far enough, but they just couldn’t quite see Ms. Evans as mayor.” 173  
Equally troubling to the business establishment was the fact that much of Evans’s 
political support came from African American, immigrant, and working-class white 
neighborhoods. “She had a very good campaign organization when she had run for 
council before,” explained Brookshire, “Her greatest strength was in the communities of 
minorities; the Jews, the Greeks, the Negroes. In fact, she was very liberal in her attitude 
on race relations.”174  
Taking a lesson from her loss to the well-funded Smith to inform her campaign 
against Brookshire, Evans attempted to use her campaign’s financial handicap to her 
advantage. One widely circulated campaign flyer, for example, told voters, “If you want a 
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voters, by whatever means necessary.” Smith, Boom for Whom? 35.  
172 Smith was also in primary, running for a third term, but according to Brookshire, he lost because 
Charlotteans were unhappy with the fact that he had recently relocated his business to Gastonia. 
Stanford Brookshire, interviewed by Edward Perzel, 16 February 1973, WSOC-TV Oral History 
Project, J. Murrey Atkins Library Special Collections, University of North Carolina at Charlotte. 
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mayor who represents ALL THE PEOPLE, not just people with money, you will vote on 
Tuesday for Martha W. Evans.”175 Evans’s underdog rhetoric, however, proved 
insufficient to defeat Brookshire and she again lost to the candidate with deeper pockets, 
but still carried both black precincts and most white working-class ones. Despite her loss, 
some local observers credited Evans’s candidacy with pushing Brookshire to become 
more progressive on civil rights to attract potential Evans voters.176  
 
The Business of Racial Moderation   
 The Charlotte governing coalition’s embrace of “racial democracy” began in 
earnest under the Brookshire administration. After his win over Martha Evans—using the 
campaign slogan “Beauty and Betterment with Growth and Greatness177 Brookshire 
portrayed his lack of African American support at the polls in a positive light. He argued 
that losing the so-called black vote actually freed him, in the minds of both black and 
white Charlotteans, of political debts to the city’s black voters. “The white community,” 
maintained Brookshire, “had to accept the fact that if I did anything for the blacks 
afterwards it was on my own and not in paying back any political obligations” and “the 
blacks had to be somewhat appreciative of any efforts I made to improve their status as 
citizens because I had made no commitments to them and they had not supported me.”178 
And despite his paternalistic tone, Brookshire became known for his progressive stance 
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176 For more on Evans, see Smith, Boom for Whom? 35-37.  
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on civil rights, especially for a Southern mayor in the early 1960s. Brookshire explained 
to one visiting journalist that a combination of “social consciousness, civic pride, and 
economic considerations” motivated his position on civil rights.179 Two additional factors 
which Brookshire glossed over, however, were also important in his political trajectory: 
Martha Evans’s challenge in the mayoral election, which pushed Brookshire to the left on 
civil rights, and persistent political pressure from black Charlotteans once he was in 
office, which kept him there. According to one study of civil rights efforts in Charlotte, 
such pressure “moved Brookshire to do ‘voluntarily’ what he knew was inevitable.”180 
Though the mayor may not have had any political debts to black voters per se, civil rights 
activists during Brookshire’s first years in office exerted increased pressure on the city to 
end the segregation within the city’s hotels, restaurants, hospitals, and other public 
spaces. As Martha Evans later explained, “The black community did a job on him … they 
really put him through the ropes and educated him.”181  
 Responding to such pressure, especially from local dentist and civil rights activist 
Reginald Hawkins, and out of fear that the city might go the way of Birmingham or Little 
Rock, Brookshire created the Mayor’s Committee on Community Relations in 1961. 
Brookshire and Charlotte’s civic leadership determined that segregation had become a 
political and economic liability for the city. As such, Charlotte Observer editor C.A. 
McKnight, mayor Brookshire, and Chamber of Commerce president and local banker Ed 
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Burnside agreed to target the city’s restaurants and hotels to spearhead the desegregation 
process. According to McKnight, the push to desegregate came after McKnight told 
Brookshire that, “if you want to keep Charlotte out of the headlines of the New York 
Times, the leadership must take concerted action.”182 Brookshire agreed and soon 
thereafter, McKnight drafted and the Chamber unanimously passed a resolution on 23 
May 1963 recommending the immediate desegregation of all local businesses that served 
the general public.183 After the passage of the resolution, Ed Burnside convinced a group 
of local hotel and restaurant owners to be the first to integrate their businesses, thereby 
setting a precedent for other city establishments to follow. In late May 1963, several 
prominent businessmen invited black guests to lunch in restaurants across the city, 
precipitating what became known in city lore as the either the Charlotte “eat-in” or the 
“let’s do lunch” initiative.184 Southern historian David Goldfield has described 
Charlotte’s approach to desegregation of public spaces as being characterized by 
“lunching rather than lynching.”185 Moreover, as L.M. Wright Jr., the City Editor of 
Charlotte Observer proudly told a meeting of the South Carolina Council on Human 
Relations in November 1963, the call to desegregate Charlotte’s public facilities in 1963 
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carried particular historical significance: Charlotte’s began its desegregation process on 
the centennial anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation.186 
 Of all the arguments Burnside made to convince Charlotte business owners to 
desegregate, his economic argument proved most persuasive to Charlotte businessmen. 
According to one business owner in attendance, “The vivid reminder of the years that 
Little Rock went without a single new industry coming to town after its racial difficulties 
in 1957 was the most effective point made.”187 An executive for Eastern Airlines 
confirmed that his company had chosen Charlotte over other southern cities to build a 
six-million-dollar computer center because of “the admirable way race relations had been 
handled.”188 In an article entitled “Credit and the Development of the South,” published 
in the University of Virginia Newsletter, Preston T. Holmes, the Vice President of State-
Planters Bank of Commerce and Trust in Richmond wrote,  
The manner in which [desegregation] is handled will have a tremendous 
effect on the ability of the South to attract new industry and to encourage 
existing industries to expand their present facilities. North Carolina, with 
legal compliance with the [Brown v. Board of Education] and little social 
unrest, had new plant investment in 1958 totaling $253 million, while 
Arkansas, with its massive resistance and unsettled conditions, had only 
$25.4 million in 1958 compared with $44.9 in 1957 and $131 million in 
1956.189  
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Indeed, Charlotte’s recent economic growth was likely the most important determining 
factor in Brookshire’s and the business community’s decision to openly support 
desegregation efforts. With Charlotte finally becoming the city its boosters had long 
envisioned, the city’s civic leadership was eager to avoid anything that might 
compromise Charlotte’s rising economic status. 
 Both of the city’s newspapers, the Charlotte News and the Charlotte Observer, 
also held fairly progressive positions on civil rights for papers in the South. The News 
established itself as a voice of racial liberalism as early as the 1930s, and the Observer 
was among the city’s leading proponents of compliance with the Supreme Court’s 1954 
Brown decision. The Observer’s position only intensified when C.A. “Pete” McKnight, a 
Shelby native and Davidson College graduate, became editor in 1955. McKnight, who 
had been editor of the Charlotte News since 1939, left his post in 1954 to become the first 
editor of the Southern School News, a Ford Foundation-funded agency established to 
monitor southern states’ compliance with Brown.190 Under McKnight’s leadership, the 
Observer would remain a voice of southern racial liberalism throughout the 1950s and 
1960s. McKnight saw segregation as both a moral injustice and a practical impediment to 
the region’s economic development, arguing that it could not, “as an abstract moral 
principle…be defended by any intellectually or spiritually honest person.”191 McKnight’s 
leadership also extended beyond the newsroom; he drafted the 1963 Chamber of 
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Commerce resolution calling for the desegregation of the city’s public accommodations, 
the school board frequently consulted him before making important decisions, and he was 
a key member of the Mayor’s Community Relations Committee. McKnight also served 
as president of the North Carolina Fund, a statewide anti-poverty program discussed in 
more detail later in the chapter.192   
 In addition to McKnight’s leadership, another important change at the Observer 
contributed to the paper’s stance on civil rights. In late 1954, the Observer’s owners sold 
the paper to John S. and James L. Knight, who also owned the Akron Beacon-Journal, 
the Miami Herald, the Detroit Free Press, and the Chicago Daily News.193 According to 
Jack Claiborne, an Observer editor, “the Observer, as the smallest member of the Knight 
organization, [became] a ‘boot camp’ for ambitious young people who were seeking 
bigger jobs in journalism”.194 This infusion of young journalists from outside of the 
South with ambitions of returning home likely moderated the tone of the paper’s news 
and editorial pages regarding civil rights issues.195  
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Black Moderation  
 With business and city leaders showing increased support for civil rights 
initiatives, African Americans also found new openings for formal participation in local 
politics. In 1965, Charlotte voters elected the first African American to a city office since 
Reconstruction, funeral home director Frederick Douglass Alexander. Throughout the 
1960s, Alexander proved integral to the city’s moderate governing coalition. He was also 
one of the leading black proponents of the “racial democracy” framework that governed 
the city. “Embracing racial democracy,” Preston Smith explains, “meant black civic elites 
accepted class privileges and the distribution of social goods according to conventional 
political economy.”196 Like many black elites during this era, Alexander believed that the 
black middle class should serve as representatives of the race and he distrusted alliances 
between the white and black working classes.  
 The son of Zechariah Alexander, a district manager for North Carolina Mutual 
Life Insurance Company, one of the nation’s largest African American-owned businesses 
at the time, Fred Alexander had opportunities unavailable to most black Charlotteans in 
large part because of his family’s financial independence from whites. Alexander 
attended high school in Charlotte but headed north for college, to Pennsylvania’s Lincoln 
University. Alexander’s elite education and affluent family background shaped his faith 
in the educated black middle class. Upon graduation from college, Alexander returned to 
Charlotte intent on improving opportunities for black Charlotteans, focusing his energy 
on registering black voters and lobbying for the city to hire more black employees. “The 
Alexanders admit their father had an advantage,” wrote local journalist Harry Golden, 
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“He didn’t work for whites. He and his two sons could agitate and speak out for Negro 
rights. It was hard for whites to discipline them.”197  
 Even with his favorable reputation among the city’s governing coalition, 
Alexander knew that winning a council seat in a predominantly white city with an at-
large election system would be challenging, even for a moderate black candidate with 
substantial bi-racial support. After all, his brother Kelly Alexander, who was the 
president of the North Carolina NAACP, had run and lost twice.198 In 1965, then, when 
Alexander decided to run for city council, he and his supporters determined that his only 
realistic chance of election was if his supporters cast “single shot” votes. This meant that 
rather than voting for a full slate of seven candidates, as voters were traditionally 
expected to do, supporters would cast a lone vote for Alexander and leave the remainder 
of the ballot empty. On Election Day, Alexander’s strategy paid off. He finished within 
the top seven, ensuring him a position on city council. However, the single-shot strategy 
enraged the Charlotte political establishment, which included his new fellow 
councilmembers, numerous city officials, as well as the Charlotte News and Observer. 
Alexander had “pushed his way” in, the Observer contended, and in so doing had 
manipulated the democratic process.199 In reviewing post-election poll numbers, the 
Alexander campaign was able to demonstrate decisively that the single-shot strategy was 
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the only tactic sure to get Alexander—or any other black candidate—elected in 
Charlotte’s at-large white-majority system.200 For many voters, Alexander’s election to 
city council proved an important first step in bringing home the gains of the recent Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  
 Despite Alexander’s controversial entrée into city politics, he proved to be a fairly 
moderate city councilman, favoring dialogue and closed-door negotiations over protests 
and direct action in the struggle for black civil rights.201 He faced resistance from his 
colleagues during his first year on the council, which likely stemmed from a mixture of 
lingering resentment over his single-shot strategy and racism. Alexander could rarely get 
a majority of councilmembers to support his motions and nominations, such as his 
attempt to appoint an African American to the Charlotte Redevelopment Commission.202 
Nonetheless, Alexander managed to develop and maintain a fairly congenial relationship 
with Charlotte’s business community. He became the first black member of the city’s 
Chamber of Commerce in 1962 and more than two-thirds of those who voted for him in 
his first city council race were white.203 Throughout his political career, Alexander 
emphasized conciliation over conflict regarding civil rights issues, winning him 
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substantial support among the city’s business and civic leadership, as well as moderate 
white voters.204   
 The other side to Alexander’s pro-business outlook and cordial relationship with 
Charlotte’s business community was a general distrust of organized labor, a position not 
uncommon among southern black elites and black organizations during this period.205 In 
1960, the NAACP’s labor department issued a well-publicized report on racial 
discrimination in unions and Herbert Hill, the NAACP’s white labor director during the 
1950s and 1960s was among the most outspoken critics of racial discrimination in 
unions.206 Echoing Hill, Fred Alexander argued that “labor unions offer little to nothing 
in the struggle for Negro rights in the South, not even membership.”207 African 
Americans had reason to distrust organized labor, given many unions’ historic exclusion 
and discrimination against black workers, especially in southern industries and the 
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building trades.208 Yet at the same time, Alexander’s position was in keeping with a 
longer history of black moderates’ antipathy towards organized labor. According to 
Adolph Reed, “Advocates of accomodationism, which was uplift ideology’s most 
conservative expression, opposed trade unionism or labor-based political action for 
blacks almost by definition.”209 Alexander was especially skeptical of interracial 
alliances between African Americans and the white working class. “You can’t get 
anywhere dealing with the poor white man,” Alexander maintained. “He’s just like the 
Negro—struggling.”210 Although Alexander recognized that the black and white working 
classes shared many of the same economic struggles, he, like other black elites, worried 
that white workers were particularly susceptible to racist appeals, making them 
untrustworthy and potentially dangerous allies of African Americans.211   
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After Fred Alexander’s election to city council, Kelly Alexander offered his 
reflections on the class politics that had gotten his brother elected. In a paper titled “The 
Role of the Negro in Charlotte City Politics,” Kelly Alexander evaluated the 
circumstances most likely to facilitate the election of black officials in southern cities 
with at-large, non-partisan local elections, as Charlotte still had at the time.212 Alexander 
highlighted class divisions among and between black and white Charlotteans when they 
went to the polls. “Upper and middle class whites will now vote for black candidates who 
approximate their class level within the black community,” asserted Alexander. “The 
reasons for this are complex. The main one being in my opinion that a middle class black 
candidate is less of a threat to their value system than a lower class one.” Candidates who 
posed a challenge to the racial order were less threatening than those who challenged the 
“business-friendly” political climate Charlotte’s civic leaders had worked so hard to 
cultivate. Like his brother, Kelly Alexander believed that successful black candidates 
must be well regarded publicly and “appear to be rational, well dressed, cosmopolitan in 
outlook and seem to have a solid middle-class or upper middle-class orientation.” 213  In 
other words, a candidate’s electability had to do more with the politics of respectability—
appearing to be middle class or above—than with the candidate’s actual economic 
status.214 At the same time, asserted Alexander, the candidate “must present himself as 
not being afraid to represent the interests of the community loudly if necessary. 
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Regardless of his income he must identify himself squarely with the poor mass of 
blacks.”215 Alexander then turned to the symbolic value of black elected officials for 
cities eager to display their racial tolerance to the nation. “For a community to have black 
elected officials has marked it as progressive,” asserted Alexander. “Such an official is a 
symbol of racial harmony within the city. In times of racial unrest it is a positive thing to 
present a quiet content city.”216  
Charlotte’s relatively quiet reputation was shaken in the early morning hours of 
November 22, 1965, when a group of unidentified whites bombed the homes of several 
black leaders, including Fred Alexander, Kelly Alexander, civil rights activist Reginald 
Hawkins, and attorney Julius Chambers.217 Miraculously, no one was injured in any of 
the explosions.218 The bombings made headlines in newspapers across the nation, 
including the Baltimore Evening Sun, Washington Evening Star, Wall Street Journal, and 
Chicago Daily News, each of which highlighted Charlotte’s moderate reputation on civil 
rights.219 The Washington Post’s headlines read, “4 Negroes’ N.C. Homes Dynamited: 
Racially Peaceful Charlotte Without Clues to Blasts,” and the Los Angeles Times 
prefaced its article on the bombing, titled “Bomb Rips Peace of Charlotte, N.C.,” by 
saying, “Charlotte is one of the few major southern cities that has escaped racial trouble 
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in recent years; schools there were integrated on a limited basis in 1957 and public 
accommodations were desegregated long before enactment of the Civil Rights Act of last 
year.”220  
Following the bombing, Charlotte’s civic leaders acted swiftly to demonstrate 
their collective condemnation for what had occurred. Mayor Brookshire called on city 
residents to contribute funds for rebuilding the damaged homes, and the Charlotte 
Observer organized an “antiterrorism fund” to offer a reward for information on the 
bombers. Civic leaders also organized a gathering at Ovens Auditorium as a public 
display of collective condemnation. More than 2,500 black and white citizens turned out 
to protest the bombings and hear speeches from local and national civic and civil rights 
leaders.221 The protest was likely the largest interracial audience ever convened in 
Charlotte for the purpose of discussing racial injustice in the city. Roy Wilkins, the 
executive director of the NAACP, who was among the national civil rights leaders in 
Charlotte for the event, remarked how “this kind of thing undermines the whole 
leadership…of the church and law-abiding, decent elements of the community.”222 In 
reference to Kelly Alexander, Wilkins said, “here is a man who, having spent his time 
promoting law and order and legal remedies, comes to suffer this rebuke when it begins 
to appear his viewpoint might prevail.” Wilkins argued that violence against moderate 
black leaders only emboldened the cause of black militants—a group Wilkins believed to 
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be nearly as great an obstacle to civil rights progress as white supremacists. Furthermore, 
Wilkins warned, “The danger is not that they will win recruits from those who have a 
stake in the community—the doctor, the dentist, the lawyer. The danger is that they will 
win recruits from the younger Negroes—the misfits, the dropouts.”223    
 A few speakers, however, used the rally as an opportunity to address the fact that 
Charlotte’s reputation for racial progress was often inconsistent with the experience of 
many black residents across the city. George Leake, a local African Methodist 
Episcopalian (AME) minister, emphasized that much work remained to be done if 
Charlotte was to live up to its carefully crafted national image. Leake urged “that 
Charlotte not use the meeting as a salve for its conscience but as a prod to provide more 
opportunities for Negroes.”224 To rousing applause, Leake demanded, “Does this mean 
that the dispatcher at police headquarters will stop using the word ‘nigger’ when making 
calls to cars? Does it mean in our lifetime we will see a Negro with enough sense to 
patrol the [downtown] square?”225 Over the course of his speech, Leake implored 
Charlotte’s civic leadership to use this opportunity to do good rather than just to feel 
good. Like journalist Harry Golden, one of the keenest observers of Charlotte politics in 
the mid-twentieth century, George Leake was an adept critic of the limitations of the 
city’s politics of moderation. “Charlotte is such a smart town,” asserted Leake, “that 
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whenever it finds a grievance that’s most acute, it’ll solve that one and wait for you to 
push the next one. It does just enough to keep the match from being struck.” 226  
Poverty Politics in Charlotte  
 The city’s anti-poverty initiatives also reflect the influence of the “progressive 
mystique” and “racial democracy” politics. The Charlotte Area Fund (CAF), established 
on August 29, 1963, became a wing of the state’s pioneering North Carolina Fund on 
July 6, 1964. Financed by the Ford Foundation, the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation, 
and the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, along with the state and federal governments, the 
North Carolina Fund eventually became the mechanism through which the federal 
government channeled anti-poverty funds after the creation of the War on Poverty’s 
Office of Economic Opportunity in 1963.227 At the time of the North Carolina Fund’s 
creation, there existed substantial poverty and economic inequality in North Carolina, and 
in Charlotte in particular.  In Mecklenburg County, 14,000 families—more than 20 
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percent of the city—lived on annual incomes of less than $3,000. According to one CAF 
report, “Poverty in Mecklenburg County is recognized not only as a problem to the whole 
general populace, but most particularly, as a racial problem.”228 Indeed, there was 
substantial income disparity between white and black Charlotte area residents; the 
median income for white families was $6440 while it was just $2,904 for black families, 
with more than half of the county’s black families living $1000 under the national 
poverty line.229  
 When Terry Sanford unveiled the North Carolina Fund in 1963, many 
progressives in the state held great optimism that the state of North Carolina, with the 
help of private and federal dollars, had the tools to combat poverty, while spurring 
economic growth. During a press conference in Raleigh introducing the North Carolina 
Fund, Terry Sanford told North Carolinians that this would be “the first massive 
statewide effort in our country to find ways to break the cycle of poverty and 
dependency.”230 Sanford’s ideas about poverty, like those of progressive policymakers 
across the nation, were heavily influenced by “culture of poverty” arguments put forward 
by social scientists and widely popularized in Michael Harrington’s 1962 The Other 
America. In short, the “culture of poverty” thesis held that a wide array of cultural 
pathologies—isolation, passivity, hopelessness—explained poor people’s status, not 
economic restructuring or unemployment. Over time, these pathologies became self-
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perpetuating across generations, leading to a “cycle of poverty.”231 C.A. McKnight, editor 
of the Charlotte Observer who had become president of the North Carolina Fund, said 
the two biggest problems the state faced were education and jobs—and that no one 
expected to “remake adults…the real hope is to cut off this generation of kids from the 
cycle of poverty.”232 That McKnight, the head of North Carolina’s leading anti-poverty 
organization and a prominent white progressive in the state, viewed adults as beyond 
hope illustrates the increasing acceptance in the mid-1960s of the idea that a stable job 
with decent wages was insufficient to lift adults out of poverty. Instead,  “culture of 
poverty” proponents argued, the poor were not in poverty because they lacked money; 
they were poor because they demonstrated deeply imbedded and often irreversible 
cultural pathologies. 
The emergence of the “culture of poverty” thesis converged with and was 
informed by social scientists’ and policymakers’ shifting ideas about the relationship 
between economic policy, employment, and the state. Neo-Keynesianism, the dominant 
economic ideology of the 1960s, emphasized the importance of full employment in 
sustaining economic growth. Poverty, proponents of neo-Keynesianism argued, was 
incompatible with the goal of full employment. For this reason, along with a growing 
concern among progressives about scarcity in a land of plenty, poverty emerged on the 
national agenda. As Alice O’Connor explains, particular neo-Keynesian notions of 
individual agency framed ideas about poverty during the Kennedy and Johnson 
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administrations. Gains made by the American working classes were understood “not as 
the product of institutional factors such as unions, government policy, or firm practices, 
but … market returns on individual investments.” 233 This individualized worldview gave 
rise to human capital theory, which “exaggerated the role of rational choice, individual 
behavior, and the level playing field.”234 Focusing on individual behavior and skills, 
proponents of human capital theory emphasized investment in education and job training 
as the most productive route to realize economic mobility for those living in poverty. 
“Most important,” emphasizes O’Connor, such a political framework “made fighting 
poverty, through human capital investments, compatible with economic growth,” at least 
in theory.235 
While Governor Sanford and the hundreds of social workers, students, and 
activists involved with the Fund throughout the state likely held a sincere commitment to 
combating poverty, the North Carolina Fund, and especially CAF, had fundamental 
limitations from the start. The city’s commitment to economic growth overshadowed 
commitments to combating poverty, limiting the ability of CAF to achieve the latter. 
CAF’s leadership, for example, was heavily stacked with representatives of the city’s 
business community and initially included few black representatives—all of whom came 
from the middle class—and no representation of the poor or organized labor.236 After 
fierce opposition from dentist and local civil rights activist Reginald Hawkins, who 
pointed out that exclusion of poor people from the CAF board violated the OEO’s 
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“maximum feasible participation” directive, the CAF added six new directors, most of 
whom were poor and African American.237 But, as Hawkins pointed out, the fact that 
these members were added later meant that they were not involved in the initial planning 
stages of the CAF, but were confined to decisions the existing board had already made.  
 Equally problematic was the fact that even when low-income representatives were 
added to the board, they were not active participants in meetings. Instead, explained one 
CAF report, the “primary spokesmen for the poor and Negro interests are still the 
polished, higher income Negroes and whites on the board. The Negro professor, lawyer, 
and undertaker remain the most outspoken minority group members.” One of the black 
board members was reported to have said during a meeting, “The poor are reluctant to 
participate in civic affairs. There is no sociological evidence that the poor are crying for 
representation, and I personally believe they would rather have someone in a higher 
income group as their representative.” 238  
On June 29, 1965, the Senate Subcommittee on Poverty invited Hawkins to 
Washington to testify, an opportunity which he used as a platform to voice his criticisms 
of the CAF.  He underscored his support for the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, but 
emphasized that he was “appalled at the manner in which proposal constructions and 
programming were submitted and accepted”—namely the exclusion of the poor from the 
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board of the CAF. “Those of us who are leaders in the civil rights struggle, especially in 
the South are not so naïve as to believe that our oppressors, who make up the power 
structure in these southern states, are, all of a sudden, going to become altruistic toward 
the Negro and voluntarily organize poverty programs to eliminate the root causes of 
poverty,” Hawkins told the subcommittee. “We know from hard, immediate and vivid 
experiences that poverty programs in the South are being formed by political and 
economic interests, which are only concerned with controlling the pace and types of 
programs started. For this reason, there is no real enthusiasm or renewed hope among our 
poor about the poverty programs.”239 Moreover, if the poor were to be included, Hawkins 
asserted, and poverty were somehow eradicated, the South’s “very structure of 
subserviency” and economy based on cheap labor would be destroyed.240  
 Though Hawkins had a point, there was one CAF program—Domestics United—
that included poor people in its planning and targeted its efforts at the dual problems of 
racial subordination and cheap labor among some of the city’s most vulnerable workers.  
Founded in 1966, the organization sought to represent domestic workers in Charlotte who 
often made less than 75 cents per hour, just half of the federal minimum wage at the time. 
Indeed, federal labor law exempted domestic workers from the minimum wage.241 As 
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Eileen Boris and Jennifer Klein have asserted, domestic workers, like care workers, faced 
numerous challenges to workplace organizing, the biggest hurdle being for workers to 
redefine the home as a workplace and household labor as real work. “Before caregivers 
were even able to bargain for better conditions,” explain Boris and Klein, “they had to 
see themselves as workers and fight for such recognition by the public, the state, and the 
very users of the services.”242Among the organization’s top priorities were helping 
Charlotte’s overworked and underpaid domestic workforce increase their wages, expand 
their housekeeping and childcare knowledge base, secure Social Security contributions 
from employers, and, more generally, raise domestic work to a respected, 
professionalized, and adequately compensated occupation. At its height, the organization 
had six chapters, more than 600 active members, and was among the first of its kind in 
the nation.243  
 Domestics United began as a collaboration between progressive Charlotte church 
women, the CAF, and domestic workers. The idea for an organization of household 
workers arose in March 1966 after members of the Christian Social Relations Committee 
of the Mecklenburg County United Church Women’s Organization met with staff 
members of the Westside Center, a CAF-funded community center, to discuss issues 
facing the neighborhood. According to one CAF report, “staff members at the center 
jumped at the chance for publicizing and creating interest in domestic workers through a 
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‘respected, middle class’ organization” and after a few meetings, Domestics United was 
born.244 One of the United Churchwomen involved was Vera Swann, wife of Darius 
Swann, both of whom were at the center of Charlotte’s landmark school desegregation 
case, Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Schools. Vera Swann, who had done missionary 
work in India for ten years before returning to Charlotte, was hopeful that the city’s 
churchwomen would be as concerned with injustices in their own city as they were for 
those in developing countries halfway across the globe. “We spend a lot on missions 
sending people to other countries,” asserted Swann, “Is there any way to appeal to 
churchwomen to say that here is an opportunity right in their own backyards to witness? 
That the opportunity not be across the sea?”245  
 On May 18 when the new organization held its first meeting, only forty domestics 
attended. After concerted efforts to get the word out to household workers across the city, 
more than 200 domestic workers attended the second meeting held on June 8.246 Shortly 
thereafter, the organization began advocating for higher wages for household workers in 
Charlotte. In July 1966, the organization approached the Mayor’s Committee on Human 
Relations, the Mecklenburg Christian Ministries Association, and the local NAACP for 
support in securing hourly wages of $1.50, paid vacation time and sick leave, a daycare 
center for domestic workers’ children, and Social Security contributions from employers. 
Domestics United’s members also organized a letter writing campaign to state legislators, 
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urging them to support the inclusion of household workers in minimum wage 
legislation.247 
 Wilhelmenia Adams, a domestic worker born and raised in Cherry, a 
predominantly black working-class neighborhood abutting Myers Park, one of 
Charlotte’s wealthiest neighborhoods, served as Domestics United’s first president. Her 
parents were homeowners who had only two children, Wilhelmenia and her brother, 
Edward, Jr. Growing up, Adams’s neighbors included janitors, laundresses, domestic 
workers, truck drivers, cooks, as well as a handful of barbers and beauticians. Adams’s 
father, Edward Roper, was a chauffeur and World War I veteran born in Charleston, 
South Carolina, and her mother, Arlene Roper, was a cook for a private family in 
Charlotte. Like many domestic workers in the 1940s, Adams’s mother would often work 
in excess of 70 hours a week, leaving little time to spend with her own children or tend to 
family affairs.248 Unfortunately for Charlotte’s domestic workers, little had changed in a 
generation, making the work of Domestics United all the more essential to Adams and 
other women involved in the organization. 
 Despite sharing many of its goals with organized labor—such as raising wages 
and improving working conditions through collective action—Domestics United insisted 
from the beginning that it was not a union. This was likely an effort to stave off 
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opposition to the organization given Charlotte’s anti-labor climate.  Nevertheless, the 
Domestics United became the center of local controversy almost immediately because 
some members of the community believed it sufficiently resembled a union. One CAF 
board member, for example, went on record as opposing the organization, insisting, “You 
know, this is a union.” 249 More generally, some affluent and vocal Charlotte families 
resented efforts to undermine their reliance on cheap household labor. According to one 
confidential CAF report, Domestics United rapidly “attracted the attention of women all 
over Charlotte.” 250 The Charlotte Observer dubbed the controversy “The Domestic 
Rumble” after both city papers received a flood of letters regarding the situation.251 One 
letter asserted that these were unrealistic demands for black women to be making of the 
white “community.” “It seems the Negro thinks all he has to do is get a group together 
and then present the community with his demands,” asserted the anonymous author, “I 
think it’s high time that the white people organized and refused to meet all of these 
absurd demands…I don’t know any maids who do work [warranting $1.50 an hour]. 
Most are unskilled, untrained, and unwilling.”252 Another Charlottean accused Charlotte’s 
“do-gooders”—the United Churchwomen—of “creating unrest” among the city’s 
domestic workers who the author argued were already being paid as much as Charlotte 
families could afford.253 Other critics of Domestics United pointed to the fact that many 
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employers of domestics were working-class themselves and if household workers were 
lobbying for free or reduced-cost childcare, perhaps it should be available to all working 
mothers.254 Among the letters published in the paper, one was from a domestic worker 
responding to another letter-writer who had argued that domestic workers’ labor was not 
worth $1.50 an hour. “I am wondering if he as an employer of a domestic has really 
thought of the value of a domestic? Could he work for a mere $5.00 a day with the 
current price of living? In one day, I am a cook, washer, ironer, cleaner, scrub woman, 
window washer, and babysitter…Can I do so many jobs in one day at less than the 
national minimum wage and be effective?”255 
 Even the director of the CAF, John Zuidema, initially expressed concern about an 
organization of domestic workers since many CAF board members employed domestic 
workers.256 In response to rumors of “a maid’s union,” some employers voluntarily raised 
the wages of their domestic workers to between $1.00 and $1.50 an hour to undermine 
the allure of joining a union. Others, however, according to the CAF report, “became 
angry at the impudence of maids and the meddling of the United Church Women who 
had led the action.”257 As a result of the article and the general level of backlash against 
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Domestics United coming from white middle-class neighborhoods, the United Church 
Women severed ties with Domestics United.258  
 Though no longer affiliated with the United Church Women, Domestics United 
pressed on, shifting its attention to what became the organization’s largest undertaking—
a citywide survey of domestic workers. Funded by a $12,000 grant from the North 
Carolina Fund, Domestics United conducted a survey in January 1967 to attempt to 
identify how many household workers were employed in the Charlotte area and to 
evaluate their wages, social security benefits, working conditions, and job security and 
satisfaction.259 Kelly Alexander, who sat on the North Carolina Fund Board, was among 
those who expressed their strong support for the idea of the survey.260 The survey team, 
which included fifty paid domestic workers, interviewed 1,586 women —roughly one 
fourth of the city’s domestic labor force—in January 1967. Interviewers dispersed across 
the city, interviewing domestic workers who lived in Brooklyn, Third Ward, Dilworth, 
North Charlotte, Griertown, and the West Side. 261  The survey revealed a number of 
significant findings. Almost half of the women interviewed reported that they were the 
primary wage earners in the family and 75% earned less than $35 per week, with 41% 
working more than 36 hours or more per week.262 The majority of women also struggled 
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to find full-time work and two-thirds of respondents reported “a desperate need for 
adequate, competent, low-cost day care.” Perhaps the most revealing finding of the 
survey was the fact that 72 percent of interviewees indicated a desire for more basic 
education and 77 percent reported a desire to train for another line of work altogether.263  
 Domestics United chose not to address directly the finding that most household 
workers disliked their work. Instead, they decided to focus on creating educational 
courses for domestic workers, hoping that an expanded skill set would lead to higher pay 
and, ultimately, increased job satisfaction.  The first course Domestics United offered, in 
conjunction with the Red Cross, provided training on post-natal care for infants and 
mothers. Nineteen women attended the six-week course, all of whom reportedly found 
work after the course’s completion earning at least $1.75 an hour. In an effort to 
recognize the women’s efforts as a significant educational achievement, Domestics 
United planned a graduation ceremony followed by a reception for those who had 
completed the course.264 The post-natal course also spawned interest in a driver education 
course after it was discovered that forty percent of domestics could not drive, a skill in 
great demand among employers. With assistance from the Washington D.C. based 
National Committee on Household Employment and the CAF’s Homemaking Education 
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staff, Domestics United also developed a six-week evening course in general household 
management skills. Such topics covered included: housecleaning, childcare, time 
management, laundering skills, infant care, and employer-employee relations.265  
  Throughout its lifespan, Domestics United maintained that it was not a union. 
One article on the organization in a CAF newsletter entitled, “Domestics United: An 
Exercise in Free Enterprise,” revealed the agency’s ideological framework. Nonetheless, 
the organization often employed the same language and arguments as unions to 
encourage women to join. For example, one flyer for a meeting of Domestics United read 
“ALONE WE CAN DO LITTLE, UNITED WE CAN DO MANY THINGS.” Another 
read, “In unity, there is strength. One domestic, by herself, may not be able to get higher 
wages, vacation pay or Social Security benefits. But a large group of domestics, working 
together for these and other improvements, may succeed.”266 The theme of collective 
action ran throughout the rhetoric of the organization. At a meeting at the Brooklyn 
Neighborhood Services Center, one domestic worker asserted, “We want our homes and 
our children to be as clean as those of the white ladies that we work for…and the only 
way we’re going to succeed is by working together.”267 
 It is understandable that the Domestics United would have wanted to distance 
itself from unions given the hostility towards organized labor in Charlotte and the 
particularly vulnerable position of domestic workers, many of whom already struggled to 
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find full-time employment. However, given that many critics of Domestics United 
already assumed it was a union and that the organization was trying to offer its members 
many of the benefits of unionization, Domestics United might have had little to lose from 
formally attempting to organize, considering that it lost funding and dissolved in 1968. 
“All the good seed money left,” explained Wilhelmenia Adams, “and we couldn’t get 
back the funding…we weren’t strong enough to continue.”268 The hostility towards 
Domestics United and the organization’s efforts to distance itself from being considered a 
union reflects Charlotte’s “racial democracy” ideology that refused to recognize the 
demands of the city’s domestic workers. Specifically, it highlights the city leadership’s 
general resistance towards challenges to the economic status quo and the city’s 
dependence on cheap labor.269 Finally, CAF’s “culture of poverty” ideology prevented 
the organization from recognizing the real work that some members of Domestics United 
were trying to accomplish. Not long before Domestics United lost funding, for example, 
one CAF report asserted that one of the primary tasks remaining for anti-poverty 
organizations was “convincing the poor…that an effort to change one’s chances in life is 
a worthwhile one.”270 Too often, CAF focused on individualized (and condescending) 
concerns, like encouraging the poor to be more motivated, rather than structural factors 
keeping many of the city’s domestic workers under the poverty line. 
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 Despite the disappointments of Domestics United, the late 1960s witnessed a 
growing movement of domestic workers across the nation to organize.271 Domestic 
workers in Atlanta, for example, formed the National Domestic Workers Union of 
America (NDWUA) in 1968. According to Premilla Nadasen, “Their agitation, along 
with that of dozens of other groups around the country, helped bring domestic workers 
under protection of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1974 and reshaped the 
character of the job” and “transformed domestic workers’ self-perceptions and enhanced 
their dignity and sense of self worth.”272 Similar to Domestics United in Charlotte, 
NDWUA worked to professionalize and standardize domestic work through organizing 
so that workers could develop “specialized and technical training to provide better 
services in the field of Household Management.”273 In New York, household workers 
picketed City Hall with signs demanding “Take Us Out of Slavery” and successfully 
organized with SEIU in 1978.274 In Las Vegas, similarly vulnerable and underpaid 
workers also demonstrated the benefits of formal unionization. Casino employees, also a 
predominantly black and female workforce, won important workplace victories through 
unionization. The casino workers—maids, porters, and kitchen staff—joined the Culinary 
and Hotel Workers Union, a national union with organizing experience, staff, and 
funding. Unlike Domestics United, the Las Vegas union had effective tools to fight 
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management. In 1976, it waged the largest strike in Las Vegas history. Twenty-two 
thousand rank and file members refused to work and blocked non-union workers from 
breaking the line. After two weeks, the workers secured the raises they sought in every 
major Las Vegas hotel.275 Domestics United, of course, was operating in a decidedly 
more anti-union climate than New York or Las Vegas; the CAF and North Carolina 
Fund—which were hardly among the state’s most politically conservative 
organizations—essentially defunded an organization of black household workers because 
their relatively modest demands were perceived as being too similar to those of a union. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
“Time to Turn Down the Heat”: Julius Chambers, the Firefighters Assembly, and 
Public Worker Unrest   
 
 
 On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr., planned to visit North Carolina to 
campaign on behalf of Reginald Hawkins, the state’s first African-American 
gubernatorial candidate.276 Two days before King was to arrive in Charlotte, however, 
Hawkins received a telegram from the director of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference’s (SCLC) Citizenship Education Program explaining that King was occupied 
with the sanitation workers’ strike in Memphis and would be postponing his visit. King’s 
and the SCLC’s decision to commit extensive resources to Memphis was part of a 
broader effort to place more emphasis on issues of economic justice.277 As King told 
strikers in Memphis, “Now our struggle is for genuine equality, which means economic 
equality. For we know now, that it isn’t enough to integrate lunch counters. What does it 
profit a man to be able to eat at an integrated lunch counter if he doesn’t have enough 
money to buy a hamburger?”278 King, however, would neither see the resolution of the 
sanitation strike, nor would he stump for Hawkins in North Carolina. On the day that he 
was originally scheduled to arrive in Charlotte, King was assassinated while he was 
standing on the balcony of the Lorraine Motel. The massive riots and demonstrations 
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following King’s murder fixed the eyes of the nation on Memphis. With escalating 
pressure from civil rights, labor, and religious leaders, as well as from President Lyndon 
Johnson and Tennessee Governor Buford Ellington, Memphis’s mayor and city council 
finally agreed to settle the strike. On April 16, 1968, AFSCME announced an agreement 
with the city of Memphis that raised sanitation workers’ wages and allowed them to join 
the union’s Local 1733. After more than two months of protest, nearly 1,300 of the city’s 
poorest-paid African-American workers had secured an unprecedented victory in the 
fight for dignity on the job.279  
 For public employees in Charlotte, the events in Memphis inspired a new sense of 
urgency to organize. The city’s sanitation workers declared five strikes between 1968 and 
1970, and its firefighters hired one of the state’s preeminent civil rights attorneys, Julius 
Chambers, to challenge North Carolina’s 1959 ban on public employee collective 
bargaining and police and firefighter unionization. The events in Memphis had been 
instructive—they demonstrated to Charlotte’s public workers that labor strikes, when 
accompanied by mass mobilization and media exposure, could facilitate better wages and 
improved working conditions. Charlotte’s civic leaders gleaned a different lesson: do not 
make the evening news. Unlike Memphis, Charlotte did not witness overt acts of violence 
and injustice against strikers. Charlotte’s mayor did not publicly flout worker demands, 
and the city’s police officers did not assault marching demonstrators with tear gas. 
National Guard tanks and soldiers wielding bayonets were nowhere to be found. In fact, 
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Charlotte’s public employee strikes and activism barely made the national news, and this, 
of course, was no accident. Charlotte’s leadership had successfully avoided the public 
clashes with civil rights activists that consumed cities like Birmingham, Little Rock, and 
now Memphis, and they were loath to ruin a good thing now.  
 This chapter draws upon William Chafe’s “Progressive Mystique” framework--
and those works that have built upon Chafe’s work, such as Matthew Lassiter’s concept 
of the “Sunbelt Synthesis,” as discussed in chapter two--to explain business and civic 
leaders’ responses to public worker activism in civil rights era Charlotte, the emerging 
economic center of the least unionized state in the nation.280 In the same way that the 
Greensboro establishment cast black activists as extremists, as was the focus of Chafe’s 
study, Charlotte’s business and political leadership portrayed labor organizers and 
workers interested in unionizing as dangerous fanatics, despite their small numbers and 
relatively modest demands. Business leaders would proclaim that wages were fine and 
workers were content, that unions were radical and Charlotte workers did not need them, 
despite workers’ persistent assertions to the contrary. Expanding on the work of Chafe, 
Lassiter, and other scholars who have argued that North Carolina’s politics of moderation 
stymied civil rights activism in the state, I argue that the same politics of moderation 
became an indispensable tool for undermining and neutralizing organized labor and 
worker protest in Charlotte. Through the lens of public employee unions and the 
campaigns waged against them, this chapter traces the evolution of a particular brand of 
anti-union politics that would become instrumental in American politics in the decades 
that followed. 
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 Although battles over school desegregation dominate most accounts of Charlotte 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, conflicts over the rights of public workers to 
organize and bargain collectively were equally important during this period, though they 
have received less scholarly attention.281 As the Charlotte Observer editorial cartoon 
below illustrates, however, school desegregation, firefighter unionization, and sanitation 
strikes took equal billing on the local political stage and each represented potential 
conflagrations the city wanted to resolve and keep out of the national spotlight.   
282 
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 This chapter traverses the political landscape of public employee activism in 
Charlotte in the aftermath of both North Carolina’s 1959 ban on police and firefighter 
unions and public sector collective bargaining as well as an emergent civil rights 
movement in Charlotte and the nation. Specifically, this chapter examines the Charlotte 
firefighters’ partially successful 1969 challenge to the law in federal district court and the 
decision of an all-white fire department to hire the state’s preeminent civil rights attorney, 
Julius Chambers, to litigate the case. In the process, it uncovers a history of white 
working-class political activism in the postwar urban South not captured by narratives of 
Massive Resistance and the Silent Majority.283  
 The chapter also looks at a series of strikes wages by the city’s poorly paid and 
predominantly black sanitation workers. It shows how city leaders’ embrace of racial 
moderation both enabled initial gains for sanitation workers—especially when they 
feared strikers might resort to violence, potentially marring the city’s image in the eyes of 
the nation—while, at the same time, stymying substantive challenges to the city’s broader 
economic order. Both the history of the Charlotte sanitation strikes and the events 
surrounding the Atkins case are significant because they contribute to scholarly 
understandings of public worker unionism in the civil rights era South, a subfield that still 
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remains remarkably thin.284  
 
The Changing Landscape of Public Employee Unionism in State and Nation 
 The 1960s proved to be a transformative decade for the nation’s public workers. By 
1962, one-eighth of the American workforce labored in the public sector, and between 
1955 and the early 1970s, public employee union rosters grew from about 400,000 to 
over 4 million members, helping AFSCME become one of the AFL-CIO’s largest 
affiliates.285 In addition to their growing numbers, public sector unions also won a 
number of important legal victories during this period. In 1959, Wisconsin became the 
first state to pass legislation granting public workers organizational and bargaining 
rights—leading twenty-two states to follow suit over the next decade.286  
 Just a few years after Wisconsin, on January 17, 1962, President John F. Kennedy 
issued Executive Order 10988, recognizing the right of all federal employees to join 
unions and bargain collectively. This represented a watershed moment for public 
workers, who had been excluded from the 1935 Wagner Act, and led AFL-CIO president 
George Meany to proclaim the executive order “a Wagner Act for public employees.”287 
A number of factors influenced Kennedy’s decision to pass Executive Order 10988. 
Since the 1919 Boston police strike, policymakers—including, President Franklin D. 
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Roosevelt—expressed fear of and opposition to public employee unionization.288 By the 
1950s, however, developments in the private sector had decreased fears of a militant and 
strike-prone public workforce: the passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which weakened 
labor radicalism and provided more protections to business; the CIO’s expulsion of 
communist-influenced unions and the creation of a more conservative AFL-CIO; the 
increasingly routinized nature of private sector labor relations; and growing support for 
government employee unionization among public administrators.289 In addition, Kennedy 
was also beholden to the AFL-CIO for its voter mobilization efforts, which had been 
decisive in his election. To begin to repay his political debts to organized labor, Kennedy 
appointed prominent labor lawyer and general counsel for the United Steelworkers of 
America, Arthur Goldberg, as Secretary of Labor and issued Executive Order 10988.290 
According to Joseph McCartin, the decision to issue an executive order rather than go 
through legislative channels was a calculated one: “Kennedy preempted the legislative 
process and issued an executive order intended to placate his labor allies while ensuring 
that the advent of collective bargaining in the federal service would alter existing labor 
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relations as little as possible.”291 President Kennedy supported public employee union 
rights because the labor movement no longer threatened his political success, but instead 
assured it.  
In the years that followed, public workers staged an unprecedented number of 
strikes. In 1966, teachers declared thirty-three walkouts across the nation—more work 
stoppages in one year than in the previous ten combined. The following year, the United 
States witnessed a record 250 public employee strikes, a fourfold increase over the 
previous one-year record.292 A few strikes, such as the New York and Memphis 
sanitation strikes of 1968, the Charleston hospital workers strike in 1969, and the wildcat 
postal workers strike in 1970—carried out by 180,000 postal workers nationwide, two-
thirds of whom were black—were particularly effective in capturing national attention 
and throwing light on the difficult, dangerous, and often demeaning work carried out by 
many of the nation’s public employees.293 As Joseph McCartin has argued, “sanitation 
workers were in many ways the militant vanguard of the public sector union movement 
… they symbolized the liberating potential of public sector unionism, and their job 
actions helped inspire many other public sector workers to strike.”294 In the state of North 
Carolina, sanitation workers followed the national trend by leading public sector 
unionism. Municipal employees declared 26 strikes, slowdowns, and work stoppages 
between January 1, 1968, and July 1, 1970 and of the 10,443 days lost due to labor 
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disruptions, 82 percent (or 8,851) were caused by the state’s 2,251 sanitation workers. 295 
When placed at the fore rather than at the periphery of the post-1945 labor movement, 
public unions force the narrative to become more rather than less militant.296  
 Within the national context of an increasingly militant public sector in the late 
1960s, Charlotte’s firefighters renewed efforts to improve their working conditions after 
nearly a decade of inactivity. Since the 1959 state ban, firefighters had grown 
increasingly frustrated with stagnant wages, dangerously long hours, outdated 
equipment, and the absence of any formal organization through which to express 
grievances. According to firefighter Jesse Atkins, the department had been a “very proud 
organization for years, but all the pride had gone out of it” after the state legislature 
passed the 1959 law. “People couldn’t belong, you didn’t know who to talk to, you didn’t 
know what to say, you didn’t have any representation, period,” explained Atkins. 
Promotions and job assignments were also determined “haphazardly,” often based on 
personal connections rather than merit.297  Atkins described constant discord within the 
department, “guys complaining, ‘I don't trust him, he don't trust me,’ [and] your lives 
depend on each other.”298 For Jesse Atkins and other firefighters, the union provided a 
hope to overcome the problems of a job that paid barely enough to survive, much less 
one that compensated workers for risking their lives on the job.  
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 In addition to grievances over wages and working conditions, the men also 
resented the city’s unofficial policy of coercing firefighters and other public employees to 
donate their “fair share” to the United Appeal, an organization that shared many members 
with the Chamber of Commerce.299 Mayor Brookshire was likely influential in this policy 
as he chaired the United Appeal in 1956 and spoke proudly of his role in helping the 
organization raise its first million dollars.300 The firefighters felt that this was essentially 
a tax on their already low paychecks, and one from which they saw no benefits. More 
importantly, they argued that the city was essentially creating  a dues check-off for 
United Appeal, while it refused one for the union.301 Pressure to give came directly from 
the fire chiefs. “Say you were making some money at that time,” explained firefighter 
and former Assembly member Bob Summey, “and you were told you owed 3 dollars and 
you didn't want to give 3 dollars a week, you wanted to mark that out and put a dollar. 
That card would come back to you from the chief saying ‘Sign it.’ And that's just the way 
that was.”302 The fire department leadership required the “fair share,” whether or not a 
fighter could afford the contribution or not. 
 In response to such grievances, city firefighters formed the Firefighters Assembly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 According to Charlotte Observer editor C.A. McKnight, “You were nothing [in Charlotte] until you 
headed the United Way or build a Red Cross building…There was no prestige in Charlotte until you 
worked for the community.” Gaillard, The Dream Long Deferred, 23. The United Appeal’s 
fundraising efforts in Charlotte, which essentially amounted to a payroll deduction, were common 
throughout the United States in the post-World War II years, when the charity relied almost 
exclusively on workplace fundraising, especially through unions. For more on the history of the 
United Appeal’s workplace fundraising efforts, see sociologist Emily Barman’s Contesting 
Communities: The Transformation of Workplace Charity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 
32-40.  
300 Stanford R. Brookshire, interviewed by Edward Perzel, 16 February 1973, WSOC-TV Oral History 
Project, UNCC. 
301 Jim Black, interviewed by author, 26 June 2014; Lee Abernethy, interviewed by author, 27 June 
2014. 
302 Jim Black interview; Bob Summey interview.  
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in March 1967 under the leadership of Jesse Atkins.303 Like many white working class 
residents of the Carolina Piedmont, Atkins was born into a family of millworkers who 
had been involved in textile strikes through the 1930s and 1940s, and these experiences 
informed his views toward unions.304 Not long after he was born, in 1928, Atkins and his 
mother moved to Charlotte from nearby Pineville. Once there, his mother secured a job at 
Highland Park Mill Number Three, where his uncle was a supervisor, and moved into a 
mill-owned house. Atkins’s mother soon remarried, and one of his earliest childhood 
memories was sitting on the picket line with his stepfather, also a millworker. He 
described the Christmas of 1938 being “one of the hardest Christmases in the world. We 
knew we were going to have to get out of the mill house by January one, because Papa 
[his stepfather] got fired for union participation.”305  
 In the years that followed his family’s eviction from the mill-owned home, both 
work and housing remained precarious for the Atkins family. Making things worse, 
Atkins’s stepfather had also developed a steady gambling habit and, unbeknownst to his 
family, had begun wagering the family home in his regular games. His enthusiasm for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Jesse Atkins, interviewed by Kieran Taylor, 19 May 2008. Interview U-0370, Southern Oral 
History Program Collection (#4007), SHC.  
304 In addition to coming from mill families, many firefighters came from families with numerous 
relatives who worked for the fire department, the police department, or both. Jim Black, for example, 
had a father who was a police officer and two brothers in the fire department. Charlotte instituted a 
civil service law against multiple family members working in the same occupation in the mid-1950s, 
but reversed it sometime in the mid-1960s. Bob Summey, a firefighter and the brother-in-law of Don 
Black, recalled being told by his father, who was a police officer and former millworker who had been 
in a union, “Get on the fire department, police department, or post office. If you keep your nose clean, 
there will be a paycheck every Friday." Many of the city’s firefighters grew up near one another and 
for many, Charlotte’s technical high school and Central High became the gateway to working for the 
city. “You had a choice of either going back into the mill,” explains Bob Summey, or you could go 
work for “the fire department, police department, and the post office. And if you were an excellent 
baseball player, you could get hired to the police or fire department if you didn't even hardly know 
your own name!” Jim Black interview; Bob Summey, interview with author, 26 June 2014.   
305 Jesse Atkins interview.  
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gambling eventually outmatched his luck, however, and Atkins’s family found 
themselves homeless for a second time. Again, Atkins and his mother moved, but this 
time leaving his stepfather behind. By sixteen, Atkins, too, had begun working in the 
mill, putting in a seven-hour shift after school cleaning textile harnesses, which he 
described as a “very dirty, very nasty job,” but one that provided he and his with mother 
much-needed income after his stepfather lost their second home in that fateful poker 
game. Atkins soon dropped out of school to work full-time in the mill to provide for his 
mother, who had developed severe rheumatoid arthritis from decades of textile work.306  
 In 1951, Atkins left the mill to work as a firefighter in Charlotte, which he 
described as a childhood dream. Because of their low pay, many city firefighters took 
second jobs to make ends meet.307 Atkins held a series of part-time jobs working as an 
announcer and host for local radio station WIST.308 At the time of the Firefighters’ 
Assembly’s creation, Atkins was hosting two shows: Charlotte Speaks and Comment, 
which he described as an “interview talk show” on local issues. Atkins’s experience in 
radio proved an asset in both persuading his fellow firefighters to support the Assembly 
and in serving as one of the Assembly’s primary spokesmen.309      
 From its founding, the Assembly’s leadership insisted that the organization was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Jesse Atkins interview. 
307 Atkins estimated that 60-70% of men had to work two jobs. He had worked as many as three jobs 
“because we don’t make enough to feed our families,” Atkins told the lawyers during the Atkins 
deposition. Jesse Atkins deposition, Atkins v. City of Charlotte, p. 37. 
308 This being the same station that the FCC censured in 1966 for announcing that “an amoeba is loose 
somewhere on the outskirts of the city!” causing mass hysteria across the city as locals jammed police 
and health department phone lines. See Mark Washburn, “The Day an Amoeba Attacked Charlotte,” 
Charlotte Observer, 1 November 2013.  
309 Jesse Atkins interview. 
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not a union.310 Nevertheless, Charlotte’s political and business leadership opposed any 
organization of firefighters, as they had nine years prior (in events that precipitated the 
state ban). The Chamber of Commerce urged city council to “use whatever means 
necessary” to disband the Assembly, claiming it “disturbed the community” and posed “a 
threat to its continued good order and effective operation.”311 City Manager William 
Veeder seconded the Chamber’s call, declaring that the organization sufficiently 
resembled a union enough to violate both the 1959 state law and a 1962 city ordinance 
prohibiting firefighter unions. He issued a report recommending that City Council 
immediately order the Assembly to disband.312 The city’s Fire Chief, Walter Black, also 
opposed the union and, according to numerous firefighters, would arbitrarily transfer men 
from one firehouse to another in retaliation for union involvement.313 Such moves created 
substantial resentment among the men. Bob Middleton, one of the founding members of 
the Assembly and someone who Jesse Atkins described as having “a lot of guts,” 
believed that if such treatment continued, “then the job wasn’t worth having. I’d go find a 
job somewhere else. I wasn’t going to live under the tyrannical rule of Walter Black.”314 
Middleton and other firemen were tired of a city and department that ignored and 
belittled their needs.  
 The city’s papers, too, were less than enthusiastic about firefighters unionizing 
and took positions that could best be described as cautious ambivalence. “The public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 Jerry Adams, “They Plan New People’s Assembly,” Charlotte Observer, 11 July 1967. 
311 Emery Wister, “Chamber Attacks,” Charlotte News, 13 April 1967.  
312 “Firemen’s Case: Two Basic Questions Need Answers,” Charlotte Observer, 11 July 1967. 
313 Jesse Atkins, for example, was moved twice after he became involved wit the Assembly. These 
transfers would become an important piece of evidence in the case Chambers brought against the city. 
Atkins interview.  
314 Bob Middleton, interview with author, 27 June 2014; Atkins interview.  
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interest,” maintained the Observer, “does not lie in firing Charlotte firemen who feel 
strongly enough about the Assembly to risk their jobs,” nor “does it lie … in inviting a 
full-fledged labor union into the department and conceding the right to strike to 
employees who protect property and human life.” Instead, the paper made two 
suggestions: (1) firefighters should challenge the untested state law in court; and (2) City 
Council should review its “non-recognition” policy, which “so far has caused the council 
to allow major discord in the fire department to build up for too long. The least these men 
deserve, even now, is a fair and public hearing before an open-minded council.”315 While 
the Observer was not necessarily supportive of unions, it thought that the firefighters 
were getting a raw deal and should challenge the restrictions being placed on them. 
 Whether or not it was intentional, the Assembly heeded the Observer’s 
suggestion. On July 10, 1967, the Assembly convened a meeting at the Firemen’s Hall to 
formulate a response to Veeder’s report. With more than 200 firefighters and their wives 
in attendance, the Assembly voted to challenge North Carolina’s law banning firefighters 
from unionizing and prohibiting all public employee unions from bargaining 
collectively.316 With unanimous approval from its membership, the Assembly’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 The Observer also framed the debate within the language of taxpayer rights, saying that [the 
legality of the Assembly] “raises fundamental questions for Charlotte firemen and for city taxpayers, 
who are their employers.” “Firemen’s Case: Two Basic Questions Need Answers,” Charlotte 
Observer, 11 July 1967. The use of “taxpayer rights” language foreshadowed a fundamental shift in 
debates over public sector workers that dominated the second half of the 1970s (and beyond). See 
McCartin, “Fire the Hell Out of Them,” 82. 
316 At the time the case was filed, the department consisted of approximately 438 employees-the 
Chief, two assistant chiefs, 14 deputy chiefs, 60 fire captains, and 56 fire lieutenants, with the 
remainder being fire fighters, inspectors, fire alarm personnel and office personnel. The plaintiffs 
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leadership resolved to take the state law “to the U.S. Supreme Court if necessary.”317  
According to one report of the meeting, “the crowd … let out a roar” when Assembly 
secretary Robert L. McCall charged that the state law against unionization violated the 
firefighters’ “civil rights.”318 
 That the Assembly’s leadership would make claims using the language of “civil 
rights” to an all-white audience of firefighters and their wives is significant. Ten years 
before, when the firefighters lost their right to unionize, they did not frame—and would 
not have framed—the state’s actions in terms of an infringement on their “civil rights.” 
Such vocabulary would have held little meaning for a group of white working-class 
firefighters articulating their grievances against the city. But in the wake of a well-
mobilized and well-publicized civil rights movement that had captured the attention of 
the nation, the Assembly now had a new framework to understand and protest the ban on 
firefighter unions. Conscious of Charlotte’s moderate stance on civil rights in comparison 
with other southern cities and aware that reporters were attending the Assembly meeting, 
the Assembly leadership’s choice of the term “civil rights” was likely deliberate, and it 
offers an interesting example of white workers taking cues from black civil rights 
activists. Jesse Atkins, in fact, confirmed being inspired by black activism: “In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Jerry Adams, “They Plan New People’s Assembly,” Charlotte Observer, 11 July 1967.  
318 Even though he had only recently joined the fire department, Jim Black described joining the 
Assembly out of frustration over the city ordinance against the firefighter union, which prohibited 
more than three firefighters from congregating to discuss fire department affairs. Jim’s older brother, 
Don Black, was the one who initially told him about the ordinance’s restrictions, to which Jim recalls 
telling his brother, incredulously, "So, what you're telling is that if you and I and my older brother 
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responded in the affirmative, Jim told his brother, "Well, I'll be at that meeting!" Jim Black, interview 
with author, 26 June 2014. Civil rights quote comes from Jerry Adams, “They Plan New People’s 
Assembly,” Charlotte Observer, 11 July 1967.  
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sixties,” he said, “there was big movements, Martin Luther King and all these other 
people. I thought to myself, ‘They can’t get me for free assembly.’” 319 Historians have 
focused substantial attention on organized labor’s influence on black political activism, 
and, conversely, on negative white responses to the civil rights movement, but the 
Assembly’s actions offer an interesting counterexample of an unlikely group of white 
working-class southerners who emulated the language of the black freedom struggle in 
the hopes of winning political ground. 
 As the city’s firefighters were building their case, Charlotte’s sanitation workers 
staged a three-day strike in August 1968. Like the city’s firefighters and all other 
municipal employees, sanitation workers were prohibited from bargaining with their 
employer, the city of Charlotte. Fed up with long hours, dangerous working conditions, 
low wages, inadequate equipment, and no organization through which to express their 
grievances or seek remediation, the city’s sanitation workers resorted to the only option 
they had left: not working. After two days of uncollected garbage piling up on sidewalks 
and overflowing into streets across town, city officials, pressured by the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), struck a deal with its 
workers and offered a fifteen-percent wage increase—greater than the ten percent the city 
initially proposed—to settle the strike. City leaders were eager to avoid escalating the 
situation or drawing national attention, as they had watched unrest unfold in Memphis. 
With AFSCME’s help, the strikers negotiated a $588 raise for the coming year.320 
Although the strike ended, many of the sanitation workers’ grievances remained and, as a 
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result, AFSCME saw the moment as a prime opportunity to organize a large segment of 
the city’s still lowest-paid public employees.  
AFSCME organizer Jim Pierce spearheaded these efforts and, more generally, 
was instrumental in forging alliances between civil rights activists and labor organizers, 
though little has been written on him. Like Jesse Atkins, Pierce was born into what he 
described as a “union family” on the Osage Reservation (his father was white and his 
mother was half-Cherokee) in Oklahoma that Pierce described as heavily unionized. His 
father, a member of a local carpenters’ union, was involved in interracial organizing of 
sawmill workers and as a child, Pierce frequented AFL meetings with him, or what he 
called “anti-CIO meetings.” Preachers used tent revivals to lambast the CIO, explained 
Pierce, “and they had some of the most horrible movies and films that you have ever 
seen. Industry was using the preachers to defeat the CIO, and the AF of L was glad to see 
it happen, I guess.” 321  
Pierce’s experience during World War II, however, changed his perception of 
industrial organizing and the CIO. Pierce explained, “While I was in the Navy … the 
miners went on strike, and they were CIO and everybody was raising hell about the 
miners striking during the war, and I thought they were pretty gutsy people … I think that 
brief exposure to John L. Lewis … made me feel pretty good about the CIO.”322 After the 
war, Pierce used the technical training he had received in the military to install office 
equipment for Western Electric in Fort Worth, Texas. Since he “had always been taught 
that any union is better than no union,” Pierce joined a small company union there, which 
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staged a wildcat strike in 1947 not long after he arrived. In the years that followed, Pierce 
became more involved in labor organizing, working in various positions across the South, 
first as a field organizer and eventually as the Southeast Regional Director of the 
International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) and the southern coordinator for the 
Industrial Union Department (IUD) of the CIO.323  
As Southern Coordinator of the IUD, Pierce was appointed to lead the Carolinas 
Coordinated Organizing Drive, the Textile Industrial Drive and the Wood and Furniture 
and Related Industries Drive. Of his position, Pierce said, “I accepted the appointment 
with a great deal of enthusiasm and a very humble heart.”324 During his time with the 
IUD, Pierce was asked to address the North Carolina AFL-CIO Annual Convention on a 
number of occasions. At the 1964 Convention, he discussed the dire conditions under 
which too many of North Carolina’s citizens still labored and his hopes that organizing 
these workers might prove the first step in improving their predicament. Pierce 
condemned the fact that North Carolina’s workers received, on average, 75 cents per hour 
less than elsewhere in the nation, yet the fruits of their labor were sold on the national 
market for the same price as goods produced in high-wage regions. “What would 75 
cents an hour do to North Carolina if we were to come up to the average wage in the 
United States?” Pierce enjoined the audience. To this, his answer was unequivocal:  
If we got that $1500 in the workers’ pay checks, it would mean that every 
worker in North Carolina could pay off a mortgage on a $20,000 home. 
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Every worker in North Carolina. If all the workers in North Carolina were 
getting the average wage, it would mean that every child in North Carolina 
could be assured of a college education; and I call thieves who come to 
North Carolina and build a factory and use the community—the 
businessmen, the ministers, the mayor, the sheriff, the governor—to 
exploit workers; I call them thieves. I don’t think they can be called 
anything else.   
 
While he was with the IUD, Pierce focused a disproportionate amount of energy on a 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) hearing against textile manufacturer JP Stevens. 
“It just was a legal battle,” Pierce recalled years later, “and I needed … direct action. I 
tried in many cases to say, you know, screw the NLRB, let’s go out and organize like 
they did in the thirties. Let’s organize and strike and come hell or high water we will 
either win or lose, but the legal thing was just tearing us apart and always will. It just is 
not the way to organize unions.”325 Pierce felt that that IUD was not doing enough for the 
workers of North Carolina and before long, he left.  
 Pierce moved to AFSCME in 1968, which he saw as a more militant left-leaning 
organization—something he was looking for as a self-described “devout socialist.” In 
contrast to his work with the IUD, explained Pierce, “[AFSCME] offered the opportunity 
to get back into the real struggle not only for unions, but for Civil Rights. It looked like a 
union that was really willing to fight and I needed a fight pretty bad then.”326 If it was a 
fight that Pierce needed, the city of Charlotte would prove to be a formidable, if slippery, 
opponent. In his work organizing, Pierce often had to contend with workers who worried 
they might be fired for joining a union. However, as Pierce told sanitation workers after 
the 1968 strike, without a union, their recent gains “were just pieces of paper to be torn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Jim Pierce interview. 
326 Ibid.  
120 
	  
up.”327 Pierce, along with Joseph (Joe) Ames, the secretary-treasurer of AFSCME, and 
William (Bill) Lucy, assistant to AFSCME’s president and the highest ranking African 
American in the organization,328 tried to capitalize on their role in the Memphis sanitation 
strike to enroll more of the city’s workers in the union and, hopefully, expand the 
presence of organized labor in Charlotte.  
On a warm evening in September 1968, Pierce, Ames, and Lucy—all of whom 
had also been involved in the Memphis strike—stood in the bed of a pickup truck to 
address roughly 100 Charlotte sanitation workers in the Motor Transport Department’s 
Siegle Avenue parking lot. Exhausted from a long day’s work, the men nonetheless 
stayed after hours to hear the organizers’ appeals. “Who wants you to join a union?” 
asked Pierce. “Your wife wants you to have a union so you can bring home better wages. 
Your kids want you to have a union so they can have better food and clothing.” Pierce 
reminded the workers of those in Charlotte who did not want public employees to 
unionize, which included mayor Stanford Brookshire, city manager William Veeder, and 
the Motor Vehicle Transport Department’s superintendent, E. G. (Buck) Davis, whom 
Lucy called the “master foot-on-the-neck-keeper.” The connotations imbedded in Lucy’s 
phrase tied the unequal power dynamic between Charlotte’s predominantly black 
sanitation workforce and white political leadership to the long history of whites’ violent 
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suppression of African Americans in the Jim Crow South.329  
In addition to framing the city’s opposition to unions as both an assault to 
sanitation workers’ masculinity—as had been a central issue in Memphis—and their race, 
the AFSCME leaders also connected the plight of Charlotte garbage men to that of 
workers throughout the nation.330 “The city is stronger than any one of you,” Ames told 
workers, “but they’re not stronger than all of you … not stronger than an organization 
you can put together that has the backing of more than 400,000 other public employes 
throughout the country.” “This union spent over $300,000 backing up the people in 
Memphis,” Pierce added, “Just get ready and we’ll be with you.” Pierce, Lucy, and Ames 
impressed upon workers the particular effectiveness of garbage strikes, which 
inconvenienced even the city’s most affluent residents. “When the garbage cans get 
full—especially out in Myers Park [one of Charlotte’s wealthiest neighborhoods]—the 
mayor gets a lot of calls, and he can find money awfully fast when he wants to. The 
longer you strike, the easier it makes it for the old big boy to open his bank account.” By 
the end of the meeting, the AFSCME organizers had persuaded all the men in attendance 
to vote in favor of union representation.331 In all, about 100 city sanitation workers voted 
for the union and 283 men (more than half of the city’s sanitation workforce) applied for 
membership to AFSCME’s newly formed Local 1127.332 Hoping to build on the recent 
Memphis sanitation strikes, AFSCME soon launched a unionization drive in 1969 in 
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330 On gendered rhetoric and the civil rights movement, see Steve Estes, I Am A Man! Race, Manhood, 
and the Civil Rights Movement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).   
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eleven southern states under Pierce’s direction.333 
 Pierce and his fellow organizers envisioned new political possibilities for this 
growing Sunbelt metropolis. “I don’t think there’s any question that the advent of a 
strong union like this in the South will force more recognition of the Negro and the poor 
white,” maintained Pierce. “This is the group that the power structure has refused to deal 
with, but we’re not a traditional union.”334 Pierce hoped the union might begin to bridge 
racial divides in the city to focus on economic issues both black and white working-class 
Charlotteans faced. Pierce was also optimistic that Charlotte municipal workers would 
benefit from the national surge in public worker organizing, stating, “If there is a group 
of forgotten people, it’s those that work for the public.”335  
Despite Pierce’s optimism, city leaders publicly opposed the efforts of sanitation 
workers to organize, as they had done with the city’s firefighters. Mayor Brookshire also 
affirmed his objection to unionized public workers, arguing that city employees had 
nothing to gain by joining a union and only take-home pay to lose. However, union dues 
would amount to less than ten percent ($52 annually) of the raises sanitation workers had 
recently won ($588), due in no small part to union backing.336 Brookshire moved from 
attempting to persuade workers to veiled threats just a few weeks later when he warned, 
“This is a free country, and everybody who works for the City of Charlotte has options 
and the city itself has options in the matter of offering employment.” In barely coded 
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terms, Brookshire insinuated that the city might revise its policy of only hiring employees 
who lived in Mecklenburg County (thus attracting workers from surrounding counties 
accustomed to lower pay scales).337 The Charlotte Observer objected to sanitation 
workers’ wage demands on the grounds that they exceeded “fair market wages.” How 
could the city’s garbage workers, even those who had been working for decades, expect 
higher wages than beginning teachers, asked one editorial?338 Despite the Observer’s 
objections, however, the “market” could and, in fact, did sustain higher wages for 
sanitation workers, as exemplified by higher wages in other cities across the nation with 
comparable costs of living.339   
 
Atkins v. City of Charlotte, Julius Chambers, and the Pursuit of Economic Justice  
 
After the Firefighters Assembly declared its intent to pursue legal action against 
the state ban, the organization made an even more unpredictable move—it hired African 
American attorney Julius Chambers as lead counsel on the case.340 Although fairly 
inexperienced at the time, Chambers would soon become one of North Carolina’s, and 
arguably the nation’s, preeminent civil rights attorneys of this period. Best known for his 
decisive role in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, Chambers secured 
the 1971 unanimous Supreme Court decision affirming the constitutionality of 
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339 The concept of “fair wages” was very much in flux during the mid-twentieth century, as human 
capital theory, which advanced an individualized framework for conceptualizing labor, displaced more 
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mandatory school busing to desegregate public schools.341 Describing his initial call to 
Chambers, Atkins recalled, “I didn't know him. I knew what he had done, his house had 
been bombed and all this,342 and so I called … and told him who I was and what I wanted 
him to do. I said, ‘Would you help me?’ He said, ‘I'd be delighted.’ I like to fell out of 
the damn chair.”343 Marvin Wilson, who joined the fire department during the Atkins 
case and became president of the union in the mid-1980s, described Chambers as giving 
the firefighters “a big break. He only charged them $50,000 to take it all the way to the 
Supreme Court and said ‘pay it when you can.’”344  
Bill Brawley, vice-president of the Assembly and eventually president of the 
Charlotte Labor Council, explained that hiring Chambers served two interrelated 
strategic functions. First, it bought the firefighters time. With the fire department still 
being “lily-white,” the department’s leadership believed an anti-discrimination lawsuit 
was imminent. Brawley maintained that the fire department would have been headed 
towards a racial discrimination lawsuit “had it not been for the fact that the best civil 
rights lawyer in the state, who would probably have handled the suit, was representing 
the firefighters, and he wouldn’t take those cases because of the conflict [of 
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interest?].”345 The second consequence of hiring Chambers was it sent a message to city 
officials. The city of Charlotte had already acquainted itself with Chambers during his 
skillful litigation of Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Schools and it was not eager to face 
him again.  
 Some firefighters objected to hiring Chambers, especially in light of his role in the 
Swann case, but Brawley said his response to such complaints was always the same: 
“Hell, that’s why we hired him! He wins.”346 Another firefighter, Jim Black, explained 
the reasoning behind hiring Chambers, Stein, and Ferguson, saying, “the reason they 
hired them, was to get [the lawsuit] into federal court without going through local courts. 
It probably would never have made it to federal court otherwise … this was during the 
civil rights era, so if we got into federal court, then this is a civil right we have to 
unionize, and if it went into federal court then we would have a good chance of winning 
it.”347 Though some firefighters disliked Chambers’s role in the desegregation of 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, his proponents in the fire department, who were in the 
majority, prized his winning record. 
Throughout his career, Chambers was known for his reserved, quiet confidence. 
His unflappability worked to his advantage in the courtroom. “A lot of people were 
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surprised to see Chambers in court,” said his partner Jim Ferguson. “Some people 
expected him to be bombastic and always on the attack. Chambers never raised his voice. 
He was always very low-key and very calm, and because of this approach, he disarmed 
the witness.” Chambers often twiddled a string or rubber band while questioning 
witnesses, which, according to former law partner John Gresham, had the hypnotic effect 
of “lulling the witness into a false sense of security.”348 Gresham also described how 
Chambers would begin interrogating witnesses with overly simple questions, leading 
witnesses to believe that Chambers was not adequately prepared for trial. “You could see 
the witness relaxing and thinking, ‘This guy doesn’t even know how we operate.’ Then 
Chambers would very carefully draw a circle around what he wanted to know, and as 
soon as he had the loop closed, he would bore in, and you could see the witness thinking, 
‘Oh, my God!’”349 
Although much of Chambers’s courtroom success was undoubtedly owed to what 
both colleagues and adversaries recognized as a brilliant legal mind, the NAACP’s Legal 
Defense Fund (LDF) provided much needed support for Chambers to get his practice off 
the ground in a community still largely hostile to black attorneys, especially those 
working to destabilize the segregationist regime.350 In 1963, after Chambers had 
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graduated at the top of his class from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Law School and after serving as the first African American editor-in-chief of the North 
Carolina Law Review, he was chosen to be one of the organization’s two inaugural civil 
rights interns.351 The LDF created this position to train and support young black 
attorneys willing to return to the South to work on civil rights cases. “It was a great 
experience,” recalled Chambers, “where one learned first-hand how the Fund operated, 
how it went about preparing cases and briefs, [and] the kind of approach it was taking 
and principles it was trying to evolve.”352 The LDF provided interns with a year of 
litigation training in its New York office, as well as $25,000 in seed money to help them 
get their firms off the ground. The seed money went towards the purchase of office 
furniture, stocking a law library, as well as salary subsidies for the firm’s first three years 
in practice.353  
In moving to North Carolina, Chambers became part of a small but growing cadre 
of African American attorneys in the state who had faith in the courts to remedy the 
injustices of Jim Crow. One study estimates that by the mid-1950s, there were no more 
that 40 to 50 black attorneys throughout North Carolina, and when Chambers arrived in 
Charlotte, he became one of fewer than ten black attorneys who had ever practiced in the 
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city. The LDF supported Chambers’s choice of Charlotte to open his office, hopeful that 
North Carolina—with its reputedly moderate political climate and strong statewide civil 
rights leadership supportive of using the courts to undermine segregation and white 
supremacy—might yield courtroom victories that could provide breakthroughs for the 
civil rights movement. As chance would have it, Chambers opened his law office in July 
1964, the same week that President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into 
law.354  
As soon as Chambers opened his practice in a modest second-floor, cold-water 
walkup at 405½ East Trade Street, he began travelling around the state to meet with 
black attorneys, clergy members, businessmen, and civil rights leaders about potential 
lawsuits. Following the Civil Rights Act’s passage, Chambers hoped to challenge 
segregation in North Carolina’s schools, public accommodations, and places of 
employment. In 1967, Chambers hired James Ferguson, a black attorney from Asheville 
who had just graduated from Columbia Law School, and Adam Stein, a white attorney 
who had interned with Chambers, thus creating the first integrated law practice in the 
state of North Carolina.355  
 Chambers and his colleagues saw economic justice as central to the civil rights 
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struggle. In choosing cases, they focused on filing class action lawsuits, rather than 
individual cases. In their estimation, if one employee faced unfair or discriminatory 
practices within a particular company or industry, it was likely that others did as well. 
Thus, the firm concentrated its energy and resources on cases with the potential to 
establish broad legal principles that would improve the employment opportunities for 
workers across the nation.356 In addition to its better-known work on school 
desegregation, Chambers, Stein and Ferguson litigated a number of influential 
employment-related cases throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In arguably the most 
important case, Griggs v. Duke Power (1971), the Supreme Court unanimously held that 
private employers could not use tests or other screening devices to select employees if 
such tests disproportionately excluded African Americans. Griggs established the legal 
doctrine of disparate impact in employment discrimination, thus holding that an employer 
who employed race-neutral testing could still be found to have violated Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act even if there was no intent to discriminate.  
 Robert Belton, a law professor and attorney who joined Chambers’s firm as it was 
litigating Griggs, argues that the case “ushered in one of the greatest social movements in 
the history of this nation because it opened up jobs and other employment opportunities, 
previously limited to white males, in both the public and private sectors for millions of 
African Americans [and] women,” an outcome that would have been impossible under 
the intent-based framework of the pre-Griggs era.357 In what is regrettably the only full-
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length study of Chambers’s impressive legal career, one scholar further contends, 
“Chambers would do more to shape the contours of evolving civil rights law than any 
other single attorney in private practice, and perhaps more than any other single attorney 
of this period save, in view of his influence atop the LDF, Jack Greenberg.”358 Griggs 
and Swann, along with Title VII landmarks Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation (4th 
Circuit, 1971) and Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody (1975), “defined the limits of 
federal civil rights law in employment and education in that era,” fundamentally 
“reshap[ing] the nation’s workplaces and schools.”359  
 Similarly to the above cases in significance, Chambers would later describe the 
Atkins case as both one of the most important civil liberties cases of his career and for 
workers in the state of North Carolina.360  In making their case, Chambers and his 
colleagues, who were also joined by attorney Reg Hamel, argued that the state ban 
constituted a violation of the Firefighters’ Assembly members’ First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.361 Given the civil liberties concerns at issue, the North Carolina Civil 
Liberties Union (NCCLU), an affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
filed an amicus brief in the case, upon Chambers’s request.362 The NCCLU’s brief 
opened by quoting Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America: “The most natural 
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privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that of combining his exertions 
with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with them … One hundred 
and twenty three years after Alexis de Tocqueville reported his prescient observations of 
America,” continued the NCCLU’s amicus brief, “the Supreme Court of the United 
States accorded freedom of association full and independent status as an explicit aspect of 
liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment...” The NCCLU 
further maintained that North Carolina’s ban on public sector bargaining was overly 
broad, constituting an unnecessary violation of the First Amendment. While the state 
could legally prohibit, penalize, and ultimately fire those public workers who engaged in 
strikes judged to be “imperiling the public safety,” it was unconstitutional for the state to 
jail, fire, or otherwise penalize “citizens merely for joining together for lawful purposes 
in a national labor union. At least it may not do so while the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments remain a part of the Constitution and while this court sits.” The brief also 
highlighted the fact that North Carolina’s ban on police and firefighter unions was the 
most restrictive in the nation. 363  
US 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge J. Braxton Craven and Judges Woodrow 
Wilson Jones and Wilson Warlick of the Federal Court of the Western District of North 
Carolina heard the case. Craven was named US District Judge for the Western District of 
North Carolina in 1961 by President Kennedy, and subsequently promoted to the 4th 
Circuit in 1966 by President Johnson. By the time he was litigating Atkins, Chambers had 
already faced Craven a number of times in the courtroom. Throughout much of his 
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judicial career, Craven espoused North Carolina’s particular brand of moderate ideology. 
While serving as a state Superior Court judge, Craven made a widely publicized speech 
in 1956 regarding school desegregation in which he advocated that North Carolina’s 
school districts take the path of moderation—in the form of “token integration”—in an 
effort to forestall court-ordered “total integration.”364 In 1965, Chambers encountered 
Judge Craven in the courtroom when the judge ruled in favor of Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Schools (CMS) in the lower-court Swann ruling. Craven affirmed a controversial portion 
of the school district’s plan allowing CMS to exclude ten black schools from city-side 
desegregation efforts on the promise that they would eventually be included, although it 
“appeared clearly unconstitutional,” asserts legal historian Davison Douglas. “The judge 
in effect concluded that the school board would eventually afford these students their 
constitutional right to a nonracial school assignment; a delay of one or two years was not 
unreasonable. Left unaddressed,” emphasizes Douglas, “was the general unwillingness of 
the courts to delay the vindication of constitutional rights on grounds of administrative 
expediency.”365 Craven and Chambers would encounter one another again that year when 
Chambers challenged the segregated policies of a local annual high school football game, 
the Shrine Bowl. Craven ruled that the 1965 game could be allowed to proceed, but that 
future games would be integrated.366 As for the other two judges, Wilson Warlick was a 
self-described “states’ rights individualist” who opposed federal intervention in public 
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school desegregation, while Woodrow Jones, who replaced Craven when he was 
appointed to the federal bench, was also a noted conservative jurist.367 
 During the deposition, Chambers along with Reg Hamel, a local attorney, and 
Harry L. Riddle, an attorney and former judge from Morganton, also worked to highlight 
the fact that City Manager Bill Veeder’s personal feelings about unions influenced the 
city of Charlotte’s decision to outlaw them and that the city of Charlotte had recognized 
Local 660 until Veeder became city manager. During the deposition, Veeder affirmed his 
position that union membership was incompatible with public employment.368 Chambers 
then drew Veeder’s attention to an excerpt published in a 1956 International City 
Managers’ yearbook, an organization in which Veeder had served as Vice President from 
1965-1967, and had him read aloud:  
It should be emphasized that an employee organization in itself is 
desirable and that it gives the administrator a regular means of enabling 
employees to participate in the formulation of fundamental policies 
relating to salaries, tenure, and working conditions. To the extent that such 
participation is denied, the grievance would then become processed—
opposition will be enhanced. The Administrator will make every effort to 
establish a fair labor policy and to permit employees to participate through 
their organization in the formulation of this policy. 
 
Chambers then had Veeder read a similar passage from a City Managers’ Association 
Fire Administration Book and eventually got Veeder to agree that he was opposed to 
public employee unionization “for policy reasons,” not because he was implementing 
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modern city management techniques objectively. Chambers then had Veeder again read 
from another City Managers’ Association handbook printed in 1967 that said, “There is 
general legal recognition of the right of public employees to organize for their mutual aid 
and protection. Equally important, an increasing number of cities are adopting positive 
employee relations programs that recognize this right.”369 
 On February 25, 1969, the three-judge panel handed down a decision declaring 
unconstitutional the North Carolina law banning firefighters from joining unions and 
striking down GS 95-99, which declared any violation of the aforementioned statutes to 
be a misdemeanor. Given the conservative leanings of the judges, however, it should 
perhaps be of little surprise that they left in place the portion of the law prohibiting public 
employees from bargaining collectively, limiting the potential effectiveness of the new 
union. The judges held that the law prohibiting firefighters from joining unions violated 
their rights to free speech and peaceful assembly under the First Amendment and the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, citing the ruling in De Jonge v. Oregon 
(1937), which held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to 
freedom of assembly. 370 The judges concurred with the city of Charlotte’s reasoning for 
outlawing fire unions—that fire departments have a necessarily quasi-military structure 
and the state has an interest in firefighters’ responding to fires without questioning the 
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orders of their superiors—but the panel disagreed with the legislation’s latitude. The 
decision stated, “The thought of fires raging out of control in Charlotte while firemen, out 
on strike … watch the flames, is frightening. We do not question the power of the State to 
deal with such a contingency.” However, the judges nonetheless maintained that the law 
constituted an unnecessary “overbreadth” and that “valid state interest may be served by 
more narrowly drawn legislation so as not to infringe the First Amendment.”371  
 Importantly, the decision also included a passage about the importance of unions 
in establishing equitable labor-management relations:  
It is beyond argument that a single individual cannot negotiate on an equal 
basis with an employer who hires hundreds of people. Recognition of this 
fact of life is the basis of labor-management relations in this country. 
Charlotte concedes in its brief that the right of public employees to join 
labor unions is becoming increasingly recognized and even admits that 
collective bargaining might be beneficial in many situations in the case of 
municipal firemen. 
 
Despite the panel’s contention that it was “beyond argument” that individual workers 
could not negotiate on an equal footing with employers, they did not go so far as to throw 
out the second portion of the law, NC 95-98, which prohibited public employees from 
bargaining collectively. Instead, maintained the judges, this was a political issue, not a 
constitutional one, and thus it should be decided by the North Carolina General 
Assembly, not the courts. The judges asserted, “There is nothing in the United States 
Constitution which entitles one to have a contract with another who does not want it … 
The right to a collective bargaining agreement, so firmly entrenched in American labor-
management relations, rests upon national legislation and not upon the federal 
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Constitution.”372   
 Among the firefighters and their attorneys, the response to the Atkins decision was 
fairly positive, although tinged with disappointment that the ruling did not go further. 
Nevertheless, Assembly leader Jesse Atkins told the Charlotte News that the decision 
“was what we had hoped for … and are well pleased with the outcome.”373 At a fish fry 
not long after the firefighters’ partial court victory, Bill Bradley, the new union president, 
told firefighters that “when we walk into city hall, everyone cheers because they know if 
we get any benefits, they will too, because of the Fireman’s Union. And this is going to 
happen all over the state.”374 During the Atkins case, Brawley described leaving the 
courtroom the night that Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated imbued with a 
newfound sense of solidarity with King and the Memphis sanitation workers. He stated 
that King “was in Memphis over the sanitation workers’ right to belong to a union in 
Tennessee … Here’s [one black man] and the rest of the lily-white fire department suing 
the state of North Carolina over the same thing that [the] black sanitation workers are 
fighting. It’s the same battle.”375 Not long after the decision, 405 of the eligible 430 
Charlotte firefighters joined Local 660 of the International Association of Firefighters 
and union leaders reported that in the wake of the court victory, general morale in the 
department had improved.376   
 Once again deploying the language of the “progressive mystique,” Mayor 
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Brookshire announced that the city would comply with “both the letter and the spirit of 
the law,” saying that the city had “always tried to be most progressive and fair in all its 
relationships with city employees.”377 A month after the ruling, North Carolina Assistant 
Attorney General Andrew Vanore, Jr., and Charlotte City Attorney Henry Underhill 
stated that neither the city nor the state had any plans to appeal the decision, citing a 
recent Nebraska court ruling legalizing public employee unions as well as “recent 
Supreme Court attitudes” as factors influencing his office’s decision.378 
 
North Carolina Public Employee Unionism at the End of the 1960s 
 
 Despite Atkins returning to firefighters the legally protected right to join a union, 
the ruling still left unresolved the problem created by a combination of state laws that 
permitted public workers to unionize while prohibiting government entities from formally 
negotiating with them. Local banker turned Mecklenburg County Representative, Arthur 
(Art) Jones complained that public employee strikes were “intolerable,” yet “right now, 
no avenues for negotiating are open.” 379 Early in the General Assembly’s 1969 session, 
Jones unsuccessfully submitted a resolution calling on the state to commission a study on 
public employee relations. In May of 1969, following strikes by cafeteria workers in 
Chapel Hill and growing public worker unrest throughout the nation, Jones again 
proposed a bill to improve the state’s policy on public worker unions. Jones’s bill would 
have permitted city administrators to bargain with public workers over wages, hours, and 
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working conditions but this effort, too, was defeated. Speaking from the floor of the 
North Carolina House of Representatives, Jones urged his colleagues to rethink their 
position, “By our shortsightedness, we shall now promote the very things the resolution 
was designed to prevent…”380 Indeed, without a formal process for dealing with public 
worker unions, city administrators in the state were in a bind.  
 In an effort to move beyond this impasse, the Charlotte City Council held a public 
hearing on April 21, 1969, to consider a new policy toward municipal employee unions. 
Mayor Brookshire presented the policy, which he had developed in consultation with 
William Veeder, the city manager, and R. A. Earl, the city’s personnel director. The 
policy would allow union representatives to make “suggestions” concerning wages and 
working conditions to the council, but would not recognize union officials as the sole 
bargaining agents for city employees. It also threatened city workers who declared strikes 
or work stoppages with unspecified disciplinary action. The policy appointed Veeder to 
be spokesman for the city in meetings with public workers, but final policy decisions 
would be reserved for the mayor and city council.381  
 At the city council hearing, both business and labor leaders criticized 
Brookshire’s proposal. The president of the newly re-formed Firefighters union, W. J. 
Martin, said that the proposal would effectively nullify the recent Atkins victory. Julius 
Chambers’s law partner, Adam Stein, spoke as counsel for both the firefighters and 
sanitation workers unions and attempted to clarify what he perceived as the city’s 
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misrepresentation of Atkins. The decision, explained Stein, affirmed North Carolina’s ban 
on public employee collective bargaining—i.e. agreements and contracts—but said 
nothing that would prohibit a city from recognizing, negotiating, or discussing 
employment matters with public sector unions. “For the council to hide behind the 
statutes and say it cannot recognize the firemen’s union,” argued Stein, “is to misconstrue 
what Judge Craven said.” Jim Pierce, as AFSCME’s representative at the meeting, called 
the plan “nothing more than six pages of meaningless evasion … an attempt to once 
again pacify the employes of the city of Charlotte and ignore their desires in this matter. 
It says nothing: it will not work, it is unfair, and is an insult to the over 5,000 public 
servants of our city.”382 Pierce and H. L. Riddle, another representative of the firefighters, 
argued that the plan violated public workers’ constitutional right “to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.”383 
 Representatives of business were equally outspoken in their opposition to the 
plan.  Edward J. Dowd, executive vice-president of Central Piedmont Industries, an 
organization that represented 221 of the region’s largest corporations, said the new policy 
would undermine both “the letter and the spirit” of North Carolina’s recently upheld ban 
on public sector collective bargaining.384 Despite objections from both sides, however, on 
May 26, 1969, the Charlotte City Council unanimously passed a resolution adopting the 
new policy towards public employees.385  
 Not long after the city council hearing, Dowd issued a public letter to industry 
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leaders, reprinted in the Charlotte Observer, that unions were unnecessary “because 
Charlotte already has generally enlightened employment practices.”386 The Observer 
agreed with Dowd’s contention that unions were bad for Charlotte, but conceded that 
until working conditions improved, unions would remain appealing to particular sectors 
of the city’s workforce. Before the strike, garbage collectors had starting salaries below 
$80 a week, and following the strike, the city council had “scraped up enough money” for 
a 15 percent raise (keeping their salaries still under $90 per week)—“not exactly the lap 
of luxury,” maintained the paper. If Dowd wanted to ensure that unions would not find a 
warm welcome in Charlotte, the Observer advised that he should present the city with a 
proposal that would improve on the recent city council policy. “Or better still, maybe he 
ought to try his views out about 7 a.m. some morning on Seigle Avenue at the staging 
yard where garbage collectors report for work. They’re the people who have to be 
convinced that unions aren’t necessary.”387  
 Charlotte’s garbage workers were indeed unconvinced, and the effects of the 
political impasse came to bear in the summer of 1969. In mid-July, the city and the 
sanitation workers union were again at odds over pay raises for the coming year, as well 
as the city’s grievance procedure and other non-budgetary items. Pierce argued that the 
city had promised a five percent raise on top of a cost-of-living adjustment, while Veeder 
maintained that the cost-of-living increase was not included.388 Unable to reach an 
agreement, on July 29, 1969, the mostly African American AFSCME Local 1127 
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declared a strike, the first since the Atkins decision. Not long after the strike began, Jim 
Pierce announced that he had been in contact with civil rights organizations and that the 
union could “turn this place into Memphis or Charleston in a few days.”389 The Observer 
urged the state legislators to reconsider their positions on public employee unions. Under 
the current circumstances, argued the paper, cities faced two choices in a strike: “either 
capitulating or going all out to break the strike. The latter course … usually means taking 
on not just the local strength of the union, but a coalition of union and civil rights forces 
mustered on a national basis.”390 Without formal negotiating mechanisms in place, it was 
only labor organizers’ “thinly veiled threats of racial violence” that convinced city hall to 
settle the strike and yield to some of the workers’ demands. Some city councilmembers 
confided that “they had a choice of giving into union pressure or focusing national 
attention on the city as racial unrest flared”—something, as always, the city was eager to 
avoid.391 A Charlotte News article described strikers as “an uncontrollable mob bent on 
violence and ready to start trouble at a moment’s notice” and placed the strike within the 
larger local political context of protests over school desegregation and urban renewal, as 
well as “the growing influence of a militant band of Negro youths who wear the Black 
Panther uniform.”392  
 Fearful that Charlotte’s sanitation strikes would repeat the events in Memphis, the 
city council settled the strike after more than one hundred hours of negotiations, 
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recognizing the union and meeting some of their demands, though still refusing to 
institute a check-off procedure.393 The provisions of the agreement included: (1) 
guaranteeing union members that they would be provided a union mediator during 
grievance proceedings; (2) seniority considerations in promotions; (3) worker 
participation in improving unsafe working conditions; (4) reaffirmation of city’s non-
discrimination policy toward municipal employees; and (5) continuation of fringe 
benefits guaranteed in writing. “The biggest thing this [settlement] means to you,” Pierce 
told sanitation workers, “is the boss can’t shove you around anymore. You got union 
recognition. You got it and it’s yours. You took it from them.”394  
 In the meantime, Jim Pierce was involved in a food workers strike at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in the fall of 1969, a strike which came as the 
result of the university breaking promises it had made in order to end another strike 
which took place earlier that year. Encouraged by recent activism at Duke University and 
North Carolina A & T and within the context of increased black political activism on 
North Carolina’s university campuses, black food workers at UNC Chapel Hill staged a 
strike on February 23, 1969.  With the support of the Black Student Movement (BSM), 
an organization that replaced the university’s NAACP chapter, the food workers’ strike 
lasted nearly a month. In response to growing unrest, Governor Bob Scott called in forty 
highway patrolmen in riot gear as backup. In so doing, the governor had defied the 
wishes of UNC system president William Friday and Chancellor Sitterson, who did not 
believe interference from the state police was necessary.  As the strike progressed, a 
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growing number of students came to support the strike and some faculty members argued 
that Scott’s actions threatened academic freedom on campus and, in the process, the 
university’s progressive image. On March 13, Governor Scott ordered the Chapel Hill 
police to arrest BSM members who were still occupying one of the university’s dining 
halls, which they were operating as an alternate cafeteria. According to historian William 
Link, the governor’s response “united the Chapel Hill campus against [Scott].”395  
 Upon their arrest, students retained Julius Chambers and Adam Stein as their 
attorneys who encouraged the striking workers to unionize, which they did, forming the 
UNC Non-Academic Employees Union. On March 21, the union was finally able to 
negotiate a raise to $1.80 per hour for all minimum wage workers on campus and the 
strike ended. The university did not hold up its end of the deal for long, however and by 
May, UNC had reneged on its pledges by raising workers’ hours—many of whom had 
since joined AFSCME—without giving them overtime pay and outsourcing dining 
services to the SAGA corporation, a California-based catering contractor. SAGA also 
fired a number of workers for union involvement. In response, 250 of the 275 food 
workers again went on strike on November 7, demanding union recognition, a contract, 
and the rehiring of six employees allegedly fired by SAGA for union involvement.  
 The strike had strong support from the state AFL-CIO, who had just elected 
Durham tobacco worker Wilbur Hobby as president in September. The Charlotte 
Observer described him as a “portly” man whose “work garb is an open-necked dress 
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shirt and baggy trousers and he looks as if he had been born on the picket line.”396 
Indeed, his experience as a child during the 1935 General Strike—similarly to those of 
Atkins and Pierce—proved formative in his political and economic worldview.397 Taking 
stock of Hobby’s election, as well as recent events in Charlotte and elsewhere in the state, 
the Observer speculated that the state’s labor movement might become more active in 
civil rights as it worked to organize public employees in the state, a growing number of 
whom were poorly paid African Americans. To Hobby, “the labor movement ha[d] a 
duty to speak out for these people who are in poverty and degradation.”398  
 Since the food workers were now AFSCME members, Jim Pierce, as AFSCME’s 
regional director, got involved. After more than a week on strike, Pierce threated 
“immediate escalation” if SAGA did not agree to bargain with AFSCME. “We’re not 
going to permit a company to come on this campus, destroy an agreement between the 
workers and the university and get away with it,” railed Pierce, “They’re going to give 
these people justice, or there is not going to be food service at this university.”399 Pierce 
was arrested for disorderly conduct while picketing with food workers outside one of 
UNC’s dining halls on November 31.400 
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397 Wilbur Hobby, interviewed by William Finger, 13 March 1975, Interview E-0006, Southern Oral 
History Program Collection (#4007), SHC.  
398 Paul Jablow, “Union Chief Predicts Pressure To Change Law,” Charlotte Observer, 29 September 
1969.  
399 “ ‘Immediate Escalation” of Chapel Hill Strike Threatened,” The Lexington Dispatch, 19 
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400 On the food workers strike in Chapel Hill, see J. Derek Williams, “ ‘It Wasn't Slavery Time 
Anymore:’ Foodworker's Strike at Chapel Hill, Spring 1969.” (M.A. Thesis, University of North 
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 Back in Charlotte, the city failed to hold up its end of agreements reached with 
sanitation workers in 1969 and, lacking any procedures to hold the city accountable, 
sanitation workers again staged strikes in February, June, and September of 1970.401  
On February 5, nearly 400 of the city’s sanitation workers walked off the job over the 
city’s recent firing of 11 union members—a group which included the union president 
and vice president, as well as stewards and members of the negotiating committee—who 
refused to work in weather below 20 degrees.402 The 11 men were concerned for their 
safety after two fellow workers were recently killed while warming their hands over the 
muffler of a garbage truck when it accidentally backed over them—mirroring the events 
that sparked the Memphis sanitation strike. In response, the city fired all strikers who did 
not immediately return to work. Central Piedmont Community College students, local 
representatives from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, outspoken AME 
minister and civil rights leader George Leake, as well as other Charlotteans joined in 
support of strikers.403 Ben Chavis, later a member of the Wilmington Ten and a local civil 
rights activist, also became a prominent supporter of the union and the strike.404 Despite 
such public support, however, the union was operating without one of its most 
experienced advocates, Jim Pierce, who resigned his post in December 1970. One 
account indicated that Pierce left because of differences with national union leadership, 
although his official reason (as reprinted in the Observer) was that he wanted to spend 
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more time with his family.405  
 Pierce’s replacement, Morton Shapiro—who had also been involved in the 1968 
Atlanta sanitation strike—negotiated an end to the strike. However, many sanitation 
workers were unsatisfied with the terms of the agreement. According to union members, 
Shapiro did not take the arbitration hearings seriously, allegedly playing tic-tac-toe 
during the meetings. Of Shapiro’s leadership style more generally, explained one worker, 
“He just don’t have the soul Jim had.”406 On February 10th, the union members voted to 
submit a letter to the union’s international president criticizing Shapiro’s handling of the 
negotiations, charging him with using “back-door” negotiations that excluded them from 
the process, and demanding that he be barred from further negotiations on their behalf.407 
As a result, the sanitation men withdrew from AFSCME in the spring of 1970 and formed 
an independent union, the Brotherhood of Charlotte City Workers Local No. 1. Gene 
Gore, whom Pierce trained and who had been involved in organizing Charlotte sanitation 
workers, coordinated the break with the national union.408 Gore said of the split, 
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Farmer,” Southern Exposure: Our Promised Land, Volume 2 (1974), 33-37; Grant, “The Organized 
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“Stemming from one of the most militant strikes in North Carolina history, we are now 
left with a handful of members and the tag ‘Uncle Tom Union.’”409 In a statement to the 
press, Gore stressed that the move was “not against AFSCME, but only against Morton 
Shapiro.”410  
 After the split, Gore formed the North Carolina Labor Alliance in the hopes of 
bringing public workers across the state under one umbrella organization. Not long after 
its formation, the new organization became involved in a Greensboro sanitation strike in 
June of 1970. Some sanitation workers and black religious leaders in Greensboro, 
however, became unsatisfied with Gore’s efforts. Speaking on behalf of some of the 
sanitation workers, Reverend James Douglas of St. James Presbyterian Church in 
Greensboro said that Gore had performed “as best as he could as a white man. And 
apparently that’s not enough.”411 A few days later, it was reported in the Spartanburg 
Herald-Journal that Gene Gore was no longer representing the Greensboro sanitation 
workers and pointed to a variety of issues plaguing his organization’s effectiveness, as 
Gore felt “it impossible to continue the struggle in Greensboro among municipal workers 
while waging battle against (race) separatists, the AFL-CIO, and city hall.”412 Elaborating 
on what he viewed as an irreparable divide between black separatists in Greensboro and 
the union, Gore said, “The dispute gave the separatists opportunity to inject their Klan 
tactics upon the black community and feel this further divided the workers—some 
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followed the separatists, some followed the union. The others, seeing this division, 
decided to return to work.”413 Not long after his split with Greensboro workers, Gore also 
resigned his post in Charlotte in the period between two sanitation strikes—one in June of 
1970 and the other in September.414 In the September strike, similarly to a recent strike in 
Atlanta that April, the city of Charlotte fired the 411 men who went on strike and began 
hiring to refill the positions within days.415  
 According to one Charlotte Observer article, “the workers’ battle with the city 
began to take on the flavor of the civil rights struggles of the early 1960s.”416  At a 
meeting at Friendship Baptist Church in Northwest Charlotte, organized by the Black 
Solidarity Committee and attended by nearly 150 people, African American leaders 
called the strike a “struggle for freedom” and pursuit of “dignity.” Speakers included the 
Rev. Elo Henderson, leader of the Black Solidarity Committee; Howard Fuller, a Durham 
civil rights leader; Rev. C.E. Quick, minister of the East Stonewall AME Zion Church; 
Rev. Coleman Kerry, a member of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board and minister 
of Friendship Baptist Church; Roy Dunlap, vice president of the sanitation workers 
union, and a number of other speakers. The meeting raised $859.28 towards food and 
other necessities for striking workers.417 However, this would do little in the way of 
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providing for hundreds of families and the city of Charlotte refused to recognize or meet 
with strikers. Without the financial and organizational support of a national union, 
lacking Pierce’s experience and ability to negotiate with city leaders, sanitation workers 
were able to make few substantive gains during these years.418   
  
Conclusion 
In the wake of the ambiguous Atkins decision and without sufficient support in the 
state legislature to overturn the ban on collective bargaining, public employees 
throughout North Carolina were forced to rely on indirect methods to sustain their 
membership and influence the terms of their contracts, as public workers had done in 
what Joseph Slater has called the “pre-collective bargaining” period before the passage of 
Executive Order 10988 in 1962. 419 Although the city of Charlotte continued to forbid a 
dues check-off procedure, Local 660 found a way around by having union members 
travel to each fire house across the city once a month with a cigar box to collect dues 
from individual firefighters, as had been done since the law took effect in 1959.420 At 
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some point in the 1970s, Local 660 began using the firefighters’ credit union as an 
intermediary to collect monthly dues from union members, as the credit union had been 
doing for years for United Appeal donations.  Although the president of the credit union 
balked at first to this plan, Jim Black recalls telling him, “It’s not the city’s credit union. 
It’s our credit union. They shouldn’t have a say in it. They’re cutting our paychecks...but 
what I do with my dollar that I put in there doesn’t concern them.”421 The credit union 
plan succeeded, and Local 660 relied on it to collect union dues until 2013, when city 
employees finally won a dues check-off procedure after more than fifty years of 
advocating for one.422  
 In the years after Atkins, Charlotte’s firefighters also worked to establish 
relationships with councilmembers in order to steer votes in a favorable direction. As one 
study of North Carolina’s public sector negotiations in the absence of a formalized 
collective bargaining procedure found, however, this has led to “a system of winners and 
losers” where “the advantages naturally accrue to public employees who happen to work 
for well connected, persuasive department heads, sympathetic city/county managers, or 
local elected boards who give high priority to positive employee-manager relations.”423 
Among public workers in Charlotte, police and firefighters have been the winners while 
sanitation workers have been the losers. 
However, as former Local 660 president Marvin Wilson explained, even the 
firefighters’ “wins” posed problems for the union. “You do not want to put out in writing 
all of your accomplishments because some of those accomplishments were done behind 
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closed doors,” said Wilson. “You don’t want to put any of the Council people on the spot 
that have helped you achieve some of them.”424 The union was also forced to downplay 
its influence in improving the working conditions for other public employees. “If 
somebody puts it on the front page of the Charlotte paper, ‘Firefighter’s union wins 
health benefits for retirees for all city employees,’ you know how long that’s going to 
last? Until the next budget session. It’s going to get the ax,” asserted Wilson.425 In the 
wake of the Atkins decision, Local 660 and other public worker unions had to navigate 
between achieving gains for workers and avoiding publicity that could provoke a political 
backlash.  
 The Atkins case also exemplified Chambers’s and his colleagues’ belief that legal 
activism had the most transformative possibilities when it operated alongside sustained 
political mobilization. “In order to get a successful outcome,” maintained Jim Ferguson, 
“you need to create a certain climate in the community. Legal cases … happen in the 
context of a political community … And courts, though they like to say they’re 
nonpolitical, react to what’s going on in the community, so community support for a legal 
case is very important.” Chambers believed it was essential to work with activist 
communities throughout every stage of a case in order to both maintain political 
momentum. He recognized that the legal process’s sluggish nature could threaten to 
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disrupt the fragile momentum of political movements. Court cases take years, and, 
according to Ferguson, “there's nothing that can kill a movement more than a legal case. 
What often happens is that the activists then get focused on the case and think that the 
case is going to solve the problem, and then they stop the activism, waiting for the case, 
and then it's like waiting and waiting and waiting. Then by the time the case comes 
around, the movement's dead.”426 Although the Atkins case was indeed an important 
victory for North Carolina’s police and firefighters, who for ten years labored under the 
most restrictive laws in the nation, one has to wonder if the considerable resources 
invested in the case in some ways distracted from potential political mobilization efforts 
to overturn the state ban. Turning to North Carolina’s conservative state legislature to 
expand the rights of public workers would undoubtedly have been a risky endeavor in the 
late 1960s, but as Ferguson suggested, relying on the courts alone also had limitations.   
In a state with an expanding public workforce legally barred from negotiating 
contracts with city and state employers, workers in the years after Atkins were left with 
limited options to improve their working conditions. In addition to creating a system of 
relative winners and losers, another important consequence of the remaining ban on 
public sector bargaining was that unions looked increasingly impotent, as they lacked 
reliable and enforceable means to improve conditions for their members, thus further 
weakening the position of organized labor in North Carolina. Nevertheless, the events 
surrounding the Atkins case were significant because they reveal how the civil rights 
movement informed the political agency of white workers in the civil rights era Sunbelt. 
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At the same time, the response of the city, the state, and the state judicial system to the 
labor activism of firefighters and sanitation workers offers another example of how the 
“politics of moderation” played out in Charlotte. These episodes are all representative of 
what AME minister George Leake described as giving people, or in case, some of 
Charlotte’s hardest working and lowest paid workers, “just enough to keep the match 
from being struck.”427 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“These Damned Lawyers and Their Consultants”:  
The Remaking of Anti-Union Politics in 1970s Charlotte 
 
 
 At the dawn of the 1970s, there was perhaps no group of workers with more to 
gain than those laboring in the South, who had long been excluded from the rewards of 
mid-century economic prosperity. Although the North-South wage differential had been 
declining since the 1940s, between 1973 and 1978 Southern workers still made 17 
percent less than the national average. The region also claimed the largest income gap 
between black and white workers in the nation. In North Carolina, black workers’ per 
capita income remained just 46 percent of their white counterparts by 1969.428  In 
Mecklenburg County, blacks trailed whites by 43 percent in 1970.429 Despite Southern 
boosters’ oft-repeated claims that industrial development would benefit the entire 
region, the influx of capital into the post-World War II South had not trickled down to 
the state’s workers, especially to those who were black. Emboldened by this disparity 
and by the civil rights, anti-war and feminist movements, black and white workers 
across the South joined with industrial, agricultural, and government workers throughout 
the nation in sustaining a level of labor militancy not seen since the 1930s.430 
Nevertheless, optimism about the decade’s prospects began to fade as the United States 
witnessed record levels of inflation, unemployment, and wage stagnation; by the mid-
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1970s, many of the gains of the New Deal era had begun to collapse and the nation 
descended into the worst fiscal crisis since the Great Depression.431   
 For opponents of organized labor, however, the decade was a boon. Though 
hostility to unions was certainly not an invention of the 1970s, the decade nonetheless 
witnessed an unprecedentedly effective and unified front of business leaders, anti-labor 
lawyers, consultants, and employers’ associations determined to undermine and 
dismantle the legal structure protecting American workers.432 During this decade, North 
Carolina would lead the nation in its concentrated opposition to organized labor as 
traditional anti-union figures—like Republican Senator Jesse Helms and the state’s 
outspoken textile executives—were joined by a new breed of anti-labor intellectuals, 
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took full effect in the 1980s. Moreover, the growing gap between 1980 and 2000 is crucial. As Smith 
asserts, “…the disparities are extremely important because they are a stark measure of ongoing 
black/white economic inequality in a place touted for its progressive race relations.” (55). Smith, 
Boom for Whom? 46-55. 
432 As Nelson Lichtenstein has argued, “Business hostility to unions was not a post-1970 phenomenon, 
nor was it limited to firms in the labor-intensive sectors of the economy or the American South, but it 
has been present since the New Deal and before. There was no labor-management accord in the early 
post-World War II years: at best the relationship between unions and capitalists constituted an armed 
truce, punctuated by frequent episodes of economically costly industrial conflict.” Lichtenstein, State 
of the Union, xi. In recent years, a substantial body of scholarship on the business backlash against 
organized labor and the New Deal order has emerged. See especially Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands; 
Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise; Shermer, “Counter-Organizing the Sunbelt,” 81-118; Sophia Z. 
Lee, “Whose Rights? Litigating the Right to Work, 1940-1980,” in The Right and Labor in America: 
Politics, Ideology and Imagination, ed. Nelson Lichtenstein and Elizabeth Tandy Shermer 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 160-180; McCartin and Vinel, “Compulsory 
Unionism,” 226- 251; and Friedman, “Exploiting the North-South Wage Differential,” 323-348. 
Nonetheless, recent scholarship has shown that the 1970s constituted an important turning point in 
labor’s decline. See, for example, Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the 
Working Class (New York: The New Press, 2010), Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United 
States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), and 
Robert Michael Smith, From Blackjacks to Briefcases: A History of Commercialized Strikebreaking in 
the United States (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), 97-118. 
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lawyers, and consultants who came from across the nation to set up shop in the Tar Heel 
state.  As southern cities like Charlotte finally emerged on the national scene, however, 
business and civic leaders were eager to demonstrate their progressive credentials to the 
nation. The city’s leading opponents of organized labor responded accordingly—they 
repackaged the anti-union message as “positive,” “modern,” “enlightened,” and 
“employee-friendly” in an effort to distance themselves from the incendiary rhetoric that 
characterized anti-union views during the first half of the century.433 Shifting anti-union 
tactics and greater sophistication characterized the 1970s as opponents of organized 
labor abandoned raw intimidation in favor of more subtle methods of coercing and 
controlling their workforces.  
 This chapter tells the story of how local and national interests converged as the 
city of Charlotte became an innovative center of the anti-union movement in the 1970s. 
Though better known as the site of the Supreme Court’s landmark Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education school desegregation case in 1971, the city’s history 
during this decade also brings together many important strands of 1970s political 
economy, including financialization, downtown redevelopment, anti-public unionism, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 On Sunbelt business and civic leaders’ courting of Northern industry, see Cobb, The Selling of the 
South; Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt; Margaret O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War 
Science and the Search for the Next Silicon Valley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), and 
Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism. On Southern cities’ efforts to convince investors and the nation that the 
Jim Crow regime was a relic of the past, Atlanta broke the mold, taking the moniker “The City Too 
Busy to Hate.” See Kruse, White Flight; Clarence N. Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 
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of Twentieth-Century Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). On Atlanta and 
Charlotte, see Lassiter, The Silent Majority. On Charlotte and the relationship between desegregation 
and economic development, see Smith, Boom for Whom? On the opening page of the book’s 
introduction, Smith quotes Hugh McColl, CEO and chairman of Bank of America, as saying, “Almost 
immediately after we integrated our schools, the Southern economy took off like a wildfire in the 
wind. I believe integration made the difference. Integration—and the diversity it began to nourish—
became a source of economic, cultural and community strength.”   
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private sector union-busting campaigns, and the emergence of neoliberal politics. 
Charlotte’s rise as a financial center and its anti-union activism became mutually 
reinforcing. In what follows, I trace the evolution of Charlotte’s particular brand of anti-
labor politics during the 1970s through the career of Edward J. Dowd, Jr., an important 
yet almost entirely overlooked figure who was active in local, state, and national efforts 
to combat organized labor. In just over a decade, Dowd went from serving as the 
executive secretary of Charlotte’s nascent employers association to leading the Council 
on Union-Free Environment (CUE), which was funded by the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM) and served as the educational mouthpiece of the organization. In 
the course of his career, Dowd helped solidify Charlotte’s anti-union position in the face 
of growing labor militancy in the city and across the state. He reframed anti-unionism as 
a modern position to maintain Charlotte’s progressive image and, in so doing, became a 
pioneer in the 1970s assault on organized labor. Across the nation, anti-unionists 
increasingly eschewed the virulent rhetoric of previous decades and adopted language 
and tactics similar to Dowd’s, recognizing—to the frustration of union leaders—that such 
rhetorical twists made labor’s foes deft opponents in the years that followed. Dowd’s 
career also challenges the idea that North Carolina remained solidly anti-union into the 
1970s because of textile industrialists whose power emanated from rural, manufacturing-
heavy sectors of the state. While the influence of the textile industry was indeed 
substantial, Dowd, on behalf of Charlotte’s leading financial institutions, energy 
conglomerates, and medical centers, waged a frontal assault on organized labor from the 
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state’s emerging center of finance—a city which had spent decades self-consciously 
crafting an image of moderation and progressiveness.434  
 In addition, the work done by a new breed of savvy lawyers and consultants like 
Charlotte’s Ed Dowd was instrumental in transforming the anti-union message into one 
that was exportable to parts of the nation with less history of hostility towards organized 
labor. As James Cobb aptly put it, “By the end of the 1970s anti-unionism had supplanted 
racism as the South’s most respectable prejudice.”435 Taking this argument one step 
further, one can argue that the lingering impact of the mid-1970s fiscal crisis coupled 
with weakened Democratic support for unions at the national level made anti-unionism 
an increasingly respectable position across the nation.  
 
Growth and Change in the 1970s: A Turning Point for Public Workers? 
 As Charlotte emerged from the 1960s having avoided the major civil rights 
clashes that consumed other southern cities, Charlotteans had good reason to be hopeful 
that the 1970s might finally yield the growth and prosperity about which local boosters 
had always dreamed. Over the course of the decade, the city of Charlotte underwent 
dramatic spatial, political, and economic transformations, many of which facilitated its 
transition into the financial capital it would become by the late twentieth century. 
Throughout this period, business interests determined many of the most substantial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 In all fairness, this was not an inaccurate depiction of Charlotte, given the city’s proactive 
response to the Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Supreme Court decision in 1971. However 
while the city’s leadership was busy congratulating itself for implementing one of the nation’s most 
successful school busing programs, the same leaders were also working to safeguard the city’s 
“business-friendly climate.” In fact, as political scientist Stephen Smith has aptly shown, the city’s 
desegregated schools became a selling point for attracting Northern industries skeptical of relocating 
to regions perceived as being backwards or too socially conservative. Smith, Boom for Whom?  
435 Cobb, The Selling of the South, 259. 
159 
	  
transformations in the city’s spatial landscape. Like cities across the nation, Charlotte 
used federal urban renewal dollars to raze homes and businesses in predominantly 
African American and white working-class sectors of town to make way for expressways 
and commercial redevelopment. The most substantial of these projects targeted Brooklyn, 
the city’s historically African American neighborhood, situated just east of downtown. 
According to Charlotte historian Tom Hanchett, “The Brooklyn project made no pretense 
at creating better quarters for residents. Not a single new housing unit went up to replace 
the 1,480 structures that fell to the bulldozer,” ultimately displacing 1,007 Brooklyn 
families.436 In the place of Brooklyn’s demolished homes and businesses, the city 
constructed Charlotte’s Government Plaza buildings, a city park and private commercial 
office space, all accessible by new, widened roads. The Charlotte Redevelopment 
Authority also utilized federal funds to bulldoze a section of the city’s Dilworth 
neighborhood “that held a mix of groceries, pool halls, and eateries that catered largely to 
black and blue-collar shoppers” in order to erect the Charlotte Convention Center, a 
Radisson hotel, and a new headquarters for North Carolina National Bank (NCNB).437  
 Downtown redevelopment was central to the remaking of Charlotte into a 
neoliberal capital of finance with competition among North Carolina’s banks fueling 
much of the construction.438 In 1970, the city’s leading banking institutions, North 
Carolina National Bank and First Union Bank, ranked forty-seventh and fifty-ninth 
nationally, respectively, by total assets, and Wachovia Bank, which was headquartered in 
Winston-Salem but would eventually relocate to Charlotte, ranked thirty-fifth. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 Hanchett, Sorting Out the New South City, 250.  
437 Ibid., 251. 
438 On neoliberal urban growth, see Hackworth, The Neoliberal City.   
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executives of these institutions envisioned a city whose towering steel and glass 
skyscrapers would serve as a symbol of their emerging economic power in the region. In 
1968, NCNB erected a 123,000-square-foot $4 million building at the intersection of 
College and Second Street and First Union constructed a 32-floor tower between College 
and Tryon Street.439 Mayor John Belk, whose family owned more than 400 Belk 
department stores across the southeast and who was an NCNB stockholder, also had a 
financial stake in the development of downtown Charlotte.440 In an effort to outdo First 
Union and Wachovia, and upon the urging of Mayor Belk, NCNB constructed another 
40-floor tower that opened in 1974. According to one NCNB executive, “There was little 
happening in Charlotte that NCNB was not involved in.”441 NCNB’s chairman, Addison 
Reese, was among the business community’s most prominent supporters of downtown 
redevelopment: “My banker’s mind is enthused at the thought of transforming this area in 
the heart of Charlotte, now mainly unproductive and decidedly unsightly, into a generator 
of jobs and income and tax revenues.”442 Moreover, Reese told an associate, “You’d have 
to work at it now in North Carolina to fail in banking. All we want to do is get our share 
of the growth coming to North Carolina.”443 
 How the rewards of such growth might be distributed, however, was yet to be 
determined. Despite the setbacks of the 1969 Atkins decision, public workers in Charlotte 
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and throughout North Carolina were among those hopeful that they might finally share in 
the city’s and state’s promising future. On the national stage, it looked as if public 
workers in the early 1970s might even revive the national labor movement as teachers, 
sanitation workers, postal workers and other government employees waged increasingly 
militant strikes across the nation. Observers and labor leaders alike imagined that the era 
might finally yield “A Wagner Act for Public Employees.”444 For public workers in 
conservative states like North Carolina, this dream came one step closer to reality when, 
in 1970, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) issued a 
report outlining recommendations to improve state and local government labor-
management relations. 445 Included in the report were recommendations that states require 
public employers to recognize the right of their employees to join or not join an employee 
organization, that strikes by public employees be prohibited, that states follow the “meet 
and confer in good faith” approach (in contrast to “collective bargaining”), and that 
voluntary check-off of organizational dues be permitted.446  Though some officials on the 
commission argued that the recommendations did not go far enough in extending to 
public workers the same rights as workers in the private sector—such as Governor 
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Nelson Rockefeller, who strongly objected to the endorsement of the “meet and confer” 
approach in favor of formal bargaining rights—ACIR’s proposal would have expanded 
the rights of public workers in states like North Carolina, which still denied both the right 
to “meet and confer” and to dues check-off to state employees. In discussing the report’s 
findings, Farris Bryant, the commission’s chairman and the former governor of Florida 
stated that without legislation permitting public workers to bargain collectively, states 
would essentially “encourage chaotic labor-management relations,” leaving such matters 
up to “the ebb and flow of the political power of employes,” unions, and state 
judiciaries.447   
 In North Carolina, government workers found increasing support for their rights 
on the job. Some observers speculated that the state legislature might be poised to do that 
which the judges in the 1969 Atkins decision had maintained the courts could not do, 
namely reverse the state’s ban on public sector collective bargaining. Since Atkins, and in 
the wake of growing public sector unrest, pragmatic government officials worried that the 
state’s collective bargaining ban would encourage labor militancy. Executive Director of 
the North Carolina Association of County Commissioners and former city attorney John 
T. Morrisey warned attendants at the Metrolina Urban Conference in Charlotte that city 
governments were “sitting ducks” for “experienced and uninhibited” union leaders. He 
cautioned North Carolina’s elected officials that the state was approaching a “stone-age, 
head-in-the-sand attitude,” to which he added, “Head in the sand means rear in the air, a 
rather inviting target.”448  In April 1970, Democratic governor Bob Scott publicly 
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announced his position that North Carolina’s laws concerning public employees were 
both inadequate and required revision. Local and state bodies, Scott maintained, needed 
to be allowed to negotiate with their workers’ unions.449 The governor called on state 
legislators to “be realistic,” warning that municipal union activism was “part of our 
times.”450 Scott’s position highlights the fact that by 1970, policymakers across the nation 
believed that public sector union rights were here to stay.  
 Many state newspapers, at least in urban areas, concurred. The Charlotte News, 
for example, urged legislators to reconsider what it referred to as the state’s “know-
nothing laws.”451 By April 1970, the Charlotte Observer reported that most Democratic 
contenders for local offices in Mecklenburg County supported the idea that state and city 
officials should be able to bargain openly and officially with public employees.452  One 
Charlotte Observer editorial concluded, “The notion that public employes can’t or 
shouldn’t organize is out the window,” noting that President Nixon had recently 
confirmed the rights of federal employees to bargain collectively, and that since 1959—
the same year North Carolina passed its ban—at least 35 states had passed legislation 
expanding the rights of public sector workers to organize and bargain collectively. 
Considering such a political shift, in combination with the low wages of many public 
employees “and the special aspirations the civil rights movement has spurred among 
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many black public employes, more organized action seem[ed] certain…”453 To the city’s 
newspapers and other local observers, maintaining the status quo of public workers 
seemed unsustainable.    
 
The Governor’s Study Commission  
 In August 1970, responding to mounting political pressure, Governor Scott 
convened the Governor’s Study Commission on Public Employe-Employer Relations and 
tasked the committee with the researching and making formal recommendations to the 
1971 North Carolina General Assembly.454 The commission held seven general meetings, 
two public hearings, and numerous subcommittee meetings. During the two public 
hearings, on 22 September and 11 November, local and state labor leaders, community 
associations, business executives, newspaper editors, city managers and other state 
officials testified concerning the state ban on public worker bargaining.  
The majority of the speakers during the first meeting offered statements on behalf 
of organized labor.455 Wilbur Hobby, the president of the North Carolina AFL-CIO, 
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began his testimony by reciting a portion of the North Carolina state constitution, which, 
interestingly, delineates citizens’ rights over their labor. “We hold it to be self evident,” 
read Hobby, “that all persons are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the 
fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness.”456 Hobby argued that the current 
ban on public worker bargaining constituted a violation of government workers’ state 
constitutional rights, and though he did not explicitly cite the fourteenth amendment, he 
focused on the law’s violation of the equal rights and protections of public workers. 
Hobby further argued that “the American way to do things” depended on a political 
process “where reasonable men sit down at the bargaining table.” Unfortunately, he 
charged, “that is not the North Carolina way.” If the North Carolina legislature could not 
create a legal infrastructure where business and labor could “sit down as gentlemen,” then 
Hobby warned that public employees would “do as the early colonists did when they 
confronted England in 1776 and as North Carolinians did on May 20, 1775 when they 
adopted the Mecklenburg Declaration against those who ‘wantonly trampled on our 
rights and liberties.’”457 By alluding to the disruption of the eighteenth century, Hobby 
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warned that North Carolina’s current affluence was predicated upon a precarious peace of 
the present. 
Labor leaders also emphasized that thousands of essential public workers across 
the state—federal employees—were already bargaining collectively, and, contrary to the 
critics’ claims, the state had not descended into chaos. Such was the argument of William 
Cates, President of the North Carolina Council of American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFGE) Locals, who testified before the commission. The NC Council of 
AFGE Locals headquartered in Fayetteville, was also the site of Fort Bragg, one of the 
nation’s largest active-duty Army bases and home to the 82nd Airborne Division. 
Speaking at the height of the Vietnam War, Cates highlighted the fact that AFGE had 22 
locals representing civilian employees of the Navy, Army, Air Force, Veterans 
Administration, Social Security Administration, Department of Agriculture, and the 
Army Corps of Engineers and was a body composed of workers of all ranks, from wage 
laborers to engineers and physicians.458 Cates also pointed to President Nixon’s recent 
signing of Executive Order 11491 on 29 October 1969, which expanded the rights of 
federal workers to unionize, as evidence of bipartisan support for public sector 
bargaining. He concluded by arguing, “simple, human dignity demands that public 
employees be given the right to negotiate conditions…which affect their employment. 
The federal government recognized the benefits of employee participation. Can the State 
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Mareschal, Labor Relations in the Public Sector, Fifth Edition (Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis 
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of North Carolina do less?”459 Cates and other union leaders pointed toward the nation’s 
military and Republican Party to legitimize the right of North Carolina’s public workers 
to unionize. 
Other speakers testified against revising the state ban, such as Charlotte’s city 
manager (and later the Chamber of Commerce president) Bill Veeder. After outlining the 
history of public worker activism in Charlotte between 1968 and 1970, Veeder asserted 
that the city of Charlotte was “generally satisfied” with the present state law, especially in 
light of Charlotte’s recently passed Employee-Employer Relations Policy (as discussed in 
chapter three), which established a “meet and confer” policy with public workers, but 
reinforced that the city would not formally negotiate with employees. In contrast to 
ACIR’s recommendations, Veeder further urged the state legislature to pass a statute 
strengthening the current law by defining dues check-offs as unlawful and by adding a 
section to the law prohibiting public workers from declaring strikes. The executive 
director of the North Carolina Association of County Commissioners and the former 
Charlotte City Attorney, John T. Morrisey, warned the Governor’s Commission, 
“workers’ goals aren’t simply more money … but more power. And political power is a 
heady wine.”460  
 Political power may indeed be intoxicating, but it was not North Carolina’s public 
workers who were most guilty of overindulging. Although the public sector was gaining 
momentum, visibility, and some measure of political influence across the nation, North 
Carolina’s business leaders and anti-union government officials had demonstrated 
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460 Paul Jablow, “Municipal Union Study Group Warned,” Charlotte Observer, 9 September 1970.  
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remarkable zeal for keeping the state’s union rates among the lowest in the nation. The 
same political forces now came before the Governor’s Commission to testify in favor of 
the state ban. Chief among these was Ed Dowd, who spoke on behalf on North Carolina 
Associated Industries, an organization representing employers associations in Asheville, 
Charlotte, Gastonia, Greensboro, and Raleigh.461 Since these employers associations 
represented virtually every leading corporation in the state, Dowd was, in essence, the 
voice of industry during these public hearings. As such, Dowd continued the long 
tradition of North Carolina industrialists proclaiming the fundamental incompatibility of 
economic prosperity with a unionized workforce. “North Carolina is today, and has been, 
the most attractive state in the United States for business and industry,” declared Dowd. 
“Our industrial development efforts are the envy of the nation.” The reason northern 
industries increasingly chose North Carolina for plant relocations was because of non-
unionized workers’ willingness to give “a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay.” Like 
many anti-union advocates, Dowd also emphasized organized labor’s threat to 
individualism: the North Carolina worker was special because he is “his own man—talks 
for himself and speaks his mind.” Dowd was unequivocal: unions, in both the public and 
private sector, were bad for business and bad for the state of North Carolina.  
 Although the Governor’s Commission focused on the state’s ban on public 
workers bargaining collectively, Dowd used his testimony as an opportunity to attack 
public workers’ demands for higher wages. In contrast to their private sector 
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counterparts, Dowd argued, government employees (1) usually received better benefits 
and (2) generally had a different “philosophy” about their labor—public workers had 
chosen to serve the public and were not in it for the money. Indeed, some sectors of 
government workers had long been referred to as “public servants,” but for a variety of 
both practical and political reasons, the increasingly diverse public sector—both in terms 
of demographic composition and job description—had begun eschewing such 
terminology in favor of “government worker” by the late 1960s. According to labor 
historian Robert Zieger, “‘Public servants,’ a phrase smacking of the old gentility, 
became ‘government workers,’ more descriptive of the people who toiled at grimy social 
services offices and on the city road maintenance crews and garbage trucks.” Though 
Zieger does not mention it explicitly, one can also imagine that African American and 
female government workers were especially eager to dispense with job titles that included 
reference to servitude. 462  Moreover, while some (predominantly white-collar) 
government workers still viewed themselves as public servants, Dowd’s contention that 
all public employees viewed their work as a calling and thus were content with meager 
pay would have been news to Charlotte’s sanitation workers, who had been lobbying the 
city for years to raise wages and improve working conditions.  
 Dowd concluded his testimony with an argument typical of mid-century anti-
unionism—that unions were anachronistic and unnecessary—but added a twist reflective 
of Charlotte’s boosterish optimism: North Carolina’s “outstanding business climate” 
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resulted from its “enlightened” and “employee-oriented” labor practices.463 Dowd 
outlined for the Governor’s Study Commission Central Piedmont Industries’ “positive” 
recommendations to improve employer-employee relations in the public sector:  Public 
employers should establish grievance procedures (though he offered no specifics); public 
employers should “follow area practices in wages, fringe benefits, and other conditions of 
work” to increase competition; managers and supervisors should be given adequate 
training for how to “provide direction and leadership employees need and deserve”; and 
public employers should impress upon workers how “necessary and important” they are. 
Dowd offered the following example to illustrate his final suggestion: “Sanitation 
workers often feel they are the lowest, most unwanted and unnecessary people in the 
work force. There is no reason for that. Admittedly, they have dirty jobs. But they are so 
very, very important to the cities in which they live and work.” Paternalistic at best, 
Dowd’s proposal overlooked the possibility that such workers might “feel more 
appreciated” if their labor were adequately compensated and their demands to bargain 
collectively were taken seriously and protected by state law. On behalf of the employers 
associations he represented, Dowd issued a warning to state officials on the commission: 
“We beg you not to turn to Chicago or Detroit and elsewhere, as some of our public 
employers are doing, to seek guidance in this field. Those people, gentlemen, are living 
by their mistakes—don’t let them foist their errors on us.”464 
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After reviewing and deliberating on the testimonies of prominent business, labor, 
and community leaders from across the state, the Governor’s Study Commission on 
Public Employe-Employer Relations ultimately recommended nothing of substance to 
encourage the legislature to revise or overturn the state ban on public sector bargaining. 
Although the report does not state whose testimony was most persuasive, the 
Commission’s decision suggests that Dowd, as the representative of the state’s most 
powerful business interests, exerted a substantial measure of influence. In its report, the 
commission determined that, based on the public hearings it organized, North Carolinians 
were “sharply divided … regarding public employer-employee relations.” Although the 
commission recognized that the Atkins ruling had caused statewide confusion regarding 
how city and county governments could and should engage with public employee unions, 
the body was “unable to agree on any fundamental changes.”465 When the Commission 
finally made its recommendation, it ultimately reinforced the current system that 
excluded public workers from the right to form a union in the state of North Carolina. 
Not all commission members were satisfied with the report’s conclusions, 
however. P.R. Latta, a prominent Wake County Democrat, issued a formal dissenting 
opinion that was included in the appendix of the report. Latta chided the commission for 
ignoring ACIR’s recommendations and, more broadly, for overlooking what he believed 
to be the importance of workers’ rights to influence the conditions under which they 
labor: “We are telling these 212,749 public employees that they are not qualified to have 
a voice in determining their working conditions. Yet we are entrusting these people with 
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the functions of our government…” Latta charged that the commission’s 
recommendations were “such a slight improvement that they are practically worthless,” 
had “no teeth whatsoever,” and that its members should “be ashamed to present such a 
program to the Governor of North Carolina.”466 State labor leaders also criticized the 
commission for failing to include representatives of police, firefighters or sanitation 
workers unions, or any members that were black or female.467 As Latta bitterly predicted, 
the commission’s tepid proposal proved insufficient to convince the North Carolina 
legislature that the state’s pro-business position on public workers needed revision. Due 
to changing political and economic circumstances in the years that followed, attempts to 
revise or overturn the state law lost momentum.  
 With respect to the creation of the Governor’s Commission, it remains unclear 
how supportive Governor Scott actually was of reversing the state’s ban on public sector 
bargaining. Such a reversal would likely have bolstered the ranks of public employee 
unions and, in turn, the labor movement writ large across the state. Even if Scott had been 
supportive of reversing the state ban, North Carolina governors have consistently paid a 
high price for anything that veers in the direction of support for unions. Former governor 
Terry Sanford, for example, once explained, “if you wanted to be halfway fair…to 
organized labor as such, it costs you politically. It cost me politically to be known as a 
person that thought labor unions were all right...I don’t doubt that it cost me votes.”468 
Governor Scott was unlikely to have supported stronger recommendations from the 
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commission since even a nod toward unionism had the potential to hurt North Carolina’s 
politicians.  
 
 
Ed Dowd and the Central Piedmont Employers Association 
 Charlotte businessman Ed Dowd, whose testimony before the Governor’s 
Commission illustrated his political influence, began his rise to prominence as one of the 
city’s leading voices against organized labor in the late 1950s, with a career that 
continued through the 1980s. Dowd was at the center of an ever-expanding network of 
anti-union operations in North Carolina’s fastest-growing metropolis. His organization, 
the Central Piedmont Employers Association (CPEA) represented many of the city’s and 
region’s largest corporations, including Duke Power, North Carolina National Bank, the 
Greater Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, Belk Stores, Charlotte Memorial Hospital and 
Medical Center, Dillard Paper Company, First Union National Bank, Harris-Teeter 
Supermarket, Knight Publishing Company, Mecklenburg County, Presbyterian Hospital, 
WSOC-TV, and Woonsocket Spinning Company. One of CPEA’s primary objectives 
was “to uphold the principles of free, private and competitive enterprise.”469 Many of the 
city’s most powerful businessmen sat on CPEA’s board of directors alongside city 
officials, such as W. J. Veeder, Charlotte’s city manager during the sanitation strikes of 
1968-70, who by then had become the president of the Charlotte Chamber of 
Commerce.470 According to Martha Evans, a former Charlotte city councilwoman and 
state senator, CPEA had displaced the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce by the 1970s as 
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the most influential business organization in the city. Although it did not actively recruit 
candidates for city office, which the Chamber was known to do (as in the case of 
Stanford Brookshire), CPEA did support candidates, many of whom won.471  
 A northerner, Dowd cited his extensive experience with unions in Massachusetts 
and Ohio as one reason he chose to move south once a job opportunity presented itself.472 
Dowd was born in Holyoke, Massachusetts, in 1921 and earned an M.Ed. in Personnel 
and Industrial Relations from Springfield College in Springfield, Massachusetts.473 He 
served in the United States Navy during World War II and, after the war, worked for 
Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Company, Toledo Edison Company, and the Employers’ 
Association of Toledo—a city he once called the “black hole of Calcutta” in labor 
relations—before being recruited to Charlotte to work for Central Piedmont Industries 
(which changed its name to the Central Piedmont Employers Association in the late 
1970s).474 A Charlotte Observer profile on Dowd described him as “a tall, handsome 
man with a shock of smooth white hair. He’s sophisticated, articulate, middle class, 
conservative.”475 His office, explained another regional publication, “is spacious and 
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tastefully furnished with couches and coffee tables, and he has a battery of secretaries to 
impede an intruder’s progress.”476  
 Not long after beginning his position with CPEA in 1959, Dowd became 
something of an itinerant preacher of the anti-union gospel, peddling his message to eager 
audiences on a virtually never-ending speaking circuit.477 On September 10, 1962, he 
brought his message to a Greensboro Rotary Club luncheon at the city’s O’Henry Hotel. 
Though Dowd told the audience that his organization (which was affiliated with 
Greensboro’s employers association, Piedmont Associated Industries) was not anti-union, 
he nonetheless offered listeners, many of whom were local business leaders, a three-point 
plan for preventing the unionization of their employees, which included encouraging 
management to incorporate merit into its seniority process, adopting “workable” 
grievance procedures, and “recogniz[ing] work well done.” Such measures, Dowd 
maintained, would allow North Carolina to maintain a friendly business climate free of 
union interference. “The Union movement in America is running scared and losing 
members,” Dowd told the Rotary Club.478   
 Throughout the 1960s, Dowd increased the political clout of the organization by 
expanding its membership roster and developing important ties with other organizations. 
Rare was the issue concerning labor that he was not involved in—nearly 50 years later, 
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union members in Charlotte still remember him as a constant fixture of the local business 
scene. Firefighter Bob Middleton described Dowd as “lambasting us every chance he got. 
Every time he could get in print he was hollering about us.” Jim Black recalled, “Most 
every time we would appear before city council, there was a gentleman that was president 
of another association in Charlotte…Ed Dowd…He would always get up there and say 
‘you can’t do this. You can’t let these people unionize. It’ll put us out of business.’”479  
 In April 1970, Dowd’s organization was at the center of a row between North 
Carolina AFL-CIO President Wilbur Hobby and Governor Bob Scott over Scott’s 
decision to name Charlotte labor organizer Jim Pierce to the State Industrial Commission. 
After over a decade of battling one another in Charlotte city council meetings and other 
public forums, Dowd and Pierce had become well acquainted enough with one another to 
recognize that they stood on opposite sides of virtually every issue. As a result, Dowd 
had good reason to believe that Pierce’s appointment to the state commission would pose 
a threat to his organization’s political agenda. Less than a year before Dowd attempted to 
block Pierce’s nomination, Pierce stood before the Charlotte city council and announced 
that Ed Dowd “has been opposed to everything that is progressive in the City of 
Charlotte” since as far back as Pierce could remember: “He was for low wages, minimum 
fringe benefits, low taxes on industry, he was against unions, against minimum wages, 
against federal programs such as the poverty program, urban renewal, low cost public 
housing, welfare programs, and fair employment practices.”480   
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 Thus, when CPEA discovered that Pierce was under consideration to lead the 
state industrial commission, Dowd initiated a letter-writing campaign to dissuade the 
governor from appointing the Charlotte labor leader. The letters and telegrams 
highlighted the fact that Pierce was in the process of appealing a conviction related to an 
arrest during the recent Chapel Hill food workers strike in February 1969 (as discussed in 
chapter three). One North Carolina industrialist urged Governor Scott to drop Pierce 
because, in addition to his “disregard for the law,” Pierce was “an extremely ambitious 
labor leader who would only ‘use’ this office to further his own career.”481 Under 
pressure, Scott withdrew Pierce’s name within a day of submitting it and instead 
appointed former deputy commissioner William H. Stephenson to the post, a more 
politically neutral choice. Hobby charged that Governor Scott had “buckled” to “vicious 
anti-labor pressure,” and the AFL-CIO president demanded that the governor “investigate 
these anti-labor people.” 482 Ed Dowd, he declared, was “out to destroy organized labor 
and return the people of North Carolina to economic slavery.”483 
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 By the mid-1970s, CPEA entered the anti-union consulting fray by advertising a 
variety of “labor management” services it could offer to client companies—some of 
which were included as a part of membership and additional services that could be 
obtained for a fee. As a part of membership, services included: regular reports on the 
state of labor relations in the city, state and nation; a committee of representatives of 
member companies that met regularly to exchange information and share anti-labor 
strategies; professional assistance in dealing with labor relations problems, EEOC, and 
OSHA; and assistance “in working with civic and community agencies, schools and 
colleges, to bring to these groups an understanding of the problems faced by business and 
industry today.”484 Additional services included “Attitude Surveys” that attempted to 
gauge employee’s feelings about their employer and, ostensibly, unions; union contract 
negotiating services, whereby CPEA would represent management in all parts of 
negotiations, using “factual statistical information and many years of staff experience in 
personnel and labor relations”; and an “Employee Benefits Program,” whereby worker’s 
benefits were “expertly communicated to the employee by means of personal 
interviews…and employee handbooks.”485  
 As its reputation grew in the business community, CPEA also began serving as 
the formal representative of some of its member businesses in negotiations with labor 
unions. For example, Dowd represented South Carolina Electric Corporation in 
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negotiations with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 379 
in 1977.486 Even major regional industries, such as Duke Power Company, believed it 
beneficial to employ CPEA’s services. Union leaders, however, held that CPEA’s 
representation and negotiation activities stretched beyond that which was permissible by 
law. On 27 June 1977, Carl Lansden, the International Representative of the IBEW, sent 
a letter to the Department of Labor on behalf of IBEW Local 967 in Charlotte claiming 
that Dowd, CPEA, and Duke Power had all violated various portions of the 1959 Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). Lansden requested that the 
Department of Labor immediately forward such reports to him, but, “[i]n the event that 
such reports are not on file, a serious question is raised as to the Duke Power Company 
and Central Piedmont Industries’ compliance with the Act.”487 To this, a representative 
from the Department of Labor responded that no such reports on either Duke Power or 
CPEA were on file and stated that, according to the LMRDA, Dowd would not need to 
file the consultant report if “he is a regular full time employee and consulting with 
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employees about exercising their rights to organize and bargain collectively is a regular 
part of his job.” 488  
 Although it is unclear whether CPEA violated the law in this case, it was not 
uncommon for anti-union consultants to do so. Although they vigorously denied it, 
consultants sometimes encouraged employers to use illegal means to undermine 
unionization efforts—such as firing pro-union employees—arguing that the rewards of 
preventing unionization outweighed any potential penalties. As one consultant told 
attendants at a management-consulting seminar in Los Angeles, “You got to remember 
you only lose once. What happens if you violate the law? The probability is you will 
never get caught. If you do get caught, the worst thing that can happen to you is you get a 
second election and the employer wins 96% of elections. So the odds are with you.”489 
Between 1968 and 1979, given the abundance and variety of legal and extralegal tactics 
anti-union consultants employed, it is little wonder that their efforts were highly 
effective, leading employers across the nation to increasingly consider it standard 
operating procedure to hire anti-union consultants.490 
 
The Evolution of Anti-Unionism in the 1970s 
 Though businesses had been employing anti-labor lawyers and consultants since 
the 1940s, these hired guns became an increasingly essential part of challenging and 
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unraveling the legal infrastructure protecting workers and unions at both the state and 
national level during the 1970s. As Harold McIver, the Organization Director of the 
AFL-CIO’s Industrial Union Department, explained, “You still get sheriffs scaring 
people away during an organizing drive, but the biggest headache now is these damned 
lawyers and their consultants.” 491 According to Assistant Secretary of Labor William 
Hopgood in a testimony before the House Subcommittee on Labor Management 
Relations in 1980, “the number of consultants and the scope and sophistication of their 
activities…increased substantially.”492 In other words, the growth in the consulting 
industry was more a difference of degree than kind—but one that nonetheless had a 
substantial impact on organized labor. By 1979, consulting firms were believed to be 
doing at least 100 million dollars in business and, by the early 1980s, various sources 
estimated that more that 1,500 anti-union consultants had opened up shop across the 
United States. Herbert Melnick of Modern Management Methods, one of the nation’s 
leading consulting firms, reported to Congress that the industry had witnessed a tenfold 
increase over the course of the 1970s.493 According to one AFL-CIO report in 1979, “The 
staggering rise in decertification and union shop deauthorization elections—up 400 
percent in the last 11 years—gives graphic testimony to the labor consultants’ success in 
their attempts to destroy the process of collective bargaining.”494  
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 Consultants’ counter-organizing campaigns usually consisted of a variety of 
tactics intended to undermine employees’ ability to vote freely and expediently for union 
representation.495 Such tactics included: authorization card delays; manipulation of 
bargaining units; molding supervisors in “foot soldiers” of the anti-union message (so as 
to avoid actual interaction between consultants and employees, which would require 
reporting to the NLRB); and designing and disseminating anti-union pamphlets, captive 
audience speeches, and letters from management to be mailed to employees’ homes. In 
general, consultants worked to create a divisive workplace environment for employees, 
often utilizing different strategies in white-collar and blue-collar settings. While 
consultants often believed using fear and intimidation was effective in industrial and 
other blue-collar workplaces, counter-organizing campaigns targeting white-collar 
workers usually emphasized that union membership was incompatible with their 
professional identity and disruptive in the workplace. Such a breadth of tactics 
contributed to both the growing effectiveness of the anti-labor consulting industry and the 
feeling among labor organizers that they were up against an increasingly impossible 
opponent.    
 In North Carolina, Dowd and the CPEA were part of a broad edifice of anti-union 
professionals that included members of law firms, consultant groups, employers 
associations, and think tanks. In the Charlotte area, corporations dealing with unions 
usually turned to either the Charlotte law firm Blakeney, Alexander and Machen or, in 
South Carolina, nearby Greenville’s Ogletree Deakins. Whiteford Blakeney was best 
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known for his involvement with the J.P. Stevens Company, the nation’s second-largest 
textile producer, which waged a well-publicized battle against the Textile Workers Union 
of America’s unionization efforts between 1963 and 1980, and for being the General 
Council of the National Right to Work Committee (NRTWC).496 Blakeney became 
infamous among labor organizers for developing the so-called “Blakeney Formula” for 
defeating unions: in negotiations, the company would refuse to allow union dues check-
offs and prohibit arbitration of grievances, but would concede to workers the right to 
strike.497 By refusing the first two points, considered essential to union organizers, 
Blakeney’s strategy made it virtually impossible for organizers to finance and sustain a 
union. Such tactics, which came to be known as “preventative labor relations,” were 
replicated across the nation.498  
The state was also home to one of the nation’s first African American-owned anti-
union public relations consulting firms, B & C Associates, located in High Point, a 
furniture-industry dominated town roughly 75 miles northeast of Charlotte. Founded by 
Robert J. Brown in 1960, who served as Special Assistant to President Nixon from 1968-
73, B & C represented a number of large national corporations, including Coors Beer, 
Woolworth’s, Nabisco, Hanes, Southern Railway, and Wachovia Bank.499 One of B & 
C’s Greensboro clients told a Charlotte Observer reporter, “We consider that we are 
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buying protection. [Brown] can communicate with Negro employees and keep them quiet 
and keep trouble from generating with that group… We just give him a payoff to keep 
down trouble.”500 One black minister from Concord, where Cannon Mills workers had 
waged a unionization drive, described how B & C targeted black clergy and community 
leaders to lead the anti-union campaigns. Another member of the clergy, Catholic nun 
Sister Imelda Maurer, who had assisted textile workers across the state in filing workers 
compensation, explained how “[Brown] helped wage a campaign of fear and intimidation 
against the workers, most of whom were black women.”501 The Amalgamated Clothing 
and Textiles Workers Union (ACTWU) called the B &C’s work “union-busting with a 
civil rights twist.”502  
Some of North Carolina’s most prominent black-owned businesses shared B & 
C’s antipathy towards organized labor. In 1978, the president of the Office and 
Professional Employees International Union, Howard Coughlin, complained about his 
union’s difficulties organizing employees of the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance 
Company in Durham, the largest and oldest African-American owned life insurance 
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company in the nation.503 According to Coughlin, the union won an August 1972 election 
in which approximately 150 North Carolina Mutual employees participated, despite the 
company’s “efforts to stall, distort the bargaining unit, and seek in every way to avoid an 
election.”504 Coughlin also noted North Carolina Mutual’s refusal to give workers Martin 
Luther King’s birthday as a paid holiday.  Because the union was “reluctant to strike a 
[black-owned company],” however, it signed what Coughlin described as “an inferior 
contract” in March 1973. In the year that followed, North Carolina Mutual placed 
increased pressure on employees not to unionize. “When key people got discouraged and 
left for other employment,” explained Coughlin, “they were replaced by those who were 
carefully selected for their anti-union attitudes…supervision kept up a constant war of 
nerves against the union.”505  Coughlin also alleged that the company attempted to 
persuade employees not to unionize by arguing that unions were racist and workers were 
indebted to North Carolina Mutual for rescuing them from Jim Crow’s exploitative 
working conditions.  Such arguments included: “As you know, all the power in unions is 
controlled by the WHITE man” and “How many of us are overly obligated to North 
Carolina Mutual for taking us out of laundries, maids in stores, kitchens and restaurants, 
factories, and other jobs where we had to slave and work hard, and put us in nice air 
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conditioned offices?”506 In the end, such efforts proved successful—within a year of the 
original contract’s signing, the North Carolina Mutual union was decertified.507   
Anti-union scholars and intellectuals also found a warm welcome in North 
Carolina. In Winston-Salem, law professor Sylvester Petro founded the conservative 
Institute for Labor Policy Analysis at Wake Forest University in 1973. According to 
Joseph McCartin and Jean-Christian Vinel, Petro advanced a critique of what he called 
“compulsory unionism,” which “linked the ideas of the Austrian school of economics to 
the venerable American antimonopoly tradition, drew on the midcentury debate over 
union violence and corruption, and ultimately forged a form of rights talk that challenged 
the class-based collective logic of the Wagner Act and asserted the worker’s right to be 
free of union ‘coersion’ based on the First Amendment.”508 In the years following his 
arrival in North Carolina, Petro joined homegrown opponents of labor, such as North 
Carolina Senator Jesse Helms, transplanted Northerners like Ed Dowd, and national 
outfits like the National Right to Work Committee (NRTWC) in his strident opposition to 
public sector unions.509  
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The “Positive” Union-Free Message 
 Central to Dowd’s and CPEA’s public rhetoric was their progressive, modern spin 
on opposition to organized labor—a positive, friendly anti-unionism distinct from the 
vicious language of the past.510  Such language was entirely congruent with Charlotte’s 
carefully crafted “Progressive Mystique” ethos. In 1974, Dowd was chosen to give the 
keynote address at an anti-union workshop sponsored by the NAM in Atlanta in 1974. 
Having previously served as the chairman of the NAM’s Industrial Relations Group, 
Dowd was well known to the organization and its members. Addressing an audience of 
business leaders eager to learn strategies for undermining organized labor, Dowd 
emphasized that employers should take a proactive role in thwarting unions rather than 
waiting for notice from a union or the NLRB about a union vote. “Over the years,” he 
explained, “I’ve developed a different approach. Why wait until the emotionalism of a 
union campaign when they will exploit your mistakes?” Instead, urged Dowd, businesses 
should train management to explain to workers that the company has “a strong desire to 
relate to the employees without going through a third party.”  
 To communicate the anti-union message, Dowd explained, management should 
organize informal meetings—smoking cigarettes, drinking coffee—to explain to workers 
that the company would “prefer to remain union-free because we prefer to deal with you 
directly in our concerns for your welfare.”511 Dowd laid out reasons companies could 
offer workers to dissuade them from joining unions, including expensive memberships (a 
particularly persuasive argument in states with right-to-work laws); how under union 
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contracts, all workers were allegedly treated the same, “thereby equating the poorest 
worker with the best”; and the fact that under seniority systems, length of service, 
according to Dowd, mattered more than ability. In other words, Dowd emphasized the 
use of persuasion over fear tactics. According to Newsweek magazine, which covered the 
event, “As far as silver-haired, smooth-talking Edward Dowd is concerned there is 
absolutely no reason in the world why an employer has to knuckle under to the pressures 
of a labor union.”512 
   In Charlotte, other anti-union consultants adopted approaches similar to those 
recommended by Dowd. For example, one Charlotte organizer with the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW), Eileen Hanson, described how the Matthews-based 
grocery chain Harris Teeter—which had been (and remains) staunchly anti-union—
shifted its approach to avoiding unionization in the 1970s. When Hanson began 
negotiations with Harris-Teeter in an attempt to get a first contract, the Blakeney 
Alexander law firm represented the grocery chain. True to the Blakeney formula, the 
firm’s attorney resisted the union’s efforts to negotiate an arbitration clause, grievance 
procedure, or dues check-off. “No union can survive in a right-to-work state without dues 
check-off,” explained Hanson, “and no grievance procedure is worth squat without 
arbitration as a final determination.” Even though the union was making little headway 
with negotiations, it was creating enough of an obstacle that Harris Teeter recognized its 
approach was still insufficient to get UFCW organizers to drop the case. According to 
Hanson, Harris Teeter replaced the Blakeney Alexander attorney—who, Hanson said, 
once bragged to union representatives during negotiations that what Harris Teeter had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512 Ibid.  
189 
	  
spent on anti-union legal representation was enough for him to construct a new “wing” on 
his house—with a new attorney taking a totally different approach to dealing with unions. 
Hanson described the new attorney as friendly, approachable, and amenable to regular 
meetings with union representatives. Harris Teeter’s new attorney was “Mr. nice guy, he 
called everyone by name,” recalls Hanson. Nevertheless, the overall strategy was still the 
same—resist unions at all costs. 513    
 In the late 1970s, the influence of Dowd’s “positive” anti-union message would 
extend beyond Charlotte and even North Carolina. Having served as chairman of the 
NAM’s Industrial Relations Group in 1968, Dowd went on to co-found the Council on 
Union-Free Environment (CUE) in 1977. In response to the 1977-78 congressional 
struggle over Labor Law Reform, the NAM created CUE to be the organization’s 
educational subsidiary.514 CUE’s goals included “educating management and the general 
public of the benefits of a work environment kept union-free through voluntary employee 
choice and strong, progressive, positive relations between employers and employees.” 
According to a statement printed in CUE brochures, the organization “does not engage in 
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millions of dollars by this time.” To this McMillan allegedly responded, “Well, that’s the cost of doing 
business.” Eileen Hanson-Kelly, interview with author.  
514 Charles McDonald and Dick Wilson, “Peddling the ‘Union-Free’ Guarantee,” AFL-CIO 
Federationist, April 1979. 
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political, legislative, administrative or regulatory activities.”515 Instead, CUE’s other co-
founder, Arthur Prine of R.R. Donnelley and Sons, a large non-unionized printing firm, 
explained in a press conference announcing the council’s formation that the council’s 
goal was to “create a climate for healthy employer-employee relations without need for 
‘third-party’ intervention.”516 Heath Larry, former head of labor relations at U.S. Steel 
and current NAM president, was quick to point out that the new endeavor was not a 
union-busting organization. The new tax-exempt non-profit organization’s approach 
would be “positive,” Larry emphasized. “Unions don’t organize employees; management 
do by their mistakes.”517 CUE’s leadership also emphasized that the new organization 
would not compete with the National Right to Work Committee, since CUE, due to its 
non-profit tax status, would not be involved in lobbying efforts.518 According to Larry, 
CUE would be “the only single purpose national organization devoted to the maintenance 
of a union-free environment in the United States by encouraging the establishment of 
strong, progressive and positive employer-employee relations.”519   
 The focus on “positivity management” was consistent with broader trends. Across 
the nation, business consultants led management seminars, charging attendees anywhere 
between $175 and $600, on new strategies for delaying and undermining employee 
unionization. Charles Hughes, an industrial psychologist and leader in the field, was 
known to make $27,000 for a three-day seminar, which he would then repeat up to 20 
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times a year.520 By 1980, Hughes was travelling 350,000 miles per year to speak before 
audiences eager to learn the newest in anti-labor tactics.521 Similarly to Dowd’s and 
CUE’s message, many of the seminars shifted the focus of anti-union efforts from attacks 
on unions to “Making Unions Unnecessary,” which was also the name of a book by 
Hughes. Hughes explained the approach as follows: “Any management that gets a union 
deserves it—and they get the kind they deserve. No labor union has ever captured a group 
of employees without the full cooperation and encouragement of managers who create 
the need for unionization. Management language does not even have a positive word for 
operating a non-union. The positive approach is: MAKE UNIONS UNNECESSARY.”522 
In essence, Hughes believed that management’s “positive approach” to discussing anti-
union ideals could effectively stave off organizing attempts.    
 Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, CUE published dozens of booklets 
distributed across the nation to businesses who feared their employees would attempt to 
unionize or who were already in the midst of a unionization struggle. The titles included 
“The Morality of a Union-Free Environment,” “Gaining Employee Acceptance: 
Whirlpool’s Total Communication Program,” “Winning the Hearts and Minds of Your 
Employees,” and “A Tomorrow You Can Count On: Communicating Employee Security 
and Opportunity.” In 1983, Dowd co-authored one such booklet with Chester W. 
Anderson, former president of a management consulting firm and employers association 
in Milwaukee and a member of the Mont Pelerin Society. Dowd’s and Anderson’s 
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booklet focused on “Union-Free Position Statements”—what they were, why they were 
important, and how companies should phrase them, and when they should be given to 
employees. Dowd and Anderson stressed that their “union-free” message should not be 
confused with being “anti-union.” “If any company is motivated by anti-union sentiments 
and not committed to enhancing the employee’s gain from maintaining independence,” 
wrote Dowd and Anderson, “it is almost certain to fail.” Instead, they urged employers to 
focus on convincing employees that they would benefit from a work environment “free of 
third-party interference.” The booklet also emphasized the importance of circulating 
position statements to employees immediately upon their being hired, rather than waiting 
until a union campaign, which the authors described as a period of “extreme employee 
emotionalism.” Moreover, they cautioned, “Any person in a highly emotional state, 
carefully nurtured by an experienced organizer, will not be receptive to a pro-employee 
union-free statement.”523  
 The AFL-CIO tracked the efforts of organizations like CPEA and CUE in two 
regular publications, The Report on Unions Busters (R.U.B. Sheet) and the Statistical and 
Tactical Information Sheet (STIR). Dowd and CPEA appeared a number of times in the 
R.U.B. Sheet, with the March 1979 issue describing Dowd’s organization as “the big 
[anti-union] outfit around Charlotte,” despite Dowd’s assertions to the contrary.524 To 
local union organizers, Dowd was public enemy number one. One organizer described 
how, in the late 1970s, unions wanted to protest outside CPEA’s office, but the 
organization was so secretive that its address was not listed in the Charlotte phone book, 
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making its office difficult to locate. Eventually, organizers who had located CPEA’s 
headquarters in a nondescript building were not surprised to discover that the building 
lacked signage to indicate who occupied it.525 Dowd’s home address, however, was easier 
to find, and labor organizers used it to their advantage in their attacks against him and his 
organization. In one article published in a small progressive newspaper, The Charlotte 
Advocate, labor organizer Eileen Hanson charged, “Congratulations Mr. Dowd,” 
continued the article. “We hope you sleep well in your $100,000 home in Southwest 
Charlotte knowing that most of the production employees of your member companies are 
living near or below poverty level…While you and your friends eat steak, we can barely 
afford a night out at McDonalds.” The article warned of the challenges unions would face 
in the future—namely, that workers attempting to organize would face opposition not just 
from their own employers, but also from CPEA and the hundreds of companies it 
represented: “Thus each union election, each contract struggle, each strike in Charlotte 
takes on a national and political character.”526   
 
Legislating the Anti-Union Message 
  In the early 1960s, Dowd’s organization financed workshops and seminars on 
business and economic policy for North Carolina schoolteachers, holding such events at 
the state’s universities to lend them an air of objectivity and impartiality.527  In July 1962, 
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CPEA underwrote an “Economic Education Seminar” for high school economics and 
social studies teachers at Appalachian State Teachers College in Boone, North Carolina. 
Controversy arose, however, when CPEA discovered that seminar organizers at 
Appalachian had invited representatives of both business and labor to address the 
teachers. In particular, CPEA was upset that organizers invited Millard Barbee, president 
of the NC AFL-CIO, and Frank Fernbach, an AFL-CIO economist, to address a session 
entitled “Labor’s Role in the Economy of the Nation and State.” Dowd then demanded 
that Appalachian withdraw invitations from Barbee and Fernbach, to which its 
administrators obliged and notified the labor leaders just five days before the workshop 
was to begin. In response, union leaders Ted Silvey and Carey Haigler called the offices 
of Central Piedmont Industries to express their displeasure with efforts to exclude labor 
from the teachers’ workshop. Retelling the conversation before the 1962 North Carolina 
AFL-CIO convention, Silvey reported that Dowd explained he was only trying to “give 
scientific free enterprise education to school teachers.” To this, Silvey told the crowd, he 
“had to laugh, because economics is not scientific. I pointed out [to Dowd] that biology is 
scientific; mathematics, astronomy and physics are scientific, but social studies and 
economics are not scientific; they are according to one’s point of view.” In the end, 
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Dowd admitted to Silvey that he had demanded the labor representatives be removed 
from the workshop’s list of speakers.528  
 In response to Dowd’s actions, Fernbach drafted the following statement to be 
read at the convention:  
The Appalachian State Teachers College… is supported and financed by 
all of the people of North Carolina and is one of the largest teachers 
colleges in the South. While it is permissible that Central Piedmont 
Industries, Incorporated should help finance a special opportunity for 
public school teachers to increase their ability to teach economics to the 
children of North Carolina if it chooses, it is totally improper that a public 
institution like Appalachian State Teachers College should be seized upon 
as a vehicle for an un-American brain-washing … the labor movement of 
North Carolina does not seek to impose its views upon the public school 
teachers of the State; however, we cannot tolerate the misuse of public 
institutions in a cross-effort by a group of North Carolina industrialists to 
impose their single viewpoint upon teachers and, through them, upon the 
children.  
 
In short, Fernbach objected to Central Piedmont Industries’ use of a public institution to 
promote anti-union ideology. Following Fernbach’s letter, the North Carolina AFL-CIO 
convention passed a resolution “vigorously denouncing this regrettable incident” and 
called upon the Governor and the Boards of Education and Higher Education to ensure 
that the state’s colleges and universities “are not used in the future by any group or 
organization to ‘brain-wash’ or just partially inform another segment of our society.”  
The convention then forwarded a copy of this resolution to the Governor, the Director of 
the Boards of Higher Education, the Superintendent of Education, and the North Carolina 
Education Association.529  
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 In support of the resolution, Haigler stated, “[Dowd’s] organization does 
everything possible under the sun to prevent the organization of unions and unorganized 
industries, and he does everything he can to prevent [workers who do unionize] from 
getting a decent contract once they have been certified.” President Barbee further asserted 
that the resolution intended to inform the convention of Dowd’s actions, so that they 
would understand “what this Central Piedmont Industries has pulled over the citizens of 
this state,” and to make them “aware of what [Dowd’s organization] may try to do in the 
future.”530 Indeed, Dowd’s efforts to suppress the influence of organized labor in the state 
did not end with the Appalachian incident nor was this the last attempt the state would 
see to enshrine pro-business ideology in educational legislation. 
 In March 1975, Dowd’s dream of North Carolina teachers as proselytizers of 
capitalism finally came to fruition when the state legislature passed a law ensuring that no 
student would leave high school without learning the virtues of the “free enterprise” 
system. Senator William K. Mauney, Jr., a Democrat and hosiery manufacturer from 
Cleveland County, authored the bill, and Representative Jo Graham Foster, a Democrat 
from Mecklenburg County, co-sponsored the bill in the House.531 In its original iteration, 
the bill defined “free enterprise” as “an economic system characterized by private or 
corporate ownership of capital goods…by investments that are determined by private 
decision rather than by state control, and by prices, production, and the distribution of 
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goods that are determined in a free manner.”532 Republican Governor James E. Holhouser 
also supported the bill, and took the idea one step further by suggesting that the state 
require all high school students to pass a course on the subject in order to graduate. 
Holhouser’s suggestion never caught on, but Mauney’s bill passed the Senate with little 
debate and a resounding 36-5 vote.533 The free enterprise bill garnered support from both 
sides of the aisle, confirming North Carolina’s reputation as a state built on the idea of 
market progress. 
 Despite state senators’ strong support for Mauney’s bill, the proposed legislation 
was not without its detractors. The least political criticism came from Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, Craig Phillips, who argued that the school system already instructed 
students on the free enterprise system. Senator Mauney did not assuage criticism when he 
admitted that he had not read any state textbooks and was unaware of how they currently 
explained the American economic system.534 The Raleigh News and Observer also 
skewered the proposed legislation in a number of editorials surrounding debate of the law 
in the state legislature. “Pity the poor teacher,” asserted one editorial, “who might be 
asked by inquisitive students to square [Mauney’s definition of ‘free enterprise’] with 
tobacco subsidies and acreage allotments, with import quotas and textile tariffs … or with 
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the price-fixing activities of the State Milk Commission.”535 The Greensboro Daily News 
charged that the bill was nothing more than a wasteful endeavor and mockingly 
suggested that legislators’ overwhelming support for the bill stemmed from “fear [that] 
their opposition might be equated with opposition to sin, motherhood, the flag, and apple 
pie.”536 A number of legislators insisted that the bill constituted a dangerous overreach of 
government power. Democratic senator Charles Phillips of Guilford County argued that if 
the legislature could dictate what should be taught in public schools, “then next 
week…the legislature can say there are some courses you cannot teach, and that is the 
beginning of a dictator system.”537 Others, such as Rep. J. Allen Adams, a Democrat 
from Wake County, maintained that the idea of a “free enterprise” system was a myth and 
students would recognize it as such.538 Criticism came from across the political spectrum: 
from those who questioned the legitimacy of the legislature’s role in education to those 
who questioned the existence of “free enterprise” itself. 
 In the days following the bill’s introduction, opponents satirized the bill by 
introducing a series of amendments. Representative Adams proposed two amendments. 
The first attempted to highlight the hypocrisy of North Carolina legislators who 
championed “free enterprise” while also defending state price controls and other 
protectionist measures. Adams’ amendment explicitly forbade educators from teaching 
material that was critical of state support for the tobacco industry, utilities, or other 
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government interference in North Carolina’s economy. The second proposed amendment 
required that students take a course comparing freedoms in the United States with those 
in totalitarian states, such as the Soviet Union. Other tongue-in-cheek proposals included 
adding portions of the North Carolina Constitution and Declaration of Independence to 
the bill and a proposal requiring that students take a course in “Abuse of government, as 
epitomized by the Nixon administration.”539 The bill’s opponents in the House gained 
some traction when they convinced fellow legislators to reject Mauney’s definition of 
“free enterprise” and instead revised the bill such that the law would require high schools 
to teach students about the “history, theory (and) foundation” of the “free enterprise 
system. The proposed bill would be more attentive to the fact that the theory of “free 
enterprise” was far removed from the reality of 1970s North Carolina. After the revised 
language was added, the bill passed the House by a vote of 78-34 and became law on 20 
March 1975.540 In response to the bill’s passage, Raleigh Chamber of Commerce 
executive director Ed Garland praised the bill: “Unless we understand the principles of 
free enterprise, there is a danger of losing this system.”541 At the time of the bill’s 
passing, North Carolina joined eight other states to require that public schools teach about 
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“free enterprise.”542  
 
Free Enterprise or Union-Free Enterprise? 
Throughout the administrations of North Carolina’s governors during this period, 
it was North Carolina’s “excellent business climate”—i.e. non-unionized workforce—
that became a selling point when the governor went on industry recruiting trips. 
Continuing in the footsteps of Luther Hodges, for example, Governor Bob Scott trekked 
across both the nation and the globe to recruit out-of-state and foreign capital to North 
Carolina. In 1972, for example, Scott travelled to Tokyo to meet with Japanese 
industrialists as part of an industrial development mission sponsored by the state of North 
Carolina and the Japan-Southern U.S. Association. “We are here to tell our Japanese 
friends of the industrial investment opportunities that await you in North Carolina,” Scott 
told his Japanese audience. “It is in keeping with our policy of aggressively pursuing 
international trade and reverse investment programs.” Scott boasted of “North Carolina’s 
attractive business opportunities,” “no huge metropolitan centers with all the problems 
associated with them,” and “an adequate and reliable labor force … who adhere to the 
concept of giving a day’s work for a day’s pay.” In effect, North Carolina’s cheap labor 
force had become its most prized commodity for sale in the global marketplace. “I can 
say, with pardonable pride I trust,” said Scott, “that [North Carolina’s industrial progress] 
is primarily due to the fact that we have the finest product in the world to sell—North 
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Carolina and her people.” At the end of his visit, the governor described the conference 
as “a shining example of the free enterprise approach.”543  
 Despite such rhetorical support for the “free enterprise” system, there were 
limitations to North Carolina politicians’ enthusiasm for unfettered capitalism, as can be 
seen in the Raleigh Chamber of Commerce’s formal written policy from 1975 articulating 
its anti-union position. The policy affirmed the chamber’s preference for industries 
“whose management subscribes to progressive and competent personnel policies and 
would not—as a matter of pre-established policy—automatically insist or encourage a 
union operation but rather (would) allow the local employees to express their freedom of 
choice on such an issue.”544 The policy’s explicit pitting of “progressive and competent 
personnel policies” against “union operation” confirmed North Carolina’s place at the 
coalescence of traditional anti-union rhetoric with economic progress, marking the 
beginning of the neoliberal future.  According to Robert E. Leake, North Carolina’s 
economic development director, who collaborated with the state’s chambers to recruit 
new industry to the state, Raleigh’s formal anti-union position stemmed from its efforts to 
recruit white-collar jobs to the city, particularly to the Research Triangle Park.545 As of 
1975, the city maintained a unionization rate below 5 percent, more than 3 percentage 
points below the state average, which was still the lowest in the nation.546 As the Raleigh 
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News and Observer noted, however, the Raleigh Chamber was not alone in its position 
towards unions, and that it put its policy in writing did not mean other North Carolina 
cities did not have similar policies. The Wilmington Chamber of Commerce president 
asserted, “It’s the attitude of the business community all across the country that good 
management doesn’t need a third party (unions).”547  
 State business leaders’ commitment to cheap labor was so intractable that they 
even turned away lucrative industries that wanted to relocate to North Carolina. In 1975, 
Miller Brewing Company expressed interest in building a $100 million plant in the 
Raleigh area that would have employed at least 500 workers, and Xerox Corporation also 
hoped to open a unionized plant employing between 1,500 and 2,000 workers. The 
Raleigh business leaders squelched both plans because both plants already had union 
shops. The Miller plant would have paid workers $5 to $6 per hour, it was speculated, a 
substantial increase from the then-average hourly manufacturing wage of $3.93 in the 
Raleigh-Durham area.548  Seemingly minor union gains, such as representation and an 
hourly wage two dollars above the local average, threatened businesses’ unfettered power 
to control the conditions under which their employees labored and thus could not be 
tolerated, even in North Carolina’s more progressive urban centers.549 
 Numerous groups criticized the Chamber’s actions. North Carolina AFL-CIO 
president Wilbur Hobby argued that the Chamber’s efforts were part of a larger project to 
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keep the Raleigh area free of high-wage unionized labor and, in response, he said the 
union was considering filing a lawsuit against the Chamber.550 The Raleigh News and 
Observer charged, “The Chamber of Commerce philosophy here and everywhere rests 
heavily on ‘growth’ and ‘free enterprise,’ two pillars sometimes exposed as mere 
matchsticks. One can tell how weak they are from the way the Raleigh chamber snubs 
certain high quality industrial prospects because they are unionized.” In other words, 
suggested the News and Observer, the state’s industrialists were more concerned with 
maintaining an economy built on low-wage labor than they were with economic growth. 
Moreover, the paper criticized the Chamber’s self-appointed gatekeeper status in 
determining which industries were beneficial for the city of Raleigh and argued that the 
city should welcome well-paying industrial jobs, unionized or not. “The time has come,” 
concluded the paper, “for the Chamber to either halt this outrage or stop representing 
itself as the city’s spokesman in such matters.”551 African American leaders argued that 
the Chamber’s behavior reflected a general disinterest in black job prospects in the 
Raleigh area—a city with the greatest income gap between black and white residents of 
the 50 largest cities in the United States.552 The news of the Chamber’s role in preventing 
unionized plant relocations also came on the heels of a study by University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill researchers tying North Carolina workers’ low manufacturing 
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wages to its low union density rates.553 Labor, civil rights and university leaders criticized 
the Raleigh Chamber’s efforts that prevented job and wage growth in the state.  
 
Conclusion 
 In 1979, the AFL-CIO Federationist reported, “Total intransigence to the right to 
organize and bargain collectively has spread from small isolated regions in the Southeast 
to encompass all geographical regions. It has permeated all aspects of American industry 
and has spawned an entirely new legal industry.”554 Given the events outlined in this 
chapter, as well as those elsewhere in the state that have been covered by other 
scholars,555 it is difficult to imagine that the Federationist was not referring in large part 
to North Carolina. To be certain, North Carolina prior to the 1970s was home to some of 
the most unrepentant anti-union outfits in the nation and the South, more generally, had 
become an important breeding ground for anti-labor ideology. Nevertheless, the 1970s 
constituted a pivotal time for the spread of these ideas throughout the rest of the country 
as the New Deal order began to fracture--ushering in a federal retreat from protections for 
organized labor and American workers—and the nation (and the globe) witnessed the 
emergence of neoliberalism. As the financial capital of one of the most staunchly anti-
union states, 1970s Charlotte became, in essence, a laboratory for a new strain of 
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“progressive” anti-unionism that was more palatable and easily exportable to the rest of 
the nation.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Sunbelt Booms in the Age of Austerity 
 
 
 In a speech to members of Leadership Charlotte in 1995 upon receipt of a lifetime 
achievement award, NationsBank CEO Hugh McColl told the many business and civic 
leaders assembled, “Any vision for Charlotte comes naturally: the use of the public-
private partnership. A cornerstone of Charlotte’s progress is the combination of a 
business-minded public sector and a community-minded private sector, one that 
understands that it bears both a responsibility and a long-term self-interest to help the 
city. And In this era of shrinking government,” McColl told the audience, “the 
importance of the partnership only grows.”556 The central role private enterprise could 
have in Charlotte as described by McColl was no hypothetical vision of what might be; 
instead, McColl was describing the very partnerships he and the city’s growing business 
class championed during the previous decade that had fundamentally shaped the direction 
of the city’s development over the course of the 1980s. 
 This chapter looks at the political and economic transformation of Charlotte into 
one of the nation’s preeminent centers of banking and finance, a process that began full-
force in the late 1960s and has continued through the remainder of the twentieth century. 
Once just a regional textile and manufacturing center, Charlotte emerged as the nation’s 
second largest finance capital after New York. While Charlotte’s boosters always  
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dreamed that the city would grow to national significance, it was not until the mid-1970s 
that this dream had the potential to become reality. This chapter looks at how business 
and politics, on both the local and national level, influenced economic growth in 
Charlotte in the 1970s and beyond. It examines the evolution of Charlotte’s “racial 
democracy” vision during this decade, the growth of the black middle class, and the 
election of the city’s first black mayor, Harvey Gantt, whose administration is generally 
considered to be a final expression of the influence of Charlotte’s biracial coalition 
around economic growth. It was during the 1980s, that Charlotte came to epitomize the 
neoliberal city as business elites –especially the city’s financial sector—used the state to 
further their own economic interests. In Charlotte, the paradoxical reality of 
neoliberalism was its tolerance for and, at times, promotion of racial diversity in service 
of business imperatives. 
 
The North Star Fades from the Sky 
 In 1983, Black Enterprise magazine ran a feature story on Charlotte, touting the 
city as “a magnet for black professionals” because of “responsive government officials 
and expanding business opportunities.”557 The article highlighted the city’s relatively 
peaceful civil rights history: “While tear gas, billy clubs, cattle prods and fire hoses were 
being used against civil rights demonstrators and activists in other southern cities, 
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Charlotte integrated many of its restaurants nonviolently,” explained the article.558 In the 
years since, the city had become one of opportunity and prosperity for black professionals 
and business was booming. The article profiled a number of local businessmen, including 
Sam Johnson, who had moved to Charlotte from East St. Louis, Missouri and whose local 
Lincoln Mercury dealership business had accrued $18 million in sales in 1982, making it 
the second most profitable Lincoln-Mercury dealership in the Southeast and the 38th 
grossing black-owned business in the nation.559  It also featured John McDonald, a local 
businessman raised in Charlotte’s rural outskirts who moved to New York City in the 
early 1940s to escape the oppressions of Jim Crow. Once there, he operated a beauty 
products company and restaurant for nearly 30 years before returning to Charlotte to open 
McDonald’s Cafeteria on Charlotte’s west side. The restaurant, which soon expanded to a 
second location, served home-style Southern food and was popular with blue-collar and 
white-collar, black and white Charlotteans from across the city. Reflecting on his 
entrepreneurial success in Charlotte, McDonald told Black Enterprise, “There is room for 
pioneers. A black man can be successful because he is not limited to the black 
community. He can go downtown. The field is wide open for young aggressive men.”560  
The Black Enterprise story also reflects a broader interest during this period in 
black reverse migration to the South, a phenomenon that gained widespread attention 
beginning in 1970, when the United States census revealed that an historic turning point 
had been reached: more African Americans were moving to the South than departing 
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from it. In contrast to previous decades that were defined by the two Great Migrations, 
James Gregory has called the years since 1970 the “post-diaspora period.”561  Just the 
previous year, Louis E. Martin, the Defender’s editor and himself a migrant from 
Tennessee, told readers, “North Star had fallen out of the sky. That promised land has 
turned out to be a mirage,” and the North had become “no more promising than 
Dixie.”562  
The census findings launched an explosion of coverage in both the black and the 
mainstream press.563 Most articles, like the one in Black Enterprise, focused on increased 
job opportunities in growing southern cities like Atlanta, Charlotte, Richmond and 
Houston, especially for educated middle-class black professionals. In 1970, the Baltimore 
Afro-American and Chicago Defender highlighted job opportunities in Charlotte for 
young black professionals interested in entering the banking industry. Black college 
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students who would likely have left the south a decade before were staying, pursuing 
college degrees, and finding an increasingly diverse set of job opportunities opening to 
them. Although Charlotte and other “New South” cities still had a long way to go in 
terms of black hiring, asserted the Defender, the potential was there, especially for black 
professionals like 25-year old Charlotte banker Robert Walden, who was “one of a 
growing number of blacks who have discarded the myth of the ‘promised land’ in the 
north and are staying to carve out careers in a south they say is slowly changing in racial 
attitudes.”564 Charles Prejean, an Atlanta resident and former director of the Federation of 
Southern Cooperatives, an organization that assisted struggling black farmers, contended 
that economic factors were a primary consideration for the reverse migrants with whom 
he had worked. “It was a bread and butter thing,” said Prejean, “I’ve come into contact 
with many blacks in Chicago, Detroit and New York who say they are coming home 
because, for the first time, they can get a job with reasonable pay down here.”565 These 
anecdotes supported a 1970 report from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Southeast office 
in Atlanta predicting that prospects for black college graduates in the South were “very 
good.”566 
By the mid-1970s, newly elected black officials showed a level of optimism about 
the political and economic potential of cities like Atlanta and Charlotte only rivaled by 
that of similarly minded white boosters. John Lewis, former chairman of the Student 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
564 Terry Wooten, “Blacks Finding ‘A New South’,” Chicago Daily Defender, 18 July 1970; Terry 
Wooten, “Young Blacks See New Opportunities,” Baltimore Afro-American, 21 July 1970.   
565 William Chaze, “Blacks Lured Back to South by Opportunity,” Los Angeles Times, December 15, 
1972.  
566 Wooten, “Blacks Finding ‘A New South;’” Wooten, “Young Blacks See New Opportunities.”   
211 
	  
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and, by 1974, the executive director of the 
Atlanta-based Voter Education Project (and eventually a United States Representative), 
believed there were fewer differences in quality of life for the average black family 
between the North and South than ever before. “During the past five to 10 years” stated 
Lewis, “we have witnessed… a revolution in this whole area of the South.” 567 Recent 
changes, Lewis asserted, such as the election of Atlanta’s first black mayor in 1973, 
Maynard Jackson, had led many Southern blacks, especially those living in growing 
urban areas to feel optimistic about the future of the South.568 Indeed, Charlotte’s first 
black mayor, Harvey Gantt, credited increased black political participation--likely due to 
the city’s growing black population—as an important factor in his election, saying, “I 
read about the Observer's report yesterday on the increasing amount of blacks that are 
registering. That is significant to me and its been significant enough in this community 
that I've been elected to public office and it's been in no small part due to the increased 
amount of participation by black voters in the electoral process.”569 
Many commentators viewed reverse migration as a potential vehicle for black 
political empowerment and offered various advice on how best to capitalize on a growing 
black electorate. One 1971 Chicago Defender article pointed out that 102 counties in the 
United States had black majorities and that, of these counties, the majority were located 
in southern states. “It is in these predominantly black counties that Negroes see their best 
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opportunity to win political control,” explained the Defender, “More than 200 Negroes 
are running for office in Mississippi this year.”570 The New York Times weighed in on 
reverse migration for the first time in 1971. Like the Chicago Defender and Pittsburgh 
Courier during the same years, the New York Times focused mainly on the political 
implications of migration. The first in-depth Times article on reverse migration, entitled 
“Black Political Potential Shown,” included a large, detailed map of the 11 ex-
Confederate states, highlighting the counties with a black population of more than 50 
percent and quoted one census official as saying that “the political potential for blacks is 
tremendous.”571 The chairman of the predominantly black National Democratic Party of 
Alabama urged a “mass reverse migration,” arguing that “this would be the quickest way 
for blacks to take over political control of entire areas.”572 Similarly, Julian Bond, a 
founder of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and a state 
representative in Georgia, encouraged northern blacks to return south because, he argued,  
“the south holds greater promise than any other region.”573 While fully acknowledging 
that the remnants of Jim Crow were still very much alive in many parts of the South, 
Bond urged a “re-migration” of blacks to the South “come home,” he urged, “We need 
you…Your roots, like ours, are here. Put them down again. The black soil here—both 
actually and spiritually—is rich.”574  
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 During this period, labor organizers also reported a connection between reverse 
migration and increased black militancy in unions. In 1974, Scott Hoyman, the regional 
director of the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) explained, “Great numbers of 
Southern blacks have worked in Northern industries and know the benefits and job 
security provided by collective bargaining.”575  Eileen Hanson, an organizer who worked 
with the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) in North Carolina in the 1970s 
and 1980s reported similar observations.576 Not unlike black GIs returning from the 
Second World War demanding civil rights in the Jim Crow South, these anecdotes from 
labor organizers in North Carolina suggest that black workers’ experiences in the more 
heavily unionized Northeast and Midwest may have made them, upon return to the South, 
less tolerant of the region’s entrenched anti-unionism.577  
 Yet, given the anti-union forces that had been unfolding in the state for decades, 
unions in North Carolina during the 1980s would need more than sympathetic migrants to 
rebuild their ranks. Despite union organizers’ hopes that black return migrants would 
inject militancy into their campaigns, they had to contend with businesses moving to 
North Carolina explicitly because of its hostility towards organized labor. Moreover, 
national and international forces at work would make Charlotte in the 1980s a 
challenging arena for the most dedicated unionists. As white-collar work in banking and 
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finance dominated the city’s labor market in the wake of the textile sector’s collapse, 
business and civic leaders’ stepped up their efforts to create a city free of organized labor.  
 
Banking and Finance  
 Charlotte’s rise as a financial center coincided with the collapse of federal support 
for cities. The two processes were entangled. In the 1960s, Charlotte had benefited from 
Great Society spending.  Under President Lyndon B. Johnson, urban areas received 
governmental aid through a variety of mechanisms including the Housing Acts of 1964 
and 1965, the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, the Demonstration Cities (Model 
Cities) Act of 1966, and the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 as well as 
through the creation of the of the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) in 1965.578 By 1968, however, support for Johnson’s urban 
initiatives was declining as a part of growing disillusionment with both the nation’s 
domestic and foreign policy agenda. “As American involvement in Vietnam deepened,” 
explains Roger Biles, “many policymakers explained the failure of domestic policies as a 
direct consequence of swelling military budgets that siphoned dollars away from needy 
neighborhoods.”579  
As support for the Great Society waned, subsequent presidential administrations 
would devote fewer resources to urban initiatives. Under what became known as “New 
Federalism,” President Richard Nixon cut funding to HUD and issued a moratorium on 
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the construction of new public housing in 1973 and the federal government would 
continue a path of retreat from American cities in the years that followed. And although 
the big city mayors were hopeful that Carter would bolster urban spending, his anti-
inflation measures and austerity budgets left federal aid to cities on the chopping block.580  
 For Charlotte, the federal retreat from the urban sphere occurred at the same 
moment the city was entering a period of substantial demographic growth. Consistent 
with African American reverse migration trends, much of this growth stemmed from 
people coming to Charlotte from elsewhere in the nation. Between 1970 and 2000, 
Mecklenburg County’s population increased by 96 percent, from 354,646 residents in 
1970 to 695,454 residents three decades later. The city of Charlotte grew at an even faster 
rate, growing from 241,178 residents to 540,828 residents—a 124 percent increase.581 As 
with any other city facing such a vast influx of people, funding the construction and 
maintenance of adequate infrastructure to accommodate this rapidly expanding 
population would be a vital concern.  
 Adding to the potentially dire consequences of a precipitous decline in federal 
support during this time of population expansion was the erosion of the historically 
dominant economic base for the entire Piedmont region, the textile industry. As foreign 
competition took a toll on the manufacturing sector nationwide during the early 80s, the 
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United States saw a decline of 4.5 million jobs (roughly a quarter of all jobs in those 
sectors) during the period between 1980 and 2005. In the Charlotte metropolitan area, 
where the textile industry dominated for most of a century, this twenty-five year period 
witnessed the loss of 40,300 jobs – a decline of 84.5 percent. Overall, the percentage of 
employment within manufacturing fell from almost 30% of all Charlotte-area jobs to ten 
percent between the dawn of the 1980s and 2005.582  
 Stepping in to fill the vacuum left by the declining textile industry and the federal 
government’s decreased economic support of American cities were private interests. In 
Boston, Atlanta, Kansas City, Pittsburgh and other cities across the nation, this pattern 
was repeated as major corporations spearheaded downtown redevelopment and 
revitalization efforts through public-private partnerships.583 In Charlotte, a new infusion 
of capital came from banks and the financial sector. One of the distinguishing features 
that made banks a particularly potent force was the lack of regulation limiting certain 
aspects of their growth. In contrast to most states, North Carolina did not restrict banks’ 
ability to branch out to multiple locations throughout the state, giving local banks a head 
start in figuring out how to operate larger and more complex financial institutions long 
before most others in the industry. Then, in 1982, North Carolina National Bank (NCNB) 
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attorney Paul Polking found a loophole in the 1927 McFadden Act—intended to prohibit 
interstate banking--allowing NCNB to purchase banks in Florida, thus becoming an 
interstate bank. By the mid 1980s, other southern states realized the necessity in 
revisiting their banking laws and worked out between themselves the Southeast Regional 
Banking Compact. This agreement extended merger rights to banks specifically 
headquartered in the South and ushered in a new era characterized by banks’ aggressive 
expansion through other southern states, many of which had burgeoning markets fueled 
by concomitant population increases. Leading this consolidation of wealth were two 
Charlotte based CEOS: Hugh McCall, of NCNB, and Ed Crutchfield, of First Union 
Bank. It is difficult to overstate the competitive advantage this gave North Carolina 
banks, which were able to expand their size and influence long before industry-wide 
deregulation in 1994. By 2000, the city’s total financial assets approached 2 trillion 
dollars—roughly equivalent to China and Canada’s combined GNP—making Charlotte 
the nation’s second largest financial center after New York.584 In Charlotte, the expansion 
of the financial industry served to offset losses in the textile industry.   
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 The financial boom also stimulated substantial growth within other interrelated 
sectors in the Charlotte area economy. Between 1980 and 2005, real estate development, 
professional services, education, health care, scientific and technical fields all 
experienced growth rates from 280 to nearly 500 percent, translating to almost 100,000 
jobs in these categories alone. Clearly, the surge of money into the city center had 
important effects beyond filling the vaults of area banks.585   
 
Urban Redevelopment in Charlotte 
 As Charlotte’s boosters had been convinced for decades, carefully crafting and re-
crafting the image of the city in the eyes of the nation was important to keeping new 
residents and new business flowing into the city. Matthew Lassiter has described these 
efforts to transform the image of Charlotte from a second-rate city forever in the shadow 
of Atlanta to a first-rate city in its own right as Charlotte’s “a search for respect.”586 Over 
the course of the second half of the twentieth century, Charlotte’s Chamber of Commerce 
experimented with a variety of slogans that would serve as selling points for the city 
including “Spearhead of the South” in the late 1950s and “Charlotte: The Action City” in 
the early 1960s. In the 1970s, the Chamber finally settled on a slogan that captured the 
city’s ambitions for the decade: “Charlotte: A Good Place to Make Money.”587 According 
to Lassiter, “The corporate priorities of economic growth and metropolitan expansion 
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have therefore dominated the presentation of Charlotte as a full-throttled embodiment of 
American capitalism...Charlotte’s business leaders and politicians pursued this public 
relations strategy in order to overcome a regional inferiority complex based on persistent 
national stereotypes about southern racial and economic backwardness by converting 
these liabilities into the virtuous synthesis of New South interracial harmony and Sunbelt 
metropolitan development.”588  
 One example of Charlotte’s “full-throttle” capitalism can be seen in the efforts of 
Charlotte’s banks to redevelop downtown. Much of the redevelopment of Charlotte was 
focused on the city’s Fourth Ward neighborhood, which directly abutted downtown. 
Charlotte’s downtown is divided into four wards and previous urban renewal efforts had 
razed two of the four, both of which were primarily African American neighborhoods. 
The city’s First Ward was demolished to make way for the Earle Village public housing 
complex in 1967 and Second Ward, which was once home to the city’s vibrant African 
American neighborhood of Brooklyn, was destroyed to construct a plaza of government 
buildings. Third Ward was primarily industrial, marred by empty factories and 
contaminated lots, and thus of little interest to urban redevelopers. As a result, 
redevelopment efforts were focused primarily on Fourth Ward, whose Victorian houses 
had been home to Charlotte’s most prominent business leaders and elected officials from 
the late nineteenth century until the 1940s but had fallen into disrepair as its middle-class 
residents fled to the city’s streetcar suburbs. Like many historic neighborhoods adjoining 
downtown business districts in mid-sized cities across the nation, Fourth Ward’s homes 
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had fallen into a state of disrepair—absentee landlords subdivided some homes into 
poorly maintained multi-family units while others remained unoccupied, often until they 
reached such a state of deterioration that they were demolished.589  
 NCNB’s interest in the revitalization of Fourth Ward was a part of the bank’s 
larger vision of remaking Charlotte’s downtown into a vibrant and business-friendly 
urban center. Fourth Ward abutted NCNB headquarters, making the neighborhood’s 
depressed condition of particular concern to a bank increasingly hosting clients from 
across the nation and the globe. Moreover, the bank had more money invested in 
downtown development than any other entity in Charlotte, so it had a substantial stake in 
the center city’s success. In the mid-1970s, then, NCNB joined several preservation-
minded organizations—Citizens for Preservation, Friends of Fourth Ward, the Charlotte 
Junior League, and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission—in working to 
preserve Forth Ward’s historic homes. These organizations emphasized the importance of 
preserving and revitalizing Fourth Ward’s historic yet dilapidated housing stock, rather 
than turning to demolition, as had been the pattern of previous redevelopment projects 
under urban renewal.  
Although at first NCNB took a backseat role in the coalition of organizations 
focused on revitalizing Fourth Ward, it soon moved to the fore, as the bank had a vested 
interest in seeing downtown redevelopment succeed since NCNB’s executives believed 
that Charlotte’s unimpressive downtown was stymying efforts to recruit top financial 
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sector workers. According to Charlotte attorney and NCNB executive J. Dennis Rash 
who would soon move into Fourth Ward, the bank was “bringing people in from London 
who didn’t know how to drive” who were deterred by Charlotte’s shortage of suitable 
neighborhoods where white-collar professionals could walk to work.590 NCNB’s 
executives believed that to recruit financial sector workers from New York, London and 
San Francisco, the city needed more than quiet tree-lined residential neighborhoods and a 
downtown that cleared out by six in the evening.591 NCNB was not the only bank in the 
city doing business with international clients and concerned with giving the city a more 
cosmopolitan feel. By 1973, Charlotte’s three biggest banks, NCNB, Wachovia, and First 
Union had offices in London, Tokyo, and the Caribbean and had goals of expanding 
elsewhere in Europe and South America. If international bankers saw Charlotte as a 
backwater, the city’s financial sector would not reach its potential.592 
 In 1976, NCNB, now the largest financial institution between Philadelphia and 
Texas, convinced the six other major banks in the Charlotte to loan $100,000 to the city, 
each creating a pool of $700,000 designated for low-interest loans to area residents 
willing to renovate Fourth Ward homes.593 Hugh McColl, who was promoted to president 
of the bank in 1974, became one the city’s leading proponents of Fourth Ward 
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revitalization efforts. “I’d like to see the city reinvent itself,” stated McColl. The bank 
“does have an interest in making this the most exciting inner city in the US. That is my 
personal goal. That is our corporation’s goal.”594  
Through the public-private partnership, NCND and the city collaborated with 
Duke Power to subsidize sidewalk construction, decorative streetlamps, underground 
power lines, and other infrastructure improvements. Because many of Fourth Ward’s 
historic homes had been demolished in the previous decades due to neglect, Victorian 
houses from across the region was trucked in to replenish the neighborhood’s housing 
stock. As the newsletter of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, Preservation 
News, noted, “The few late Victorian houses that remain may not be highly significant 
architecturally but they are all the people of Charlotte have left.”595 Nevertheless, the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission designated the neighborhood as a Historic 
District, the first step toward making buildings there eligible for the 1976 Historic 
Preservation tax credit program.596  
 NCNB expanded its role in Fourth Ward’s redevelopment in 1978 through the 
creation of a Community Development Corporation (CDC) whose goal was to “assist in 
revitalizing inner-city residential neighborhoods.”597 The NCNB CDC became the first 
such non-profit subsidiary dedicated to urban redevelopment “in the public interest” in 
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the nation.598 Under the tutelage of McColl and Dennis Rash, whom NCNB hired as CDC 
president, the non-profit development corporation worked to prove to investors and 
developers that it was possible, and even profitable, to transform downtown Charlotte 
into a vibrant urban space attractive to young professionals otherwise destined for the 
affluent suburban-style neighborhoods of South Charlotte. NCNB turned to the CDC 
idea, explained Rash, because the bank “saw it as a vehicle for projects that the private 
sector didn’t want to do downtown, couldn’t do downtown, but were too important not to 
do.”599  
 In the years that followed, property values in the area rose exponentially as 
hundreds of new professionals and families moved into the area. According to Rash, the 
offer of downtown living alone was not enough to attract new buyers. “We couldn't sell 
location,” explains Rash, “so we offered below market loans” starting at $50,000 to 
buyers willing to invest time and money into revitalizing residential properties.600 This 
strategy proved effective and between 1979 and 1980 alone, 450 homes and apartments 
were sold in Fourth Ward and by 1981, just over 1,400 residents lived in the 
neighborhood.601 Property values increased from $1.2 million before the redevelopment 
project began to $32 million in 1984.602 In roughly a decade, NCNB spearheaded the 
transformation of downtown Charlotte into a more suitable environment for what would 
soon become one of the nation’s leading financial institutions.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598 Covington and Ellis, The Story of NationsBank, 147. 
599 Mitch Lubitz, “New Housing is the Key to Charlotte’s Downtown Revival,” St. Petersburg 
Independent, 7 November 1984. 
600 Ibid.; Smith and Graves, “Gentrification as Corporate Growth Strategy,” 407. 
601 Smith and Graves, “Gentrification as Corporate Growth Strategy,” 410. 
602 Lubitz, “New Housing is the Key to Charlotte’s Downtown Revival.” 
224 
	  
 Like similar redevelopment efforts of urban residential neighborhoods across the 
nation, the Fourth Ward project resulted in the displacement of existing residents, in 
favor of attracting middle-class and wealthy newcomers. One resident voiced frustration 
that existing residents were clearly an afterthought of the project: “When the white 
people were here, they wanted to move to Myers Park. Now, they want to come back to 
Fourth Ward. This is our home. Why don’t they fix it up for us? We’re the ones that’s 
been living here all the time.”603Although NCNB made some efforts to minimize the 
impact of gentrification through offering low-interest loans and additional subsidies to 
elderly residents as incentive to stay in the neighborhood, for many low-income residents 
who had been renters for decades, becoming a homebuyer was not a feasible financial 
option. For all of its faults, urban renewal programs had as a central mission providing 
affordable housing, but for NCNB, the poor were an obstacle.  
 Geographers Heather Smith, William Graves, and Emily Thomas Livingstone, 
who write about the redevelopment of Fourth Ward, address the neighborhood’s history 
of redevelopment to highlight two points: that the neighborhood’s gentrification was 
business-driven, thereby defying traditional patterns of gentrification, and that it offers an 
excellent example of “corporate citizenship.” According to Smith and Livingstone, 
“NCNB’s leadership in the private-public partnership that facilitate[d] Fourth Ward’s 
transformation took on a complex, perhaps more ‘enlightened’ and forward-thinking tone 
than other examples detailed in the literature.”604 Defining corporate citizenship as 
“improving life for others while at the same time improving life for oneself,” Smith and 
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Livingstone argue that on the balance, NCNB’s “visionary leadership team” improved 
Charlotte for the better. They worry about the fate of the city’s downtown in the wake of 
the banks’ “waning corporate influence” following the upheavals of the economic 
collapse of 2008.   
While NCNB may indeed have been a better “corporate citizen” than some, Smith 
and Livingstone’s characterization ignores the broader historical and political context in 
which this corporate-led urban redevelopment effort unfolded. Rather than being seen as 
an example of a corporation behaving admirably, NCNB’s efforts to transform downtown 
Charlotte are better understood as a part of the ongoing federal retreat from cities in the 
1970s.Under the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the federal government’s 
approach to cities was, for the most part, a continuation of Nixon’s and Ford’s New 
Federalism. “With its austerity budgets and penchant for cultivating private funding 
sources,” explains Roger Biles, Carter’s “New Partnership” continued the “path of 
devolution and a reduced role for the federal government. Rather than reestablishing the 
kind of relationship between the cities and the federal government forged in the Great 
Society, Carter’s presidency paved the way for the accelerated decentralization of the 
Reagan Era.”605  
 Moreover, NCNB’s leadership role in redeveloping downtown Charlotte—which 
successors NationsBank and Bank of America would continue—epitomizes the 
neoliberal urban project of remaking city spaces to better serve the interest of capital. As 
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Jason Hackworth and others have argued, the public-private partnership has been central 
to neoliberal regimes in American cities. Hackworth explains: “These alliances can vary 
considerably in form, but city governments are increasingly expected to serve as market 
facilitators, rather than salves for market failures. Cities have moved from a managerialist 
role under Keynesianism to an entrepreneurial one under neoliberalism.”606  Over time, 
Hackworth notes, “[n]eoliberalism became naturalized as the ‘only’ choice available to 
cities in the United States and elsewhere.” Charlotte’s bankers put the city on the cutting 
edge of that neoliberal transformation.607  
 
Harvey Gantt and the Emergence of Charlotte’s “Post-Racial” Coalition Around 
Economic Growth 
 Within the context of ascendant neoliberalism, the federal government’s retreat 
from cities, and increased black migration to Charlotte, as well as the political gains of 
the civil rights movement, Charlotte elected its first black mayor, architect Harvey Gantt, 
in 1983. Gantt’s election signaled the zenith of Charlotte’s “bi-racial coalition around 
economic growth” that had been in control of city politics for the better part of three 
decades.608 
 Much of Gantt’s political worldview was a product of the family, community, and 
period in which he came of age. Born on the Sea Islands just outside of Charleston, South 
Carolina, Gantt and his family moved into public housing in the city of Charleston not 
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long after he was born. He and his parents stayed in public housing for four years, during 
which time his father secured a job working at Charleston’s naval shipyard during World 
War II that, along with other side jobs, helped him “[get] a leg up on the economic 
ladder.”609 After the war, the Gantt family had the financial resources to move out of 
public housing into a home Gantt’s father built in the center of Charleston. The house 
expanded to fit the needs of the family, which eventually included Gantt’s four younger 
sisters. Gantt described his parents as “salt of the earth working people” who showered 
their children with love and affection and who instilled in them “a great belief in America 
as the land of opportunity if you work hard and you get an education.”610 
 Reflecting on formative events in his youth, Gantt describes 1954, the year the 
Supreme Court handed down the Brown v. Board of Education decision, as being “a 
watershed year in my whole life.”611 In the years that followed, Gantt watched his parents 
become increasingly involved in efforts to improve opportunities for black schoolchildren 
in Charleston, which then inspired him to lead student sit-ins when he was a senior in 
high school. “I had to act on my own conscience then about the system and had been 
sufficiently radicalized enough that I thought we ought to do something,” Gantt 
explained.  Along with other youth members of the NAACP a month away from 
graduation, Gantt organized a sit-in in 1960 at the S.H. Kress lunch counter in 
Charleston. The group chose their members carefully, recalls Gantt, “We started reading 
about Martin Luther King and non-violence and we were concerned that we got people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609 Harvey B. Gantt, Interviewed by Lynn Haessly. 6 January 1986, Interview C-0008, Southern Oral 
History Program Collection, SHC.  
610 Ibid.  
611 Ibid. 
228 
	  
who were not hot-headed because they would be a liability...We didn’t want any violence 
beyond what was necessary.”612  
As a National Merit Scholar, Gantt chose Iowa State University for college, 
imagining that the Midwest would offer more opportunities for a bright black student 
hoping to major in architecture. Not long after his arrival, however, Gantt became 
disappointed with both the lack of a black student presence on campus and the bitter Iowa 
winter, prompting him to eventually transfer back south. Gantt decided upon Clemson 
University because of its strong architecture program and in 1963, with assistance from 
the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund, he became the first black student admitted to the 
university.613 
 After graduation, Gantt moved to Charlotte, because, like many black migrants, 
he believed the city’s job opportunities were promising for young, well-educated black 
professionals and certainly more promising than his prospects in South Carolina. “I was 
graduating third in my class in architecture,” explained Gantt,” and usually the first three 
or four or five students are the ones that are gobbled up. It didn’t take me long to figure 
out I wasn’t getting the offers from South Carolina, I was getting them from North 
Carolina and…Atlanta.”614 Gantt described falling in love with the city upon his arrival 
thinking, “hey, here is a place that’s growing. [I] might be able to grow with it.”615 He 
left for a few years to pursue a master’s degree in city planning at the Massachusetts 
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Institute of Technology and then returned to Charlotte to open an architecture practice in 
the city.  
 Gantt entered local politics in 1974 when he was appointed to fill the seat of city 
councilmember Fred Alexander who had recently been elected to the North Carolina 
Senate. In the 1975 election, Gantt won the seat outright. Like Alexander, Gantt had faith 
in the conference approach to handling differences of opinion, whether personal or 
political. “I just always have this confidence that if I can get you to sit down and look you 
in the eye we can talk, we can get to know each other,” explained Gantt. Contrasting his 
political outlook with that of more militant black leaders, Gantt drew on his middle-class 
background to explain his belief that “the way to do things is not to destroy them but to 
negotiate power.”616  
 Gantt was reelected in 1977, but under very different local political 
circumstances. In that year, Charlotte city council elections shifted from at-large to 
district representation.617 Though Gantt won an at-large seat, district representation made 
it easier to elect black candidates and, according to many local observers, began to break 
the stranglehold the business elite had on city politics. According to Stephen Smith, 
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however, the referendum did not pose a significant challenge to elite agendas. In fact, 
Smith credits the referendum with facilitating further economic growth in the city, 
pointing to the fact that a bond initiative to fund airport expansion that failed in 1975, due 
to black political mobilization against the measure, passed in 1978 under the new district 
election system.618 Following the shift from the at-large system, Gantt would be reelected 
to city council in 1981, this time serving as mayor Pro Tem. 
 In 1983, Gantt was elected mayor, becoming the first black mayor in a large 
white-majority southern city.619 According to Black Enterprise magazine, Gantt won 
because he was able to build an electoral “coalition that included businessmen and 
grassroots organizers.”620 This description characterizes what scholars would later call 
the “biracial coalition around economic growth”—a term used to characterize political 
coalitions in a variety of Sunbelt cities.621 Gantt became one of a growing cadre of black 
mayors elected in the last third of the twentieth century.  In many ways, Gantt 
represented the “post-racial” trajectory of American politics that would become more 
common in the decades following his election. Much of the press coverage surrounding 
Gantt’s election emphasized that while he had been the first student to desegregate 
Clemson, he was decidedly different than black candidates who had emerged from efforts 
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to topple the Jim Crow regime. An article in Black Enterprise quoted Gantt as saying that 
“race was not an issue in the campaign.”622 Gantt’s colleagues and other local leaders 
agreed with this assessment. Ron Leeper, a black city councilmember in Charlotte in 
1986 described Gantt as “just has the kind of personality that has allowed him to 
transcend racial lines in a way that few of us do.”623 Robert Alston, president and chief 
executive officer of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Urban League said of Gantt: Whites don't 
seem to perceive Harvey as a ‘Black mayor.’ They see him as a mayor who happens to be 
Black. It’s as though because he’s articulate and successful, he’s somehow an exception 
to the rule.” 624 Gantt himself said just before winning mayor election: “There a lot of 
southernness in Charlotte, but I think there are more and more people who are getting 
beyond race. It’s an interesting place to live.”625 One journalist observed, “Gantt’s 
lexicon was that of an urban planner, not a civil rights activist.”626 
 Indeed, throughout much of his mayoral career, Gantt’s primary focus was on 
what had come to be called Smart Growth. Like other architects and planners during this 
period, Gantt had become increasingly worried about the costs of the city’s expansion 
and population growth. Instead of allowing the city to follow the path of Atlanta, with its 
sprawling suburbs and traffic congestion, Gantt hoped to refocus political and financial 
resources on Charlotte’s urban center. However, explains Matthew Lassiter, while Gantt 
made curbing certain types of development a priority during his administration, “his 
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unreliable allies at the Chamber of Commerce never really abandoned their belief in the 
inherent value of any new growth anywhere in the sprawling Metrolina region.”627 
 In February 1984, Gantt unveiled a proposal for a payroll tax on non-residents in 
an effort to more fairly distribute the cost of providing city services to a rapidly 
expanding metropolis facing cuts in federal funding to the city. According to Gantt, it 
was only reasonable to require all those who worked in the city to contribute their “fair 
share” since commuters, like Charlotte residents, used roads and other city amenities 
funded by paid for with tax dollars.628 “It’s easy for any local politician to say he supports 
lowering taxes, tightening the belt, and working with interest groups to fund needed 
projects without increasing the property tax,” asserted Gantt, but considering that federal 
support for Charlotte had dropped from 23% to 8% since 1980, and state funding was on 
similar decline, Gantt argued that such measures were necessary if the city was to 
maintain its AAA bond rating and current level of economic growth.629  
 The proposal drew immediate criticism from Charlotte’s business community and 
many private citizens who argued that the new tax would hurt Charlotte’s competitive 
advantage in attracting new companies. In the days following the proposal’s introduction, 
Gantt received a slew of letters, many of which resembled one another, suggesting a 
coordinated effort, likely on the part of the Chamber of Commerce. Some drew negative 
comparisons between the growing Sunbelt and declining northern cities such as Detroit 
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and Philadelphia. In a letter to Gantt, one employer argued that in Detroit, a city he had 
lived in before moving to Charlotte, high city taxes caused Detroiters to abandon the city 
for the suburbs.630 Ed Crutchfield, the president and CEO of First Union Bank asserted 
that “a local income tax would send a high profile signal that we have a mentality of 
preying on workers and their wages.”631 Still other critics argued that the tax would 
unfairly burden low income workers, who could barely afford their current tax rates, 
much less an increase.632  
 Some opponents of the tax proposal offered alternative suggestions. Hugh McColl 
of NCNB suggested shifting the tax burden to consumers through a consumption tax that 
he argued would “tax those with the highest incomes since they spend the most money 
and therefore pay the highest consumer taxes.” Moreover, asserted McCall, it would 
bring in additional money from visitors and tourists.633 Many Southern states had high 
sales taxes, but McColl overlooked the fact that they fell hardest on low and middle-
income taxpayers, who spent more of their disposable income on consumer goods than 
did the wealthy.  
 Other business leaders presented their own alternatives to the income tax. Margo 
Whitfield, the Vice President of a local temp agency employing over 900 people, urged 
the mayor to erect toll booths at the city limits and charge incoming and outgoing traffic 
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$.10 per car while cutting down on traffic and pollution.634 South Carolinians also joined 
in attacks. At a National League of Cities meeting in 1985, South Carolina 
Representative Herbert Kirsch told Gantt, “The idea that South Carolinians should also 
help underwrite the costs of Mecklenburg County…is an insult and affrontery to those of 
us who have worked long and hard to build strong working relationships between the two 
states.” In response, Gantt told the Charlotte Observer that Kirsch’s letter was “the most 
far-fetched thing I’ve heard.” Moreover, asserted Gantt, “I think its ridiculous to say that 
we don’t want to welcome our friends from South Carolina; we just want our friends to 
help us out.”635 Despite Gantt’s arguments for the benefits of the payroll tax, it failed due 
to substantial and continued opposition from the city’s business community as well as 
that of a committee appointed by Gantt to study the plan.636  
 On many other issues, however, Gantt’s political and economic agenda was 
consistent with the city’s business class. For example, Gantt aggressively pursued a 
professional sports team, winning an NBA franchise in 1987 and, in the process, gaining 
widespread approval from business and civic leaders, the city’s newspapers, and the 
50,000 fans that turned out for the Charlotte Hornets’ first basketball game. Gantt was 
instrumental in numerous other development projects and when it came to the city’s 
downtown, Gantt and the city’s banking leaders were often on the same page, working 
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together to transform the city’s urban center and, in turn, the political and economic 
trajectory of Charlotte. 
 This political alliance and, more broadly, Charlotte’s bi-racial coalition around 
economic growth unraveled when Gantt lost reelection to Republican Sue Myrick in 
1987. As Stephen Smith and other observers have argued, Gantt’s loss was due in large 
part to the changing demographics of the city—specifically, the massive influx of whites 
from Northern and Midwestern states to outlying areas of Charlotte that remained within 
city limits because of the city’s aggressive annexation laws.637 Despite this political 
transition, however, Charlotte continued its economic ascent in the years that followed, 
laying the groundwork for it to become the financial capital it is today. As historians 
become increasingly interested in understanding the emergence of neoliberalism, late 
capitalism and modern political economy, it becomes evident that Charlotte’s history in 
the late twentieth century still warrants further investigation.   
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EPILOGUE 
 
 In September 2012, Charlotte, North Carolina was chosen to host the Democratic 
National Convention. As was to be expected, a variety of speakers addressed the 
convention and, like its Republican counterpart, the convention served as an opportunity 
for speakers to rally the so-called base of the Democratic Party. First lady Michelle 
Obama, San Antonio mayor Julian Castro, former President Bill Clinton, and a host of 
Democratic Party celebrities and rising stars all made their case for President Obama’s 
reelection. Vice President Joe Biden told the audience of loyal Democrats, as he 
announced numerous times on the campaign trail, “Bin Laden is Dead, General Motors is 
alive.” United Auto Workers President Bob King also addressed the convention, saying, 
“The auto industry has added a quarter of a million jobs and is thriving once again. These 
are good middle class jobs –jobs making things for an economy built to last.” 
Importantly, however, King failed to mention that many of these jobs are at foreign-
owned plants throughout the American South such as Toyota and Volkswagen, which do 
not employ union labor.  
 In fact, as cameras panned across the diverse crowd of delegates and party 
members, organized labor beyond the United Auto Workers was one group not visibly 
present in large numbers. In fact, when the Democratic National Committee announced 
that it had chosen Charlotte as the site for the 2012 Convention, UNITE HERE, the 
nation’s largest hotel worker’s union, threatened a boycott due to the fact that none of the 
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city’s hotels are unionized. 638 There was such union dissatisfaction with the DNC’s 
decision that a number of unions and labor activists held an alternate conference at a 
nearby church. Rick Sloan, communications director for the International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, told the press, “Going to a right-to-work state and 
starting a convention on Labor Day for the Democrats? Wow. That’s quite the 
equation.”639  
 The DNC’s selection of Charlotte to host its convention highlights a number of 
political trends that have defined the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. First, 
it signifies what has arguably been the Democratic Party’s abandonment of organized 
labor and the American working-class. As Judith Stein and other scholars have argued, 
this was a process begun in the 1970s with profound effects on both domestic and foreign 
policy in the decades that followed.640 Equally significant is the fact that the DNC chose 
Charlotte—home to Bank of America and former home of Wachovia (now home to the 
East Coast Operations of Wells Fargo, which acquired Wachovia in 2008)—just four 
years after the largest global financial collapse since the Great Depression. Given the 
financial sector’s role in the 2008 crisis and its disproportionate impact on the working-
class and middle-class Americans, and especially public employees and their pensions, 
there are but so many ways to interpret the DNC’s convention site selection. While it is 
understandable that the Committee would choose a city in a battleground state to host the 
convention, the DNC’s message to organized labor was hardly mistakable: What is good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638 Melanie Mason, “Democrats and Labor Part Ways for Convention,” Los Angeles Times, 11 August 
2012. 
639 http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/48901.html, accessed 1 September 2013.  
640 Stein, Pivotal Decade.  
238 
	  
for business is good for the Democratic Party.  Finally, in the wake of former union 
stronghold such as Michigan becoming a right-to-work state and Wisconsin passing some 
of the nation’s most restrictive anti-union legislation, a fate unimaginable two decades 
ago, we see the anti-union trends that unfolded in Charlotte over the second half of the 
twentieth century becoming common on the national political scene.  
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